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FEDERAL AND STATE WATER




Watercourses and groundwater aquifers in Missouri serve as the
only sources of water for drinking, livestock watering, industrial process
and cooling water, and irrigation. Watercourses are the sole source of
water for wildlife habitat, recreation and navigation. In Missouri, 66%
of the population is served by watercourses and 34% by groundwater.'
By coincidence, 66% of total water withdrawals are made from surface
watercourses, while 34% are made from groundwater.2 Groundwater
is the source of 74% of all rural domestic (self-supplied) water, 75% of
all irrigation water, 22% of public water supplies, and 39% of all
industrial (self-supplied) water.3
As in all states, surface and ground waters in Missouri have been
subjected to extensive waste discharges as a result of man's activities.
The discharge sources are widely varied in location, type, and size.
They include municipal and industrial wastes from point sources, urban
* Isador Loeb Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia; B.A. 1959,
Haverford; LL.B. 1963, S.J.D. 1972, University of Wisconsin.
Most of this article is comprised of two prior limited circulation works by
the author, Section 3, in TASK FORCE ON MISSOURI GROUNDWATER ISSUES,
MIssouRs GROUNDWATER: PROTECTING A THREATENED RESOURCE (J. O'Connor,
ed. (1987)) (Coalition for the Env't Found., unpublished); and ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW IN MISSOURI: MISSOURI'S CLEAN WATER LAW (1988) (mimeo, University of
Missouri-Columbia CLE). All of the research in this article, including the
unpublished research, will appear in a water pollution regulation and law book
the author has under contract. Butterworths Legal Publishers expects to
publish the book in 1991 or 1992.
1. Of Missouri's 4,929,000 population, 3,253,000 are served from surface
watercourses and 1,676,000 are served from groundwater. TASK FORCE ON
MISSOURI GROUNDWATER ISSUES, MISSOURI'S GROUNDWATER: PROTECTING A
THREATENED RESOURCE 1-6 (1987) (Coalition for the Env't Found., unpublished)
(citing U.S. Geological Surv. (1985)) [hereinafter TASK FORCE].
2. In 1980, of 1,382,000,000 gallons per day withdrawn, withdrawals from
surface watercourses (excluding hydroelectric withdrawals) totaled 912,000,000
gallons per day and groundwater withdrawals totaled 470,000,000 gallons per
day. TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 1-6.
3. Id. at 1-6 to 1-7.
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and agricultural runoff after rains, leaching into groundwater from
landfills, underground storage tanks, and agricultural operations,
drainage from mines, and erosion from construction and farming. In
1976, there were 3571 point source discharges into Missouri watercours-
es.
4
In Missouri in 1988, about 52% of the state's 19,630 miles of
watercourses meet applicable water quality standards.5 The principal
pollutants are deposited sediment primarily from agriculture (8,299
miles), chlordane pesticide (833 miles), habitat alteration (180 miles),
acid drainage from abandoned coal mines (88 miles), lead mine tailing
deposits (24 miles), and reservoir releases (including low dissolved
oxygen, dissolved manganese, and rapid temperature changes) (10
miles).6 Of the 9,445 miles of nonattainment watercourses, over 99%
(9,377 miles) are contaminated from nonpoint sources.' Groundwater
quality in Missouri varies from very good south of the Missouri River in
the Ozark karst area and the Bootheel to salinity levels rendering it
unpotable in the northwest third of the state.
8
The waste discharges from most of those sources are regulated and
are subject to common law remedies. This article discusses that law in
two parts. The first part examines the federal and Missouri waste
discharge regulatory system. The second part analyzes common law
rights and remedies related to water pollution.
PART I
FEDERAL AND MISSOURI STATUTES
REGULATING WATER QUALITY
Until recent years, federal attention into water quality has been
directed towards surface watercourses. Currently, regulation of surface
water quality is conducted under the Clean Water Act.9 But the
4. Mo. DEP'T OF NAT. RESOURCES, WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT BASIN
PLAN (1976), which are mapped in Mo. DEP'T OF NAT. RESOURCES, MISSOURI
WATER ATLAS 48-51 (1982).
5. Mo. DEPVT OF NAT. RESOURCES, MISSOURI WATER QUALiTY REPORT 1
(1988). This report contains a series of maps delineating the nonattainment
waters. Id. at 8-38.
6. I& at 3.
7. Id
8. Mo. DEPT OF NAT. RESOURCES, MISSOURI WATER ATLAS 52 (1982)
(groundwater quality map); Mo. DEPT OF NAT. RESOURCES, MISSOURI WATER
QUALITY REPORT 3, 39 (1988). Seventeen known groundwater contamination
sites are listed id. at 43-47.
9. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387. For descriptions of the provisions of the Clean
Water Act, see generally J. ARBUCKLE, G. FRICK, R. HALL, M. MILLER, T.
412 [Vol. 55
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quality of groundwater is getting increasing attention at the federal
level. The quality of public drinking water supplies is the subject of the
Safe Drinking Water Act.'0 Contamination of groundwater by leachate
from licensed hazardous waste disposal facilities and solid waste
disposal facilities is the subject of the Solid Waste Disposal Act of
1976.11 Cleanup of abandoned hazardous waste disposal sites under
the Superfund Act 12 will eliminate sources of groundwater contamina-
tion. Groundwater contamination by acid mine waste leachate is
regulated by the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act.'3 There
is, however, no comprehensive federal regulation of groundwater quality.
Similarly, Missouri law focuses on regulating water quality in
surface watercourses. That regulation is conducted under the Clean
Water Law.'4 Although that law also applies to pollution of groundwa-
ter,'5 no regulatory program has been established because Missouri
prohibits injection of wastes into -groundwater.' 6  Under federal
impetus, Missouri is beginning to direct its attention to regulating
groundwater quality more comprehensively. Although Missouri
currently does not regulate underground sources of drinking water, it
does regulate underground storage tanks,17 and leachate from hazard-
SULLIVAN & T. VANDERVER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK ch. 3 (10th ed.
1989) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK]; R. Beck & C. Goplerud,
Water Pollution and Water Quality: Legal Controls, comprising 3 WATER &
WATER RIGHTS (R. Clark, ed. 1988 & Supp. 1989); 1 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON
ENVIRONmENTAL LAW ch. 3 (1973-90); 1 J. DAVIDSON & 0. DELOGu, FEDERAL
ENvioNmENTAL REGULATION ch. 2 (1989); S. NOVICK, D. STEVER & M. MELLON,
LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ch. 12 (eds. 1987); 2 W. RODGERS,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1988); 2 D. STEVER, LAW OF
CHEMIcAL REGULATION & HAZARDOUS WASTE § 7.03(2) (1989).
This article will not discuss the wetlands dredge and fill regulatory
program administered by the Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army, under Clean Water
Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344. On the wetlands program, see generally, W. WANT,
LAW OF WETLANDS REGULATION (1989).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992.
12. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
13. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328.
14. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 644.006-.141 (1986 & Supp. 1989).
15. Mo. REv. STAT. § 644.016(15) (1986).
16. Id. § 260.424 (hazardous waste injection prohibition); Id § 577.155
(injection well prohibition). The power to grant injection well permits under the
Clean Water Law has never been exercised. Statement by Jerry Vineyard,
Director, Missouri Geological Surv., to Groundwater Protection Task Force,
Jefferson City, 1987.
17. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 319.100-.137 (1986 & Supp. 1989).
1990]
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ous waste disposal facilities under the Hazardous Waste Management
Law.' 8 The Missouri Superfund Law assists cleanup of abandoned
hazardous waste disposal sites. 9 Acid and other mine leachate from
surface coal mines is regulated under the Surface Coal Mining Law,2'
from barite mines under the Strip Mine Law,21 and from clay, lime-
stone, gravel and sand pits and quarries under the Land Reclamation
Act.2 The water quality aspects of all of these federal and Missouri
statutes are discussed in this article.
The federal Clean Water Act provides the basis for both federal and
state regulation of waste discharges into surface watercourses today.
Under the concept of "creative federalism" embodied in the Act,
Congress and the Environmental Protection Agency determine the basis
policies of regulation; the states are given the opportunity to incorporate
those policies in their own regulatory programs and to assume day-to-
day implementation. If any state chooses not to adopt a state regulatory
program conforming to that pattern, EPA will operate the federal waste
discharge permit program in parallel with the state program. The effect
of that arrangement imposed by the Act is a basic uniformity of
regulatory policy throughout the United States.
Missouri's regulatory program for waste discharges into surface
watercourses was approved by the Environmental Protection Agency in
1974.' Since Missouri regulates waste discharges into surface
watercourses under federal oversight, the federal Clean Water Act and
the Missouri Clean Water Law will be discussed simultaneously.
A. Regulation of Waste Discharges
from Point Sources
The federal government has gradually increased its regulation of
waste discharges into surface watercourses since World War II. In
1948, it began a grant-in-aid program for construction of municipal
waste treatment plants,' and enlarged it during the 1950s. Under the
Water Quality Act of 1965, the federal government first required
imposition of water quality standards on interstate streams.2 The
first comprehensive regulation of waste discharges into surface
18. Id. §§ 260.350-.434.
19. Id. §§ 260.435-.552.
20. Id. § 444.800-.970.
21. Id. §§ 444.500-.775.
22. Id. §§ 444.760-.786.
23. 52 Fed. Reg. 27,578 (1987).
24. Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-845, § 5, 62 Stat.
1155, 1158.
25. Pub. L. No. 89-234, § 5, 79 Stat. 903, 908 (1965).
[Vol. 55
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watercourses was a massive regulation in 1971 2 under the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899.' Following judicial impairment of that regula-
tion by requiring preparation of Environmental Impact Statements
under the National Environmental Policy Act9s for each discharge
permit application,' Congress enacted the first federal comprehensive
statute in 1972.30 That was the original version of the present federal
Clean Water Act.31 A major amendment in 1977 gave the federal act
its name and current format.
3 2
Missouri established its Water Pollution Board in 1957 and
empowered it .to require "necessary, reasonable treatment of sew-
age... [and] other wastes."33 Regulation was based on ambient
quality standards of receiving waters, not on discharge standards as is
done today. The water quality standards were to reflect the "public
interest in water supply, the conservation of fish, game and aquatic life,
and agricultural, industrial and recreational uses."34 The 1957 statute
established a permit system for new and modified dischargesY
The 1957 act apparently complied with the requirements of the
federal Water Quality Act of 1965, requiring states to establish water
quality standards for interstate waters,'6 since the Missouri Legisla-
ture did not amend it at that time. Most states, including Missouri,
established water quality standards for intrastate streams as well.
When Congress enacted comprehensive regulation of waste
discharges in 1972, Missouri, like many states, was required to
massively amend their water pollution regulatory programs. Congress
made two major changes in regulatory policy in the 1972 act. First, it
established a federal waste discharge permit system which would
operate in those states which failed to establish a federally approved
state permit system. Second, it abandoned as unworkable the use of
water quality standards as the basis for regulation and substituted
technology-based waste discharge treatment standards.37 In order for
26. Exec. Order No. 11,547, 35 Fed. Reg. 19,627 (1970). The permit
regulations were published at 36 Fed. Reg. 6564 (1971).
27. § 13, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982).
28. § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982).
29. Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1, 14-15 (D.D.C. 1971).
30. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-500, 86 Stat. 816.
31. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) [hereinafter CWA].
32. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977).
33. 1957 Mo. Laws 659.
34. 1957 Mo. Laws 659, § 8(9).
35. Id. § 3(2).
36. Pub. L. No. 89-234, § 5(a), 79 Stat. 903, 907-909 (1965).
37. R. Zener, The Federal Law of Water Pollution Control, in FEDERAL
19901
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states to avoid imposition of a federal permit program in addition to
their own, they would have to alter their own programs to meet the
policies and minimum standards of the federal program. Congress
tightened and refined the technology-based standards and extended time
limits for compliance in the 1977 amendments. The Clean Water Act
is administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
The Missouri Legislature responded three times in 1972 and 1973
to bring its regulatory program into compliance with the federal
requirements." Together they are known as the Missouri Clean Water
Law.' In May of 1974, the Missouri waste discharge permit program
was approved by the Environmental Protection Agency.40 Since that
time, waste dischargers in Missouri have needed to obtain only a state
permit. The changed standards imposed by the 1977 federal act did not
require amendment of the Missouri act, but did require amendment of
the regulations. The Missouri Clean Water Law is administered by the
Department of Natural Resources (DNR).
1. Jurisdictional Waters
a. Surface Watercourses
The federal Clean Water Act extends to "navigable waters.",4' By
reference to the legislative history, the courts have held that the Act
extends to all "the waters of the United States," not merely to the
commercially navigable waters traditional to federal civil works
jurisdiction.4"
ENvIRONMENTAL LAw 682, 719 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974).
38. 1972 Mo. Laws 819; 1973-74 Mo. Laws 324; 1973-74 Mo. Laws 336.
39. Mo. REv. STAT. § 644.006 (1986). For a description of the law, see
generally T. LAUER, P. DAvIS & J. CUNNINGHAM, IMsSOURI STATE LAWS-WATER
& RELATED LAND RESOURCES 57-68 (3d ed. 1977) (Mo. Clean Water Comm'n).
40. See supra note 23.
41. "Navigable waters" are defined as "the waters of the United States,
including the territorial seas." CWA § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
42. United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1323 (6th
Cir. 1974) (quoting 118 CONG. REc. 33,756-57 (1972) (statement of Rep.
Dingell)).
Federal jurisdiction for regulation of obstructions to navigation, and for
enforcement of the anti-pollution provisions of the Rivers & Harbors Act of 1899,
§8 13, 17, 33 U.S.C. §8 407,411, is limited to commercially "navigable waters of
the United States." See infra text accompanying note 268.
[Vol. 55
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The language of the Clean Water Act does not mention groundwa-
ter.43 The case precedent is conflicting. Most courts have held that
discharges into groundwater are not subject to the Act when EPA has
sought to extend its jurisdiction to groundwater.' The current
jurisdictional regulations reflect that interpretation.4 5 It is not clear
whether the Act's jurisdiction can be interpreted broadly to reflect the
hydrologic cycle; one court has ruled that groundwater is not subject to
the Act even when contaminated groundwater eventually percolates to
and contaminates a surface watercourse, 6 while another has ruled to
the contrary.
47
By contrast, Missouri's Clean Water Law expressly extends to
"subsurface water."'  Missouri has not needed to establish a permit
program for waste discharges into groundwater since it expressly
prohibits injection of wastes into groundwater in two statutes.49
2. Waste Discharges by Point Sources
The purpose of the Clean Water Act is to restore the natural
chemical, physical and biological integrity of the nation's surface
watercourses, 5° and eventually to eliminate all waste discharges into
them.5 '
43. See CWA § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
44. Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 1980); United States v.
GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1379 (S.D. Tex. 1975). Contra United States Steel
Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977).
45. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1989).
46. Kelley ex rel. Michigan v. United States, 618 F. Supp. 1103 (W.D. Mich.
1985).
47. New York v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 374 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
48. Mo. REV. STAT. § 644.016(15) (1986).
49. Mo. REV. STAT. § 260.424 (1986) (hazardous waste injection); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 577.155 (1986) (waste disposal wells).
50. CWA § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
51. CWA § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
1990]
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a. Point Sources
The Clean Water Act extends regulation to discharges of "pollut-
ants 5 2 from "point sources."3 Point sources do not include agricul-
tural stormwater discharges and irrigation return flows.'
Originally, because of the difficulty in devising a technology for
regulating them, nonpoint discharges were not regulated. But in 1987,
the scope of regulation was expanded. First, to deal with hazardous
waste disposal problems, the definition of "point source" was expanded
to include discharges from landfill leachate collection systems.
55
Second, regulation was imposed on stormwater drainage outfalls.
Third, states were required to develop regulatory systems for dealing
with nonpoint sources of pollution.
57
The -Missouri regulatory system has been limited administratively
to point source discharges58 into surface watercourses. The Clean
Water Law's language encompasses regulation of any direct or indirect
entry of a water contaminant "by surface runoff, by sewer, by subsurface
seepage, or otherwise."59  That statutory language arguably goes
52. "Pollutant" is defined by the CWA § 502(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). The
definition excludes (1) sewage from vessels and (2) water, gas, or other materials
injected into an oil or gas well for secondary recovery operations or derived as
part of oil and gas recovery and disposed of in a state-licensed injection well.
53. CWA § 402(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a). A "point source" is a waste
discharge from a discrete source, such as a pipe or channel. CWA § 502(14), 33
U.S.C. § 1362(14); Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41 (5th Cir.
1980). There must be an addition of a pollutant from an external source.
Hence, discharges from dams are not point sources. This is true whether the
dam discharge is water with a low oxygen content, National Wildlife Fed'n v.
Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Missouri ex reL Ashcroft v. Corps of
Eng'rs, 672 F.2d 1297, 1303-04 (8th Cir. 1982); or water containing pollutants
originating in the reservoir above the dam, National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consum-
ers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 581-84 (6th Cir. 1988) (turbines ground up fish
entrained in the reservoir).
54. CWA § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
55. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 507, 101 Stat. 7, 78.
56. See infra notes 260-67 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 252-59 and accompanying text.
58. See Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 20-6.010 (1989). A "point source" is
defined by Mo. REv. STAT. § 644.016(6) (1986).
59. Mo. REV. STAT. § 644.016(12) (1986) (definition of "water contaminant").
See also id § 644.016(1) (definition of "discharge"), 644.051-1(1) (unlawful to
cause pollution by placing a "water contaminant" in a location where "it is
reasonably certain to cause pollution"), 644.051-1(2) (unlawful to "discharge any
water contaminants"), 644.051-2 (unlawful to "maintain any water contaminant
or point source without a permit").
[Vol. 55
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beyond point sources to encompass regulation of stormwater drainage
and nonpoint sources.
Water contaminants need not be directly discharged into a
watercourse in order to be subject to the Clean Water Law. Discharge
into a septic tank whose effluent reached a watercourse by way of a dry
ditch has been held subject to regulation.60 Similarly, discharge of
treated subdivision effluent into a pond which overflowed into a creek
by way of an intermittent creek was held subject to regulation. 61 But
a water contaminant does require the addition of a pollutant from an
external source, not the removal of oxygen from the water; hence, a
dam's release of low oxygen water was held not to be a "discharge."
6 2
b. Permit System
Permits are required under the federal Clean Water Act for waste
discharges from "point sources."'  They are issued subject to condi-
tions. New discharges must comply' with the national performance
standards for discharges established by EPA5 and with individualized
effluent limitations based on available waste treatment technology. The
permits have a five year term.m Federal facilities are subject to the
permitting requirements of the Act, 6 7as are state facilities. 6 Regula-
tions have been established for the National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit system.69 Those regulations have
been upheld in most respects. °
60. Hammack v. Missouri Clean Water Comm'n, 659 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983).
61. Scheble v. Missouri Clean Water Comm'n, 734 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987).
62. State ex reL Ashcroft v. Union Elec. Co., 559 S.W.2d 216 (Mo. Ct. App.
1977); see supra note 53.
63. CWA § 401(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a).
Permits are not required for irrigation return flows or stormwater runoff
from oil, gas, and mining operations (unless contaminated by tailings or waste
products located on the site). CWA § 402(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(1).
64. CWA § 402(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(A).
65. CWA § 306, 33 U.S.C. § 1316.
66. CWA § 402(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(B).
67. CWA § 313(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a).
68. CWA §§ 301(a), 502(5), 33 U.S.C. §8 1311(a), 1362(5) (prohibition of
discharges by "persons" without a permit; definition of "person").
69. See 40 C.F.R. § 122 (1989).
70. Natural Resource Defense Council v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
The court rejected regulations requiring compliance with permit conditions
unrelated to effluent limits because they were ultra vires, and rejected
disallowance of the upset defense (violation beyond the control of the permitee).
1990]
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In order for states to obtain federal approval, their permits must be
made subject to those same federal performance standards and
limitations. 1 Regulations for federal approval of state permit pro-
grams have been established. 2
Missouri requires permits for water contaminant sources, which
include "point sources."1 3  State facilities and municipalities are not
exempt from the permitting requirements. 74 Similarly, federal facili-
ties are subject to the state act's permit requirements. 5
The Missouri Clean Water Law establishes a permit program for
point sources. In Missouri, application for waste discharge permits
must be made at least thirty days before beginning construction or
installation of the discharge facility or establishing the discharge.
7
The application must include submission of plans and specifications of
the proposed facility.' Before issuing the permit, DNR must hold a
public hearing. 9 The permit will be granted or denied within sixty
days after all federal Clean Water Act permit issuance requirements
have been met.' State permits are subject to the provisions of the
federal Clean Water Act and any effluent limitations, water quality
related effluent limitations, national performance standards, toxic and
pretreatment standards, or water quality standards applied to the waste
Id at 169-70, 205-10.
71. CWA § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
72. See 40 C.F.R. § 131 (1989).
73. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 644.016(13) (definition of "water contaminant
source"), 644.051-2 (1986) (requirement for a permit).
Point sources subject to permit in 1976 are mapped in Mo. DEP'T OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, MISSOURI WATER ATLAS 48-51 (1982).
74. Op. Mo. Att'y Gen. No. 37 (Hardwicke, Oct. 17, 1958, Nov. 7, 1958).
The Clean Water Laws language clearly indicates that state facilities are not
exempt. Mo. REv. STAT. § 644.051-1 (1986) provides that "persons" cannot
engage in the prohibited polluting activities without a permit. Section
644.016(5) defimes "person" as including "political subdivisions" and "any agency,
board, department, or bureau of the state or federal government."
75. CWA § 313(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a); Op. Mo. Att'y Gen. No. 53 (Lafser,
Jan. 26, 1979). That section is a 1977 amendment reacting to EPA v. California
ex reL State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200 (1976), which held that
Congress must specifically direct that federal facilities be subject to state
permitting requirements.
See supra note 74 on the definitional language of the Clean Water Law
which confers regulatory jurisdiction over federal facilities.
76. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 644.026(13), 644.051(2) (1986 & Supp. 1989).
77. Mo. REv. STAT. § 644.051(3) (1986).
78. Mo. REV. STAT. § 644.026(12) (Supp. 1989).
79. Mo. REv. STAT. § 644.051(4) (1986).
80. I& § 644.051(5).
[Vol. 55
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discharge.8 ' State permits must contain a compliance timetable if the
discharge will initially violate them. 2  Missouri permits have a
maximum term of five years.' Renewal applications must be filed 180
days prior to expiration of the existing permit; compliance with the
existing permit and with all effluent standards and limitations, water
quality standards, and other federal and state statutory and regulatory
requirements is a condition precedent to the granting of a renewal.'
Permit regulations have been established.85
Missouri prohibits the discharge of radiological, chemical, and
biological warfare agents and high-level radioactive wastes.8
c. Effluent Limitations
The Clean Water Act established a two-tier set of effluent limitation
standards. 7 The first tier standard was designed to avoid public
health hazards in receiving waters and required use of off-the-shelf
technology. That standard, "best practical control technology currently
available" (BPCT), was to be achieved by mid-1977.8
The second tier standard is designed to achieve swimmable water.
Conventional industrial discharges must utilize "best conventional
control technology" (BCCT) within 3 years after the effluent limitation
is established, but not later than 1989.' Nonconventional industrial
discharges must use "best available control technology economically
achievable" (BACT)" within 3 years after the effluent limitation is
established, but not later than early 1989.91 Toxic discharges must use
such technology within three years after EPA sets discharge standards
for specific toxic substances. 92 Municipal treatment plants must apply
81. Id § 644.051(4). A state permit is to be denied if it violates those
standards. Id. Permits are issued under authority of section 644.026(13) (Supp.
1989).
82. Mo. REV. STAT. § 644.051(4) (1986).
83. Id § 644.051(9).
84. Mo. REV. STAT. § 644.051(10) (1986).
85. MO. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 20-6.010 (1989).
86. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 644.026(17), 644.051(1)(4) (1986).
87. For regulations on criteria and standards, see 40 C.F.R. §§ 125, 401
(1989).
88. CWA § 301(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A).
89. CWA § 301(b)(2)(E), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(E).
90. CWA § 302(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A).
91. CWA § 301(b)(2)(F), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(F).
92. CWA §§ 301(b)(2)(C), (D), 307(a), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(2)(C), (D), 1317(a).
For the regulations, see 40 C.F.R. § 129 (1989).
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at least secondary treatment.9" The individualized effluent limitations
can be made more stringent as required to comply with the water
quality standards established for the receiving waters.' Renewal
permits cannot contain effluent limitations less stringent than those in
the existing permit.95 Also, states are authorized to establish and
impose more stringent effluent limitations.96
The first tier "best practical control technology" standard was
designed to avoid public health hazards. BPCT applied to all industrial
discharges, required use of off-the-shelf treatment technology and took
economic effects into account. This standard for effluent limitations
continues to apply to permitted discharges until the second tier
standards come into force. The factors EPA was to consider in
establishing that standard for classes and categories of industrial
sources included (a) the total cost of applying the treatment technology
in relation to the effluent reduction benefits, and (b) process changes.
Additional factors common to all of the standards included: (1) the age
of equipment and facilities involved; (2) the process employed; (3) the
engineering aspects of various types of control technologies; (4) non-
water quality environmental impacts; (5) energy requirements; and (6)
other factors considered appropriate.97
The second tier "best available control technology" and "best
conventional control technology" standards are designed to produce
swimmable receiving waters. BACT applies to nonconventional
industrial discharges and requires use of state-of-the-art technology
with little regard for the economic effect on individual plants." The
factors EPA is to consider in establishing this standard for classes and
categories of point sources include the cost of achieving the effluent
reduction, as well as the common factors listed under BPCT.'
By contrast, the BCCT standard, applying to conventional industri-
al discharges, does allow for greater recognition of economic effects on
individual plants. The factors EPA is to consider in establishing this
standard for classes and categories of point sources include: (a) the
93. CWA §§ 301(b)(1)(B), 304(d)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(B), 1314(d)(1).
For secondary treatment regulations, see 40 C.F.R. § 133 (1989).
94. CWA § 302(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a). The water quality standards are set
by the states, subject to EPA approval, under CWA § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313.
EPA has discretion to accept or reject proffered state standards. Mississippi
Comm'n on Natural Resources v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1980).
95. OWA § 402(o)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(o)(1). There are certain exceptions.
CWA § 402(o)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(o)(2).
96. CWA § 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C).
97. CWA § 304(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B).
98. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
99. CWA § 304(b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B).
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reasonableness of the relationship between the costs of attaining a
reduction in effluents and the effluent reduction benefits derived; (b) a
comparison of the cost and level of reduction of various pollutants in the
discharge from municipal treatment plants to the cost and level of
reduction of the same pollutants from the class or category of industrial
sources; and (c) process changes, as well as the common factors listed for
BPCT.' ° Since those factors include some recognition of cost-benefit
analysis, unlike the BAT standard imposed under the original 1972
Act,"0 EPA has interpreted BCCT as allowing a comparison of the
marginal cost of industrial treatment beyond BPCT with the marginal
cost of tertiary treatment beyond the secondary treatment level required




Waste discharge permits issued by Missouri under the Clean Water
Law are subject to federal effluent limitations and water quality related
effluent limitations."° 3 This means that Missouri permits will require
achievement of BACT and BCCT no later than early 1989. Further-
more, the Missouri Clean Water Law requires the Clean Water
Commission to adopt "reasonable" effluent control regulations as
required by the federal Clean Water Act.( 4 State effluent regulations
have been established by regulation.'
0 5
d. Standards of Waste Treatment Performance
The Clean Water Act requires EPA to establish national standards
of performance for twenty-seven categories of industries determined by
the Act and other categories established by regulation.1°3 A "standard
of performance" will be required which EPA determines is achievable
"through application of the best available demonstrated control
technology, processes, operating methods, or other alternatives.
10 7
EPA uses technology-based performance standards, 108 which generally
100. CWA § 304(b)(4)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B).
101. See R. Zener, supra note 37, at 699-700.
102. That interpretation was upheld in American Paper Inst. v. EPA, 660
F.2d 954, 962-63 (4th Cir. 1981).
103. Mo. REv. STAT. § 644.051(4) (1986). A state permit is to be denied if
it violates those standards. Id.
104. Id. § 644.041.
105. See Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 20-7.015 (1989).
106. CWA § 306(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1). The statutory categories
include the most obvious major sources of industrial waste discharges. See CWA
§ 306(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(A).
107. CWA § 306(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1).
108. Use of technology-based performance standards was approved in
American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 453-54 (7th Cir. 1975).
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are uniform within each category for both existing and new sources. 109
New sources must comply with those standards,1 but cannot be
required to comply with more stringent standards for ten years after
completion of the source. 1 ' National performance standards have
been established by regulation for fifty industries." 2  Municipal
sewage treatment are to employ secondary treatment technology.113
Waste discharge permits issued by Missouri under the Clean Water Law
are subject to national performance standards.11 4
e. Toxic and Pretreatment Standards
A total of 879 industrial and municipal sources in the United
States, including eighty-eight bleached kraft paper mills, have been
identified as contributing significantly to toxic pollution of surface
watercourses. The metal finishing, pulp and paper, and natural gas
industries account for 45% of the 627 industrial sources. Of the 879
industrial and municipal sources, 240 are municipal sewage plants,
mostly receiving industrial effluents, and twelve are federal facili-
ties. 1
5
The Clean Water Act requires EPA to establish treatment stan-
dards for treating designated toxic pollutants."8  The initial list of
toxic pollutants originated in a Congressional report"7  and was
adopted by statute in 1977.118 The list has been adopted and expand-
ed by regulation." 9 The toxic treatment standards must apply the
'best available technology economically achievable,""2 and provide an
109. Such uniformity was upheld in E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,
430 U.S. 112, 120-21 (1977).
110. CWA § 306(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(e).
111. CWA § 306(d), 33 U.S:C. § 1316(d).
112. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 405-471 (1989). For a list of the industries subject to
national performance standards, see infra Appendix.
113. See supra note 93.
114. Mo. REv. STAT. § 644.051(4) (1986). A state permit is to be denied if
it violates those standards. Id See performance standards regulations at Mo.
CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 20-7.031 (1989), and sewage treatment works requirements
regulations at Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 20-8.020 (1989).
115. 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 433 (June 16, 1989).
116. CWA § 307(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2).
117. HOUSE Comm. ON PUBLIC WoRKs & TRANSP., DATA RELATING TO H.R.
3199 (Clean Water Act of 1977), Table 1 (Comm. Print No. 95-30, 1977).
118. CWA § 307(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(1).
119. See 40 C.F.R. § 116 (1989).
120. Taking into account toxicity, persistence, degradability, usual or
potential presence and importance of affected organisms in receiving waters, and
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ample margin of safety.'2 1 Toxic treatment standards must be com-
plied with one to three years after promulgation by EPA.' 22 Effluent
standards for toxic materials have been established by regulation."
Compliance must be achieved by June 13, 1992.'2A
The Clean Water Act also requires EPA to establish pretreatment
standards for pollutants introduced into publicly owned treatment
facilities either if those facilities do not adequately treat those pollut-
ants or if their operation would be interfered with by them. Those
pollutants must be treated prior to introduction into the public
treatment facilities. 12 States may adopt pretreatment standards not
in conflict with the federal standards. 12 New sources are subject to
these pretreatment standards. 1' Pretreatment standards have been
established by regulation.
128
Waste discharge permits issued by Missouri under the Clean Water
Law are subject to federal toxic and pretreatment standards. 129
Furthermore, the Clean Water Law requires the Clean Water Commis-
sion to adopt "reasonable" pretreatment and toxic material control
regulations as required by the federal Clean Water Act.'
3 0
f. Water Quality Standards
The first federal involvement in water pollution regulation was a
requirement that states establish water quality standards for interstate
waters.' While water quality standards were abandoned as the
primary basis for regulation in 1972, they provide benchmarks against
which to measure the sufficiency and effectiveness of the other federal
extent of effective regulation under other programs. Id, as defined by OWA
§3 301(b)(2)(A), 304(b)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A), 1314(b)(2).
121. CWA § 307(a)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(4).
122. CWA § 307(a)(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(6).
123. See 40 C.F.R. § 129 (1989).
124. 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 433 (June 16, 1989).
125. CWA § 307(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(1).
126. CWA § 307(b)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(4).
127. CWA § 307(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(c).
128. See 40 C.F.R. § 403 (1989).
129. Mo. REv. STAT. § 644.051(4) (1986). A state permit is to be denied if
it violates those standards. Id Regulations are issued under Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 644.026(16) (Supp. 1989).
130. Mo. REV. STAT. § 644.041 (1986). The pretreatment regulations are at
Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 20-6.100 (1989).
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standards. 13 2 Hence, states are still required to establish, maintain
and review water quality standards under the Clean Water Act." In
establishing those water quality standards, the states determine both
the water uses appropriate for each segment of each watercourse and
the physical, chemical and biological characteristics appropriate for each
category of water use. 34 The standard for appropriateness is protec-
tion of the public health or welfare, enhancing water quality, and
promoting the purposes of the Act," taking into consideration the use
and value of watercourses for public water supplies, fish and wildlife
propagation, recreational purposes, and agricultural, industrial and
other purposes, and their use and value for navigation." Water
quality standards must be reviewed every three years and modified
when appropriate.
137
Whenever discharges from point sources under established effluent
limitations interfere with attainment of the water quality standards for
a particular segment of a watercourse, the effluent limitations for those
discharges must be made more stringent so that the water quality
standards can be attained or maintained." The severity of those
water quality related effluent limitations can be modified if the
discharger demonstrates that there is no reasonable relationship
between the economic and social costs and the benefits to be ob-
tained." 9  Nonetheless, the effluent limitations must represent the
maximum degree of control within the economic capability of the
discharger and will result in reasonable progress beyond the effluent
limitations established under section 301.140
States are required to identify those receiving waters where effluent
limitations are insufficient to achieve the applicable water quality
standards.' When revisions to effluent limitations are considered,
their cumulative pollution load must assure attainment of the water
quality standards. 42 If water quality standards are being achieved,
132. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971); R Beck & C. Goplerud,
supra note 9, at 57; 1 F. GRAD, supra note 9, at § 3.03(1)(a, a-i).
133. CWA §§ 303(a), (c), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(a), (c).
134. 1 F. GRAD, supra note 9, at § 3.03(4)(j). For regulations, see 40 C.F.R.
§ 131 (1989).
135. CWA § 303(c)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A).
136. Id
137. CWA § 303(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c).
138. CWA § 302(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a).
139. CWA § 302(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1312(b)(2)(A).
140. CWA § 302(b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1312(b)(2)(B). On § 302 effluent
limitations, see supra notes 87-105 and accompanying text.
141. CWA § 303(d)(1-3), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1-3).
142. CWA § 303(d)(4)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(A).
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revisions to effluent limitations must be consistent with an antide-
gradation policy.
143
Waste discharge permits issued by Missouri under the Clean Water
Law are subject to water quality standards.'4 Water quality stan-
dards have been established by regulation for all watercourses in
Missouri. 145  Streams are classified for various uses, including
irrigation, livestock and wildlife watering, warm-water aquatic habitat,
cold-water sport fishery, whole-body contact recreation, drinking water
supply, industrial process and cooling water, commercial fishery, and
boating and canoeing. 146  Missouri usually prohibits any discharges
into "losing streans '147 and into designated wild and scenic rivers.'
g. Difficulties With Use of
Water Quality Standards
Two difficulties arise with the use of water quality standards as
benchmarks for determining the success of the regulatory program and
as a basis for tightening effluent limitations. First, the standards
assume that the normal flows in the receiving waters will not be
reduced. That is a false assumption, however, because consumptive
diversions are occurring in many areas. Irrigation is by far the largest
diversion. When the normal flows are reduced, the watercourses are
less able to assimilate the same volume of treated effluent as before.
There is no legal basis for preventing such additional diversions, since
143. CWA § 303(d)(4)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B).
144. Mo. REV. STAT. § 644.051(4) (1986). A state permit is to be denied if
it violates those standards. Id
145. Water quality'standards are issued under Mo. REV. STAT. § 644.026(7)
(Supp. 1989). For the various water quality standards, see Mo. CODE BEGS. tit.
10, § 20-7.031 (1989). This regulation includes water quality parameters for
each use classification and a list of all stream segment classifications.
146. Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 20-7.031 (1989). Streams designated for
whole-body contact recreation, cold-water sport fishery, and drinking water
supply, and urban protected streams are mapped in Mo. DEP'T OF NAT.
REsouRcEs, MISSOURI WATER ATLAS 46-47 (1982).
147. Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 20-7.015(4)(A) (1989). A "losing stream" is
one where 30% or more of streamwater percolates into the groundwater supply.
Mo. CODE BEGS. tit. 10, §§ 20-7.015(l)(A)-3, 20-7.031(1)(1) (1989). This is
characteristic of some streams in the karst topography of the Ozarks.
148. Mo. CODE BEGS. tit. 10, § 20-7.015(5)(B)-(C) (1989).
Wild and scenic rivers in Missouri include portions of the Eleven Point River.
16 U.S.C. § 1274 (1988). Potential additions to the system include the entire
Gasconade River. 16 U.S.C. § 1276 (1988). The Ozark National Riverway
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there are no provisions in the Clean Water Act, in Missouri's Clean
Water Law, or in any other state water pollution statute for preventing
encroachment on the assumed normal flow. In many western states and
those few eastern states with diversion permit statutes, however, the
diversion regulatory agency has authority to designate a minimum
protected flow which cannot be diverted. The volumes of those protected
flows can take waste assimilation into account.149
The second difficulty is even more important. Recent research
indicates that nonpoint sources are the predominant sources (65% to
75%) of surface watercourse pollution today."5  These are largely
uncontrolled sources, made up of diffused material from erosion, animal,
bird, and insect feces, fertilizer and pesticide residues in runoff, oil
leaks, and the generalized debris of human and natural acitivities.
Until technological methods are developed to trap those materials and
the regulatory techniques to require their use are established, nonpoint
source pollution will continue to prevent the achievement of water
quality standards.
h. Thermal Discharges
In addition to quality degradation caused by the addition of
polluting materials, water quality can be degraded by the addition of
.heat. As the temperature of water increases, its biological activity
increases while its ability to dissolve oxygen decreases. Hence, heated
water in a watercourse is less able to assimilate residual wastes.
Common law cases indicate that thermal discharges present a prob-
lem.' 5
1
The Clean Water Act requires cooling of discharges whose heat
would adversely affect the environment. "Pollutant" is defined as
including heat.152 Hence, heat is subject to regulation under the
sections of the Act relating to permitting, 1' effluent limitations,6'4
national performance standards, 55 water quality standards,'" and
149. On this topic generally, see Davis, Protecting Waste Assimilation
Streamflows by the Law of Water Allocation, Nuisance and Public Trust, and by
Environmental Statutes, 28 NAT. RESOURCES. J. 357 (1988).
150. See infra notes 280-300 and accompanying text.
151. See Sandusky Portland Cement Co. v. Dixon Pure Ice Co., 221 F. 200
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 630 (1915).
152. CWA § 502(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).
153. CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
154. CWA § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311.
155. CWA § 306, 33 U.S.C. § 1316.
156. CWA § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313.
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water quality related effluent standards.' 57 The effluent limitation for
the thermal component of a discharge (taking its interaction with other
pollutants into account) must "assure the protection and propagation of
a balanced, indigenous population of shellfish, fish, and wildlife in and
on" the receiving waters." The "best technology available for mini-
mizing adverse environmental impact" is required for cooling water
intake structures.1 59  More stringent thermal effluent limitations
cannot be imposed for ten years after completion of cooling facilities.1"
The defimitions of "pollution" and "water contaminant" under the
Missouri Clean Water Law include a temperature component. 16 '
Hence, thermal discharges can be regulated under all aspects of the
Law, including permits, effluent limitations, and water quality
standards.
i. Variances
The federal Clean Water Act discourages the use of variances or
individualized consideration of waste discharge sources based on
economic considerations. If a particular source cannot afford to meet
the Act's treatment requirements, Congress prefers that source to go out
of business.6 2 Hence, there is absolutely no variance procedure for
the 1977 BPCT effluent limitations. Congress was willing, however, to
allow modification of the 1989 BCCT and BACT levels of effluent
limitations for economic reasons. Such modifications may be granted
upon a showing that: (1) the modification represents "the maximum use
of technology within the economic capability" of the operator of the
source; and (2) that it "will result in reasonable further progress toward
the elimination of the discharge.' 6
Another type of variance is available. The national performance
standards are based on common industrial technologies. If a particular
industrial source is using a technology "fundamentally different" from
the one on which the national performance standard is based, a variance
is available to take into account the different mix of pollutants which it
157. CWA § 302, 33 U.S.C. § 1312.
158. CWA § 316(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(a). More stringent thermal effluent
limitations can be relaxed to that standard. Id
159. CWA § 316(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b).
160. CWA § 316(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(c).
161. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 644.016(7), (12) (1986).
162. EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980).
163. CWA § 301(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c).
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produces." This variance amounts to an individually tailored efflu-
ent limitation.
1 5
Variances are not available for water quality standards applied to
receiving waters. To allow such variances would be inconsistent with
the prohibition against variances to BPCT effluent limitations.'
The Missouri Clean Water Commission is authorized to grant
variances which do not violate the requirements of the federal Clean
Water Act.167 The discharger must establish that compliance with the
rule, regulation, standard, requirement, limitation, or order would result
in "an arbitrary and unreasonable taking of property or in the practical
closing and elimination of [a] lawful business, occupation or activi-
ty... without sufficient corresponding benefit or advantage to the
people."" Nonetheless, a variance will not be granted where the
effect of the variance would permit continuation of a condition "which
may unreasonably cause or contribute to adverse health effects upon
humans or upon fish or other aquatic life or upon game or other
wildlife."'6 9 Also, the granting of a variance does not relieve the
discharger of any liability imposed by the law of nuisance.7
j. Monitoring, Record-Keeping, and Reporting
Waste discharge permits are subject to monitoring, record-keeping
and reporting requirements. The federal Clean Water Act requires
permittees to monitor the physical, chemical, and biological characteris-
tics of their waste discharges and to maintain records.' 7 ' That
information must be reported periodically to EPA.1 2  Furthermore,
EPA officials may enter the dischargers premises to inspect those
records, to inspect monitoring equipment, and to sample effluents.'
Information received from permittees or acquired by entry and
inspection may be used as a basis for enforcement action against
them.17 4 The United States Supreme Court has held that use of data
164. CWA § 301(n)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(n)(1)(A).
165. National Assn of Metal Finishers v. EPA, 719 F.2d 624 (3d Cir. 1983)
(dictum), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. National
Resources Defense Council, 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
166. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 671 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1982).




171. CWA § 308(a)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(A).
172. Id.
173. CWA § 308(a)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(B).
174. See CWA § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319, discussed infra notes 185-206 and
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supplied by permittees in enforcement actions against them does not
constitute self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. 175
The Missouri Clean Water Commission requires monitoring, record-
keeping and reporting of waste discharges.'7 6 It has the power of
entry and inspection.
171
k. Delegation to States
Under the dual federal-state regulatory scheme under the federal
Clean Water Act, states may assume sole responsibility for regulating
waste discharges if they adopt state regulatory programs which comply
with the minimum policies and standards established by the Act. 78
Upon EPA approval of a state program, the federal permit program is
suspended. 9
In order to assure that the state conducts its program in compliance
with federal policies and standards, EPA retains two forms of oversight.
It may veto the issuance of individual state waste discharge permits' 8
or it may withdraw federal approval of the state program.' 8'
Although the Clean Water Act itself does not regulate waste
discharges into groundwater, a state must do so in order to obtain EPA
approval of the state program. 82 Missouri's Clean Water Law regu-
accompanying text.
175. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 254 (1980).
176. Mo. REv. STAT. § 644.026(23) (Supp. 1989). The self-monitoring
regulations were rescinded May 12, 1983. See former Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 10,
§ 20-6.050.
177. Mo. REV. STAT. § 644.026(20) (Supp. 1989). If disclosure is not
required by the federal Clean Water Act, a search warrant is required if the
discharger objects to entry. Id.
178. CWA § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). The state permit programs must
(1) insure compliance with the Act's policies and requirements for effluent
limitations, water quality related effluent limitations, national performance
standards, and toxic standards, (2) require permits with a maximum term of 5
years, (3) have adequate enforcement powers, (4) require monitoring, record-
keeping, and reporting, and provide for entry and inspection, (5) require public
notice and provide for a public hearing on permit applications, (6) provide for
notice of permit applications to EPA and to other affected states, (7) and provide
for pretreatment standards. Id For regulations, see 40 C.F.R. § 123.1-123.30
(1989).
179. CWA § 402(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(1).
180. CWA § 402(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2). This federal veto power is
acknowledged in Missouri by Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 20-6.010(9)(B) (1989).
181. CWA § 402(c)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3).
182. CWA § 402(b)(1)(D), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(D).
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lates groundwater,"s and has been approved by the EPA."& Hence,
EPA does not administer a federal permit program in Missouri.
1. Enforcement
Enforcement of provisions of the federal Clean Water Act and its
regulations and permit requirements is done through compliance
orders,' 8 civil injunctions,'8 6 civil penalties, 7 and criminal fines
and imprisonment.'8 EPA can bring enforcement actions for wholly
past violations, as well as for present violations." EPA's decision
whether to pursue enforcement is discretionary, not mandatory. 19°
Defenses to enforcement actions are limited. Sovereign immunity
is not a defense for either the federal government, states, or municipali-
ties. The federal government and its agencies expressly are subject to
federal and state regulation.'9' States and municipalities are not
immune from federal enforcement actions because the Act expressly
applies to them. 92 Responsible corporate officers and state officials
183. Mo. REv. STAT. § 644.016(15) (1986).
184. See supra note 23.
185. CWA § 309(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1).
186. CWA § 309(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b).
187. CWA §§ 309(d), (f), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(d), (f). Penalties range up to
$25,000 per day. They can be imposed administratively in amounts up to
$10,000 per day with cumulative maximums of $25,000 or $125,000 depending
on the seriousness of the violation. Amounts in excess of those limits can be
obtained only by civil suit.
188. CWA § 309(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c). Criminal sanctions for negligent
violations ranges from $2,500 to $25,000 per day and/or up to one year's
imprisonment. Sanctions for knowing violations range from $5,000 to $50,000
per day ($100,000 for a second violation) and/or up to 3 years' imprisonment (six
years for a second violation). Conviction of a knowing endangerment of
imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury can increase the sanctions to
$250,000 and/or 15 years' imprisonment for an individual and $1,000,000 for an
organization (double for a second violation). Id.
189. United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979).
190. Dubois v. EPA, 820 F.2d 943, 951 (8th Cir. 1987).
191. CWA § 313(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (reversing the ruling in EPA v.
California ex rel State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200 (1976)).
192. Enforcement actions may be brought against "any person in violation."
CWA § 309(a)-(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)-(c). "Person" is defined as including a
state. CWA § 502(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5). This interpretation was upheld for
the identical definitions applicable to the citizen suit provision in CERCLA (42
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are individually liable under the Act.'9 Federal officers are, however,
immune from individual liability.'9 Although the Act is not clear
whether the "upset defense" (activities beyond the control of the
permittee) is viable, regulations disallowing that defense were rejected
on review. 9 5 Lack of federal grant funds for construction of municipal
treatment facilities is not a defense."9 States expressly are made
liable for municipal violations resulting from state actions preventing
municipal compliance."9 Impossibility is not a defense.
198
EPA also is given emergency response powers to deal with spills.
When there is an "imminent and substantial endangerment to the
health of persons," EPA may bring an action seeking immediate
cessation of the polluting activity."
The Missouri Clean Water Law contains similar enforcement
powers, including compliance orders,2° civil injunctions and penal-
ties,2° ' and criminal fines and imprisonment. 202 Intent, knowledge,
willfulness, or negligence are not elements of liability, since the
sanctions under the Clean Water Law are malum prohibitum. Civil
and criminal relief are subject to the Act of God defenseY 4 In addi-
tion, the state may recover actual damages, including the costs of
193. CWA § 309(c)(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6). State officials are notimmunized by the state's sovereign immunity. Pennsylvania Environmental
Defense Found. v. Mazurkiewicz, 712 F. Supp. 1184, 1189 (M.D. Pa. 1989).
194. CWA § 313(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a).
195. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 210 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
196. Township of Franklin Sewerage Authority v. Middlesex County Util.
Auth., 787 F.2d 117, 121 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. City of Detroit, 720
F.2d 443, 450 (6th Cir. 1983); State Water Control Bd. v. Train, 559 F.2d 921,
926-27 (4th Cir. 1977).
197. CWA § 309(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(e).
198. United States v. City of Hoboken, 675 F. Supp. 189, 198-99 (D.N.J.
1987).
199. CWA § 504, 33 U.S.C. § 1364.
200. Mo. REV. STAT. § 644.056(3) (1986). Compliance orders were enforced
in Scheble v. Missouri Clean Water Comm'n, 734 S.W.2d 541, 559-69 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987); Hammack v. Missouri Clean Water Comm'n, 659 S.W.2d 595, 600
(Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
201. Mo. REV. STAT. § 644.076(1) (1986). Penalties can range up to $10,000
per day.
202. Id § 644.076(3). Sanctions can range from $2,500 to $25,000 per day
and/or one year's imprisonment (double for second violations).
203. State ex reL Ashcroft v. Mathias, 616 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981).
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restoring the receiving waters to their prior condition.205 No state or
local government contract may be awarded to a discharger who has
failed to obtain a permit or is in contempt of a court order enforcing the
Clean Water Law. 2W
m. Preservation of Common Law Rights
The federal Clean Water Act expressly preserves rights for relief
against water pollution created by the common law or by statute. 7
The Missouri Clean Water Law also has a provision preserving common
law rights, which expressly preserves the right to suppress nuisanc-
es.' State ex rel. Dresser v. Ruddy 9 holds that even the State
retains the right to abate nuisances and that its remedies are not
limited to those provided in the Clean Water Law. Curdt v. Missouri
Clean Water Comm'n21° holds that the Clean Water Commission has
no power to determine whether riparian rights have been violated by a
discharge of treated effluent.
n. Citizen Suit Provision
The Clean Water Act contains a typical federal citizen suit
provision. Any person may bring suit against the federal government,
state government, any governmental agency or waste discharger for
violation of an effluent standard, limitation, or administrative order. 1
A citizen suit may be filed either by an individual,1 by a collective
group,2 13 or by a state.2 4 A suit may be brought against the federal
205. Mo. REv. STAT. § 644.096 (1986).
206. Id § 644.091.
207. OWA § 505(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e).
208. Mo. REV. STAT. § 644.131 (1986).
209. 592 S.W.2d 789, 273 (Mo. 1980) (en bane).
210. 586 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
211. CWA § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1).
212. A "citizen" is "a person... having an interest which is or may be
adversely affected." CWA § 505(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g). A "person" is "an
individual, corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, commis-
sion, or political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." CWA § 502(5),
33 U.S.C. § 1362(5). The nature of the "interest" appears to be coincidental to
the definition adopted by the Supreme Court in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972). Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers, Inc.,
453 U.S. 1 (1981).
213. Provided it can show that some of its members are adversely affected.
Chesapeake Bay Found. v. American Recovery Co., 769 F.2d 207, 209 (4th Cir.
1985); Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir.
[Vol. 55434
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or state government for failure to perform a nondiscretionary act under
the Clean Water Act.215 Citizen suits against states, however, are
expressly subject to whatever immunity the states may enjoy under the
eleventh amendment.
216
Before a citizen suit may be filed, sixty days' notice must be given
to EPA, the state agency and the violator.217 The suit may not
proceed if EPA or the state agency has initiated an enforcement lawsuit
by the end of the sixty-day notice period, s but administrative actions
short of a suit are insufficient to forestall a citizen suit.219 In 1989,
EPA proposed rules for the filing of citizen suit complaints and proposed
consent decrees.' The federal generic five-year statute of limitations
apparently applies to the filing of citizen suits."'
1985); RITE-Research Improves Env't, Inc. v. Costle, 650 F.2d 1312,1319 (11th
Cir. 1981); Montgomery Envtl. Coalition v. Costle, 646 F.2d 568, 578 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
214. "Citizen" includes a state. Massachusetts v. United States Veterans
Admin., 541 F.2d 119, 121 (1st Cir. 1976). See CWA §§ 505(g), 502(5), 33 U.S.C.
§9 1365(g), 1362(5), described supra note 212.
215. CWA § 505(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2). Performance of discretionary
activities, such as investigations and initiation of enforcement actions, cannot
be compelled under the citizen suit provision; the courts lack jurisdiction to hear
such citizen suits. Dubois v. EPA, 820 F.2d 943,951 (8th Cir. 1987); Sierra Club
v. Train, 557 F.2d 485, 491 (5th Cir. 1977).
Civil penalties canbe collected from the federal government in citizen suits.
Sierra Club v. Interior Dep't, 30 Env't Rep. Cas (BNA) 1841 (D. Colo. 1990),
relying on CWA § 313(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a).
216. CWA § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1). See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
But state officials responsible for violations are not immune. Pennsylvania
Environmental Defense Found. v. Mazurkiewicz, 712 F. Supp. 1184,1190 (M.D.
Pa. 1989).
217. CWA § 505(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A). For regulations on the
giving of the 60 days notice, see 40 C.F.R. § 135.11 (1989).
218. CWA § 505(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B).
219. Initiation of administrative investigations, proceedings or negotiations
are insufficient to bar the citizen suit. Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985) (state administrative enforcement action);
Proffitt v. Commissioners, Township of Bristol, 754 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1985) (EPA
compliance order); Northwest Envtl. Defense Center v. Unified Sewerage
Agency, 30 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1117 (D. Or. 1989); SPIRG v. Tenneco
Polymers, 602 F. Supp. 1394, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. 1327 (D.NJ. 1985) (EPA
investigatory proceedings).
220. 54 Fed. Reg. 36,020 (1989).
221. The Ninth Circuit has held that the five-year statute of limitations in
28 U.S.C. § 2462 applies and that it is tolled when the 60-day notice is filed.
Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517 (9th Cir. 1987). See also
Public Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, 59
199o]
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The citizen suit provision also provides for rights of intervention.
EPA may intervene as a matter of right in citizen suits brought to
enforce a national performance standard, an effluent limitation in a
permit, or an order respecting a standard or limitation.' Citizens,
including environmental groups, may intervene in suits by EPA against
violators.2 Although they have no status as class representatives,
citizens as individuals may intervene for the purpose of commenting on
any future proposed consent decree or modification because they have
an interest in proper remedial action.W
The Missouri Clean Water Law does not contain a citizen suit
provision. Therefore, there is no basis for a citizen suit under Missouri
law.Y
(A) Gwaltney Decision
Most federal citizen suits are for injunctive relief against continued
violations of the Clean Water Act or regulations or permits under it. In
recent years, however, several citizen suits have been brought to recover
civil penalties. There is no doubt that citizen suits can be brought to
recover penalties for violations occurring at the time of the lawsuit.
2 8
It was unclear for a time whether penalties for past violations could be
recovered. Two circuit courts of appeals concluded that penalties could
not be recovered for past violations.' Then, another circuit court
held that they could be recovered.m Thereafter, still another circuit
court held that penalties could be recovered for past violations if their
U.S.L.W. 2146 (3d Cir. Aug. 20, 1990)(No. 89-5831).
222. CWA § 505(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c).
223. CWA § 505(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B); United States v.
Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 883 F.2d 54 (1989).
224. United States v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 30 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1439
(W.D. Pa. 1989); Proffitt v. Morrisville Mun. Auth., 716 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Pa.
1989).
225. But see infra text accompanying notes 241-42 for a discussion of federal
citizen suits against violators of the state act.
226. CWA § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1).
227. City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008
(7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980); Hainker v. Diamond
Shamrock Chem. Co., 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985). The latter court reached the
same conclusion in a later case. Sierra Club v. Shell Oil Co., 817 F.2d 1169 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 895 (1987).
228. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d
304 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated, 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
[Vol. 55
26
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss2/2
WATER QUALITY
pattern was intermittent and could be expected to occur again in the
future.=
To resolve the conflict between the circuits, the United States
Supreme Court recently held in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.' that citizen suits must be based
on ongoing violations. The purpose of the citizen suit provision is
forward-looking, to supplement government enforcement of the Act. The
sixty- day notice prerequisite to a citizen suit was intended to give
potential defendants an opportunity to comply with the Act and to
render suit unnecessary. 3' That role would be undermined if citizens
could bring suit even if violators complied with the Act upon receiving
the sixty days' notice; it could even interfere with agreements for
compliance negotiated by EPA. 22 Furthermore, the legislative history
suggests that citizen suits should not be available for wholly past
violations.
Nonetheless, the Court reasoned that the statutory language did
not require a citizen plaintiff to prove the existence of an ongoing
violation as part of its pleading, but that a good faith allegation of an
ongoing violation would be sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the federal
courts.' The citizen suit provision requires merely that the defen-
dant be "alleged to be in violation" of an effluent standard or limitation
in a discharge permit.23 Instead, plaintiff must prove the allegation
if defendant asserts that the allegation is not true.' Although the
defendant apparently had stopped violating its discharge permit two
months before the citizen suit was filed, the court below had not
determined whether plaintiff had made a good faith allegation on an
ongoing violation. Therefore, the Court remanded the case.
Gwaltney is causing some confusion because it is not clear whether
it suggests an alteration in the prior learning on the requirements for
standing in federal court. The majority opinion holds that a plaintiff
need only allege ongoing violations in order to have standing.237 The
dissent asserts that by that reasoning the case must proceed to the
229. Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 1089 (1st
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 975 (1987).
230. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
231. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60.
232. Id- at 60-61.
233. Id. at 62-64.
234. Id. at 64-65.
235. Id. at 65 (quoting CWA § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (emphasis
added)).
236. Id. at 66.
237. Id. at 67.
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merits regardless of whether the allegation is in fact true.2s But the
concluding remarks of the majority opinion imply that if defendant can
show that there was no ongoing violation, then he is entitled to
summary judgment.' If that is a correct interpretation of the
majority opinion, Gwaltney does not alter the current understanding
about standing. Gwaltney does decide definitively that a citizen suit
cannot be brought to recover civil penalties for wholly past violations.
On review of the remanded case, the court of appeals held that
although the discharger had come into compliance at about the time of
the filing of the suit, the correct time for determining whether there was
a likelihood of continued violations was at the time of the suit, and that
jurisdiction could not be rendered moot later by a period of nonviola-
tion.24
°
(B) Application of Citizen Suit Provision
to Violators of State Act
Although the Missouri Clean Water Law does not contain a citizen
suit provision, that does not mean that waste dischargers in Missouri
are immune from citizen suits. The federal citizen suit provision
expressly provides for suits for violations both of federal effluent
standards and limitations and of EPA and state orders involving such
standards and limitations."' Since state permits must incorporate
federal effluent standards and limitations as minimums, their violation
can trigger a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act. Federal approval
of and deferral to a state regulatory program does not abrogate federal
citizen suit authority."' Only if the discharger is violating a Missouri
standard or limitation which is more stringent than the federal one, but
not the federal standard or limitation itself, will he be immune from a
federal citizen suit.
o. Act Does Not Create
Any Private Right of Action
Violations of the federal Clean Water Act do not constitute prima
facie violations of the common law rights of downstream riparians or
landowners; those rights must be established under common law
238. Id at 67-70.
239. Id at 66-67.
240. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 890 F.2d
690 (4th Cir. 1989).
241. CWA § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1).
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principles. Nor does the citizen suit provision create a private right to
monetary damages.2
3
p. Spills and Accidental Releases
The federal Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of oil and other
hazardous substances into watercourses subject to the Act" and
declares them to be an imminent and substantial danger to public
health or welfare."6 As soon as a person in charge of a vessel, on-
shore facility, or offshore facility becomes aware of a discharge of oil or
a listed hazardous substance, he is required to notify EPA or the state
agency "immediately.""6  If EPA acts to clean up the spill and to
mitigate its effects, it may bring suit to recover the costs of those
actions. 7 In addition, EPA may recover civil penalties.'
Although Missouri initially accepted responsibility for dealing with
spills of oil and hazardous materials in 1974, it relinquished that
responsibility to EPA in 1975" 9 and no longer deals with them. The
243. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n,
453 U.S. 1 (1981); City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604
F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980).
244. CWA § 311(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1). "Oil" is defined as including
"petroleum, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse, and oil mixed with wastes other than
dredged spoil." CWA § 311(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(1). EPA has prepared a
list of substances and their quantities designated as hazardous. See CWA
H8 311(b)(1)(A), (b)(4), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(b)(1)(A), (b)(4). On section 311
generally, see 3 LAW OF HAzARDous WASTE § 15.02 (S. Cooke ed. 1987-89).
245. CWA § 311(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A). Section 311 does not
apply to continuous or intermittent discharges from a permitted point source,
which are dealt with under § 319. CWA § 311(a)(2)(C), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1321(a)(2)(C).
246. CWA § 311(b)(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5); United States v. Messer Oil
Corp., 391 F. Supp. 557 (D. Pa. 1975). The courts have held that imposing
enforcement sanctions based on such notification does not violate the self-
incrimination provision of the fifth amendment. United States v. Texas Pipe
Line Co., 528 F. Supp. 728 (W.D. Okla. 1978), affd, 611 F.2d 345 (10th Cir.
1979). For regulations, see 40 C.F.R. § 110.10 (1989).
247. CWA § 311(b)(6)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)(C).
248. Not to exceed $50,000 (or $250,000 if the spill werethe result of willful
negligence or willful misconduct). CWA § 311(b)(6)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)(B).
EPA cannot recover civil penalties under both § 311 and § 319. CWA
§ 311(b)(6)(E), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)(E). For regulations, see 40 C.F.R. §§ 113-
114 (1989).
249. The spill notification regulations were rescinded in 1980.
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statutory authority to deal with spills is provided in the Clean Water
Law.2 °
3. Refuse Act of 1899
The Rivers & Harbors Act of 1899"' originally was enacted to
regulate obstructions to navigation. During most of the 19th century,
Congress had enacted special acts authorizing specific obstructions, such
as bridges and dams. In 1890, the first general legislation was enacted.
It established the Corps of Engineers obstruction permit system. The
1899 Act reenacted and elaborated on that 1890 legislation, but a
portion of the ACt later developed important pollution control functions.
a. Provisions of the Act
Two sections of the Rivers & Harbors Act have come to be known
as the Refuse Act of 1899.2 Section 13" 3 prohibits the dumping or
discharging of any refuse into a navigable water of the United States,
unless the discharger holds a permit.2 Liquid wastes from streets
and sewers are excepted.25
Section 17' provides for enforcement fines. Violation of the act
is a misdemeanor. Penalties are fines between $500 to $2500 a day and
potential imprisonment from thirty days to one year. Like the Clean
Water Act, the Refuse Act is a strict liability statute; it imposes liability
regardless of intent or knowledge. 7 Due care and compliance with
industry standards or practices is not a defense.2 Furthermore,
250. Such spills are unlawful under Mo. REv. STAT. § 644.076 (1986).
Recovery of cleanup costs is authorized by Mo. REV. STAT. § 644.096 (1986).
Sanctions are provided in Mo. REv. STAT. § 644.076-3 (1986).
251. Rivers & Harbors Act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1112 (codified as amended at
33 U.S.C. §§ 401-16). On the Refuse Act generally, see R. Beck & C. Goplerud,
supra note 9, at 33-36; 1 F. GRAD, supra note 9, § 3.03(1)(b); 2 W. RODGERS,
supra note 9, § 4.11; 1 D. STEVER, supra note 9, § 6.10(1).
252. CWA §§ 13, 17, 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411.
253. 33 U.S.C. § 411.
254. An NPDES permit under the Clean Water Act is such a permit.
255. 33 U.S.C. § 411; United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482
(1960).
256. 33 U.S.C. § 417.
257. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 328 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ind.
1970), affd 482 F.2d 439 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 909 (1973).
258. United States v. White Fuel Corp., 498 F.2d 619 (1st Cir. 1974).
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injunctions and other equitable remedies are available to enforce the
Act's prohibition. 9
b. Application of the Act to Waste Discharges
The Refuse Act became important as an important pollution control
statute as a result of some cases decided in the 1960's. The Supreme
Court held in United States v. Republic Steel Corp.,' that the term
"liquid wastes" means municipal sewage only, not other liquid wastes.
This meant that suspended solids are not exempted from regulation
under the Act. The reason is that suspended solids can settle out and
block navigable channels. Later, in United States v. Standard Oil
Co.," I the Court held that even commercially valuable products
become refuse if they accidentally escape from control. It held that
aviation gasoline is refuse once it is floating on a navigable water, and
because it poses a fire hazard. Finally, in United States v. Esso
Standard Oil Co., 2 a Court of Appeals held that even indirect
deposits which flow by gravity into navigable waters are refuse. Oil
spilled on the ground at an oil terminal became refuse when it migrated
to the harbor.
In 1970, the Nixon Administration discovered that this line of
precedent enabled it to establish a waste discharge permit system by
regulation. As one of its first responses to the environmental movement
after Earth Day 1970, the Administration directed the Corps of
Engineers to establish a joint permit program with EPA.m In April
1971, the Corps promulgated its permit system.2" 4 It required permits
for all industrial waste discharges into traditional navigable waters and
their tributaries where the navigable capacity of the mainstream would
be affected. The permits would have a five year term, require self-moni-
toring and periodic reporting, and authorize inspection. In effect, the
Corps designed the major parameters of the permit system later created
under the Clean Water Act.
Many environmentalists applauded that initiative. Some thought,
however, that it would grant a license to pollute, because they feared
that the Corps of Engineers would be too accommodating to waste
dischargers. They attached to the Corps their attitude about its water
259. United States v. Consolidation Coal Co., 354 F. Supp. 173 (N.D.W. Va.
1973).
260. 362 U.S. 482 (1960).
261. 384 U.S. 224 (1966).
262. 375 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1967).
263. Exec. Order No. 11574, 35 Fed. Reg. 19,627 (1970).
264. Former 33 C.F.R. §§ 209.131 (1972); 36 Fed. Reg. 6564, 13,835 (1971).
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facility construction programs, although the facts suggest that the Corps
was planning to mount a vigorous cleanup program. Two of them filed
a lawsuit alleging that the Corps waste discharge permit program could
not be implemented unless Environmental Impact Statements were
prepared and filed2 on the regulations themselves and for each and
every one of the 23,000 odd permit applications filed. The federal
district court reluctantly agreed in Kalur v. Resor.2" That decision
created an insurmountable administrative burden and destroyed the
permit program.
Congress was appalled by Kalur. It responded by enacting the
statutory permit program embodied in the Clean Water Act. It adopted
the major features of the Corps permit program, extended it to
municipal discharges, extended it to all waters, exempted permits for




Only to "Navigable Waters"
Because the Refuse Act is a part of the Rivers & Harbors Act of
1899, the jurisdiction of the Refuse Act extends only to those waters
which traditionally have been subject to the jurisdiction of the Corps of
Engineers. Those waters are "navigable waters of the United
States."' They consist of waters which (1) are presently used as an
interstate highway of commerce by commercial vessels,269 (2) have
been so used in the past,20 or (3) are susceptible to such use in the
future with reasonable improvements.27 1 Jurisdiction extends also to
265. Under National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(C), 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(C).
266. 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971).
267. That 1972 legislation was called the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972). It replaced
the entire prior legislation, except the section establishing the short name of the
act.
268. United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); United States v. Sunset Coves, Inc., 3 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,370 (D. Ore.), affd in part, 514 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975); see W. RODGERS, supra note 9, § 4.11(C).
For jurisdictional regulations, see 33 C.F.R. §§ 329.11-.12 (1989).
269. See, e.g., The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
270. See, e.g., Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113,
123-24 (1921).
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tributaries where the waste discharge might flow into a navigable
watery 2 The Clean Water Act jurisdiction cases indicate that this is
a smaller set of waters than are subject to the Clean Water Act. 73
d. Relation to Clean Water Act
Since 1972, EPA and the Corps have followed a policy of using the
Refuse Act to prosecute single-instance waste discharges, whether
accidental or deliberate, and using the Clean Water Act for dealing with
continuous discharges and violations of permitsY4 Permits no longer
are available under the Refuse Act, except for fill materialsY 5 Refuse
entering a navigable water from a nonpoint source is subject to the
Refuse Act prohibitionY6
e. Bounty Provision
One half the fine collected must be paid to the person(s) giving
information leading to the conviction."
f. No Private Right of Action
Under the common law, private parties have a cause of action to
collect a fine, penalty or forfeiture in the name of the sovereign if the
statute provides that the informer may keep part of that fine. It is
called a qui tam action. While they may exist under other federal
statutes, the federal courts have determined that qui tam actions do not
272. United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 480 F.2d 1132, 1133 (2d Cir.
1973); see United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 708-10
(1899).
273. United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1325 (6th
Cir. 1974).
274. F. GRAD, supra note 9, § 3.03(1)(b); W. RODGERS, supra note 9,
§ 4.11(G).
275. CWA §§ 402(a)(5), 511(b), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)(5), 1371(b); CWA
§511(a), 33 U.S.C. §1371(a).
276. United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655,669-
70 (1973); W. RODGERS, supra note 9, § 4.11(G).
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exist under the Refuse Act of 1899Y Furthermore, the Act does not
create any private right of action on general principles.
27 9
4. Regulation of Nonpoint Sources
From its inception, the federal Clean Water Act has required states
to conduct planning studies which include methods for dealing with
nonpoint sources of pollution.m After 15 years of study, Congress
concluded that techniques for controlling nonpoint sources of pollution
had developed sufficiently to enable establishment of a regulatory
program. Also, it had become clear that nonpoint sources constitute a
much larger proportion of surface watercourse pollution than had
originally been believed. An EPA report concludes that 76% of pollution
in lakes and 65% in rivers is derived from nonpoint sources.2 1 Of
17,000 heavily polluted water bodies in the United States, only 595 were
polluted primarily by point sources. 2 In Missouri, 9,377 miles of
watercourses are polluted from nonpoint sources, over 99% of the state's
nonattainment waters; the bulk of those watercourses are contaminated
with erosion from agricultural lands and construction sites.23 Control
of nonpoint sources of pollution potentially should have a significant
effect on groundwater quality, because the portion of diffused pollution
sources that does not reach a surface watercourse contributes to
groundwater contamination by percolation. The Water Quality Act of
278. City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008
(7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980); Connecticut Action Now, Inc.
v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1972); Bass Angler Sportsman Soc'y
v. United States, 447 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1971), affd per curiam, 324 F. Supp.
412 (N.D., M.D. & S.D. Ala. 1971).
279. Sierra Club v. United States Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d 1011 1033-34
(2d Cir. 1983) (Westways fill permit). A private right of action exists if (1)
plaintiff is a member of the class for whose special benefit the statute was
enacted, (2) there is legislative intent to create a private remedy (or least, not
to deny it), (3) the private remedy is consistent with the statutory scheme, and
(4) there is not a traditional state law right of action. Id. (citing California v.
Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)).
280. CWA § 208(b)(2)(F), 33 U.S.C. § 1288(b)(2)(F).
281. EPA Proposes Non-point Pollution Strategy, Seeks State, Local
Assistance for New Plan, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1280 (Nov. 4, 1988) (citing
ENvIRONmENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NON-POINT SOURCES: AGENDA FOR THE
FUTURE (1988)).
282. NRDC Offers Solution to "Poison Runoff," Calls It Leading Source of
Water Pollution, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 569 (July 21, 1989) (citing NATURAL
RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, POISON RUNOFF: A GUIDE To STATE AND LOCAL
CONTROL OF NoNPoiNr SOURCE WATER POLLUTION (1989)).
283. See supra note 7.
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1987 enacted a new regulatory program for nonpoint sources of pollution
of surface watercourses and for stormwater runoff.24
a. Nonpoint Sources
The Water Quality Act of 1987 requires states to identify nonpoint
sources and categories of sources which require regulation in order to
achieve water quality standards, to identify best management practices,
to prepare management programs and to submit them to EPA for
approval by August 1988.m If a state fails to obtain approval, EPA
is empowered to prepare a report containing that information. 
2M
Alternatively, local governments within such states may prepare their
own management programs.287 States and local governments which
obtain federal approval may receive federal technical assistance and
partial funding for implementation of their management programs and
for protecting groundwater quality.m While the Water Quality Act
of 1987 does not mandate creation of comprehensive state programs for
regulating nonpoint sources of pollution, it clearly is seeking to induce
states to develop such programs.
Missouri has not yet established a regulatory program for control
of nonpoint sourcesY The permit program under the Clean Water
Law presently is limited to point sources.2
°
b. Storm water Runoff
Stormwater runoff is one of the major sources of nonpoint pollution
reaching surface watercourses. Recent research indicates that it is more
polluting than point sources of treated effluents.29'
284. Pub. L. No. 100-4, §§ 319, 405, 101 Stat. 8, 52, 69, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1329,
1342(p) (Supp. V 1987) (hereinafter WQA 1987). See generally R. Beck & C.
Goplerud, supra note 9, § 235, at 282-85; I J. DAVIDSON & 0. DELoGu, supra
note 9, § 2, 13; F. GRAD, supra note 9, § 3.03 (4)(h); W. RODGERS, supra note 9,
§ 4.2A (Supp. 1988).
285. WQA 1987 §§ 319(a)-(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a)-(c).
286. WQA 1987 § 319(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(d).
287. WQA 1987 § 319(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(e).
288. WQA 1987 § 319(f), (h), (i), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(0, (h), (i).
289. MISSOURI DEPVT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, MISSOURI WATER QUALITY
REPORT 58 (1988).
290. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 644.016(1), (6), (12), (13), 644.051(2) (1986).
291. For example, the stormwater runoff from Washington DC contains
twice the Biological Oxygen Demand and 5 times the lead contained in the
treated effluent of its metropolitan sewage treatment plant. See supra note 281.
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The Water Quality Act of 1987 establishes a new permit program
for point sources composed entirely of stormwater runoff.2 2 Industrial
and large municipal stormwater discharges must obtain permits by
February 4, 1991.29 Smaller municipal stormwater discharges must
obtain permits by February 4, 1993.m Stormwater runoff from oil,
gas and mining operations are exempted from either federal or state
permitting. 5  Also, agricultural stormwater runoff is exempted,2
but potentially is subject to future regulation under the nonpoint source
management programs discussed above. These permits must require
compliance with established stormwater management practices within
three years.' By October 1, 1992, EPA must issue regulations on
which types of stormwater discharges must be regulated and establish
minimum requirements for the state management programs, including
management practices." Since these stormwater permit require-
ments constitute part of the point source discharge permit provisions of
the Clean Water Act,' EPA is required to establish a federal permit
program in those states which do not obtain EPA approval for their own
programs.
The Missouri Clean Water Law does not expressly provide for
regulation of stormwater drainage from point sources. Nonetheless, the
present statutory language appears to permit extension of regulation to
stormwater point sources. 3
°
B. Protection of Underground
Public Drinking Water Sources
Underground sources of water supplies are threatened by a variety
of sources, including leachate from landfills, leaks from underground
storage tanks, injection wells, and percolation from contaminated
292. WQA 1987 § 405, 33 U.S.C. § 1 34 2 (p). Stormwater discharges were
exempt from permitting prior to the 1987 amendment by regulation. 40 C.F.R.
§ 125.4(a)(f).
293. WQA 1987 § 405(4)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(4)(A). Large municipal
stormwater discharges are those from municipalities serving a population of
250,000 or more. WQA 1987 § 405(p)(2)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(2)(D).
294. WQA 1987 § 405(4)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(4)(B). These smaller
municipal stormwater discharges are from municipalities serving a population
between 100,000 and 250,000. WQA 1987 § 405(2)(D), 33 U.S.C. § 1342)p)(2)(D).
295. WQA 1987 § 403, § 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(2).
296. WQA 1987 § 503, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (definition of "point source").
297. WQA 1987 § 405(4)(A)-(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(4)(A)-(B).
298. WQA 1987 § 405(3), (6), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3), (6).
299. CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
300. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 644.016(1), (6), (12), (13), 644.051(2) (1986).
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surface watercourses and ground surfaces. In Missouri, there are
seventeen known major groundwater contamination sites, of which
eleven affect public water supply wells. 1 Some of those sources of
contamination are regulated specially. Protection of the aquifers
themselves from all contaminating sources seemed appropriate as well,
as evidenced by common law cases.3
2
In 1974, Congress enacted the Safe Drinking Water Act. 3  It
provides for the establishment of primary and secondary drinking water
standards, and protection of underground sources of drinking water
through regulation of underground injection wells. In 1986, Congress
amended the act to include two further techniques for protecting
groundwater sources for public water supplies: (1) sole source aquifer
regulation, and (2) wellhead protection regulation. 4' Like the federal-
state relationship under the Clean Water Act, the Safe Drinking Water
Act's basic policy is established by the federal government, with day-to-
day implementation by the states.' Drinking water standards
do not directly affect groundwater quality, of course. But the ability of
a water utility to utilize that source of water depends on their meeting
the minimum drinking water standards. The Safe Drinking Water Act
contains three regulatory programs directly influencing groundwater
quality.
301. See MISSOURI WATER QUALrrY REPORT 43-47 (1988).
302. See, e.g., Chappell v. SCA Serv., Inc., 540 F. Supp. 1088 (C.D. ll1. 1982)
(PCBs from hazardous waste landfill allegedly polluted public water supply
well); Rogers v. Bond Bros., 279 Ky. 239, 130 S.W.2d 22 (1939) (creosote
drippings allegedly polluted public water supply well); Village of Claycomo v.
City of Kansas City, 635 S.W.2d 365 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (landfill leachate
polluted public water supply well); Town of Rolesville v. Perry, 21 N.C. App. 354,
204 S.E.2d 719 (1974) (leaks from auto repair garage allegedly would pollute
public water supply well); State v. Monarch Chem., Inc., 111 Misc. 2d 343,443
N.Y.S.2d 967 (Sup. Ct. 1981), modfied, 90 A.D.2d 907,456 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1982)
(hazardous chemical spill polluted public water supply well); Barclay v.
Commonwealth, 25 Pa. 503 (1855) (manure seepage polluted public water supply
spring).
303. Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1661-1694 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (1982)) [hereinafter SDWA]. On the Act generally, see
F. GRAD, supra note 9, at § 3.05 (7); 3 LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE 8H 15.03(3)-(4)
(S. Cooke ed. 1987-89); W. RODGERS, supra note 9, § 4.8(B) (1986), § 4.20A(C).
304. Pub. L. No. 99-339, 100 Stat. 657-664, 42 U.S.C. 88 300h-6, -7 (Supp.
V 1987).
305. SDWA H8 1413, 1423, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-2, 300h-1 (Supp. V 1987).
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1. Regulation of Underground Injection Wells
Injection wells pose a particular danger to groundwater aquifers,
since they directly contaminate them and render them permanently
unpotable. This form of pollution has been the subject of common law
cases.3
The Safe Drinking Water Act evinces a Congressional policy that
the states carry the primary burden of enforcing the policies of the Act.
A precondition to a state taking over regulation of the safe drinking
water program is establishment of a state program to regulate under-
ground injection of wastes.307 Furthermore, EPA can require a state
to develop and submit for approval a program for regulating under-
ground injection wells.' Underground injection must be prevented
where it would endanger public drinking water sources.3m The state
program must take the form either of a flat underground injection
prohibition81 ° or a permit program for underground injection
wells. 1 ' The permit program, however, is not to include underground
injection of brine or other fluids from oil and gas primary or secondary
recovery operations, unless necessary to avoid endangering drinking
water sources. 1 Monitoring of aquifers and the usual record-keeping
and reporting requirements must be imposed.3 1
EPA is to operate a federal permit program in those states which
are required to have but do not have federally-approved state pro-
grams.3 14 The permit system is governed by regulation. 1 ' EPA has
306. See, e.g., Alliston v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 143 Kan. 327, 55 P.2d 396
(1936) (injected oil well brine polluted domestic & livestock well); Augustine v.
Hinnen, 201 Kan. 710, 443 P.2d 354 (1968) (injected oil well brine polluted
livestock well); Theriot v. Mermentau, Inc., 385 So. 2d 939 (La. Ct. App. 1980)
(hazardous waste injection allegedly would pollute aquifer); Ressler v. Gerlach,
189 Pa. Super. 192,149 A.2d 158 (1959) (domestic sewage drainage well polluted
domestic well).
307. SWDA § 1421(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1).
308. SDWA § 1422(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. § 300-h-l(a)-(b). For regulations, see 40
C.F.R. §§ 145, 147 (1989).
309. SDWA § 1421(B)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1). "Endangerment" is defined
as the presence or expectation of future presence of a contaminant which would
result in noncompliance with national primary drinking water standards or
otherwise adversely affect the health of persons drinking the water. SDWA
§ 1421(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(2).
310. SDWA § 1421(b)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1)(A).
311. SDWA § 1421(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. 300h(b)(1)(B). For regulations, see 40
C.F.R. §§ 145, 147 (1989).
312. SDWA § 1421(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(2).
313. SDWA § 1421(b)(1)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1)(C).
314. SDWA § 1422(c), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-l(c) (Supp. V 1987).
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been given emergency powers to issue orders to protect groundwater
used for public drinking water from contamination. 6
Congress also has enacted a partially overlapping provision in the
Resources Conservation and Recovery Act which regulates injection of
hazardous wastes into groundwater aquifers. 17
Missouri complies with the federal underground injection require-
ment, since it has a flat prohibition against underground waste
injection, with certain exceptions for injections licensed under other
statutes."1 The state is proceeding to develop a more comprehensive
groundwater protection management strategy.
3 1 9
2. Sole Source Aquifer Regulation
In order to protect the aquifer recharge areas of drinking water
wells supplying the public, EPA may designate areas in which under-
ground injection wells are prohibited. That may be done in areas where
contamination of the aquifer would cause a significant public health
hazard.32 This authority is designed to provide protection for sole
source aquifers pending establishment of a state safe drinking water
program which includes a permit program for underground injection
wells.
321
Additionally, in 1986 Congress enacted a sole source aquifer
protection demonstration program for critical aquifer protection
areas.3' State and local governments and other governmental entities
315. See 40 C.F.R. § 144, 146 (1989).
316. SDWA § 1431(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300i(a) (Supp. V 1987). EPA has been
given authority to issue orders necessary to protect public health, including
requiring provision of alternative water sources by the polluter and to bring civil
actions for injunctive and remedial relief. Id See United States v. Price, 688
F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982) (funding of diagnostic study by landfill operator). There
are penalties for refusal to comply with such orders. SDWA § 1431(b), 42 U.S.C.
§ 300i(b) (Supp. V 1987).
317. Resources Conservation and Recovery Act § 3004(f), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(f)
(Supp. V 1987) (discussed infra notes 359-62 and accompanying text).
318. Mo. REV. STAT. § 577.155 (1986). The exceptions are fluids injected
pursuant to licensed primary and secondary recovery operations of oil and gas
wells, small residential heat pump injections, backfill operations of mines,
licensed nonhazardous sanitary landfills, residential cesspools, and septic tanks.
For regulations, see Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 20-6.090 (1989).
319. See Missouri Dep't of Natural Resources, Missouri Ground-Water
Strategy (Feb. 2, 1987) (draft mimeo).
320. SDWA § 1424, 42 U.S.C. § 300h-3(a)(1). EPA has designated only 2
sole source aquifer areas. See 40 C.F.R. § 149 (1989).
321. Id
322. Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-339, §
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can seek financial assistance for establishing a comprehensive manage-
ment program for maintaining groundwater quality in those areas.
There are no designated sole source aquifers in Missouri.
3. Wellhead Protection Area Regulation
Also in 1986, Congress enacted a wellhead protection area program
for recharge areas of public water supply wells.3 23 Each state is
required to adopt and submit for approval a program for regulating
sources of contaminants in recharge areas of wells supplying water to
the public." A wellhead protection area is a "surface and subsurface
area surrounding a water well or wellfield... through which contami-
nants are reasonably likely to move toward and reach... [the]
well."' The state regulatory plan is to include control measures,
technical and financial assistance, education and training, demonstra-
tion projects and contingency plans for alternative water sources.32
Also, potential sources of contamination must be considered in locating
new water wells serving the public.3 ' The states are to submit their
programs for approval by June 19, 1989, 32 and should implement
them within two years after submission.3 1 Missouri was not among
the twenty-seven states which submitted wellhead protection area plans
by the deadline.'
Federal facilities are subject to state regulation.3' Partial federal
funding is available to support state regulation under this program.
3 2
203, 100 Stat. 657 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 300h-6 (Supp. V 1987)
(comprising SDWA § 1427)).
323. Id § 205, 42 U.S.C. § 300h-7 (SDWA § 1428).
324. Id § 205(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-7(a) (SDWA § 1428(a)).
325. Id § 205(e), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-7(e) (SDWA § 1428(e)).
326. Id. § 205(a)(4)-(5), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-7(a)(4)-(5) (SDWA § 1428(a)(4)-(5)).
States with more than 2,500 oil and gas wells which reinject brine by annular
injection must adequately regulate them to avoid brine contamination of
groundwater. Id § 205(i), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-7(i) (SDWA § 1428(i)).
327. Id § 205(a)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-7(a)(6) (SDWA § 1428(a)(6)).
328. Id § 205(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-7(a) (SDWA § 1428(a)).
329. Id. § 205(g), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-7(g) (SDWA § 1428(g)).
330. 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 513 (July 7, 1989).
331. Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, § 205(h), 42 U.S.C. §
300h-7(h) (Supp. V 1987) (SDWA § 1428(h)).
332. Id § 205(k), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-7(k) (SDWA § 1428(k)).
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C. Regulation of Drainage and Leachate
from Landfills
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976m es-
tablished a federal program for regulating (1) disposal of solid waste
and (2) generation, transportation and disposal of hazardous waste. It
provides for a comprehensive program under which the federal
government establishes basic regulatory policy under which, if willing,
the states do the day-to-day enforcement. Today this act is known as
the Solid Waste Disposal Act.
Landfills have great potential for contaminating groundwater by
percolation of leachate from buried waste. Regulations under the Act
which require prevention or interception of such leachate percolation
contribute to improved groundwater quality. That landfill leachate
poses a threat to surface and ground water quality is demonstrated by
common law cases seeking relief from such contamination 2am
The cases show the even greater danger posed by leachate from
hazardous waste landfills.3 5 The following discussion of the provi-
sions of the Act will concentrate on those which relate to leachate
percolation.
The Solid Waste Disposal Act has four main purposes: (1)
prohibiting future open dumping and closing existing open dumps and
converting them to more environmentally suitable facilities; (2)
regulating the collection, transport, separation, recycling, and disposal
of solid waste; (3) regulating the generation, collection, transport, and
disposal of hazardous waste; and (4) regulating underground storage
tanks.3
333. Pub. L. No. 94-580, §§ 1001-9010, 90 Stat. 2796 (1976), 42 U.S.C. §§
6901-6991(i) (Supp. V 1987). On the Act generally, see ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
HANDBOOK, supra note 9, ch. 5; 1A F. GRAD, supra note 9, § 4.03; 1 LAW OF
HAZARDOUs WASTE chs. 1-5 (S. Cooke ed. 1987-89); 2 S. NOvICK, D. STEVER &
M. MELLON, supra note 9, §§ 13.01-.03; 3 W. RODGERS, supra note 9, §§ 7.1-7.5;
1 D. STEVER, supra note 9, ch. 5.
334. See, e.g., Frank v. Environmental Sanitation Management, Inc., 687
S.W.2d 876 (Mo. 1985) (watercourse); Filisko v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 176
Conn. 33, 404 A.2d 889 (1978) (groundwater); Village of Claycomo v. City of
Kansas City, 635 S.W.2d 365 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (groundwater); Reinhart v.
Lancaster Area Refuse Auth., 201 Pa. 614, 193 A.2d 670 (1963) (groundwater).
335. See, e.g., Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Serv., Inc., 86 Ill. 2d 1, 426
N.E.2d 824 (1981) (groundwater); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557,
525 A.2d 287 (1987) (groundwater); Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244 (R.I. 1982)
(groundwater); Neal v. Darby, 282 S.C. 277,318 S.E.2d 18 (1984) (groundwater).
336. SWDA § 1003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a) (Supp. V 1989). Regulation of
underground storage tanks is not mentioned in that section, but is implied from
the amendment of the Act in 1984 adding the underground storage tank
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1. Solid waste
SWDA establishes standards for solid waste (nonhazardous)
landfills, but neither establishes a federal permit program nor requires
states to establish them. The Act's purposes are implemented by solid
waste management plans developed by the states. Federal approval of
such state plans is required for federal financial assistance. 3 7  The
state plans must include three features: (1) provide for resource
conservation and recycling and for disposal of all solid waste in sanitary
landfills; (2) prohibit all future open dumping; and (3) require closing or
upgrading of all existing open dumps.m EPA is required to develop
guidelines for appropriate solid waste management aa9 which the states
are to incorporate into their management plans.' ° The EPA guide-
lines shall consider, inter alia: (1) the geographic, geologic, climatic and
hydrologic characteristics of disposal sites "to insure the reasonable
protection of the quality of the ground and surface waters from leachate
contamination, [and] the reasonable protection of the quality of the
surface waters from surface runoff contamination;" (2) the characteris-
tics of collection, storage, processing and disposal operating methods;
and (3) the constituents of waste.3 1 The EPA guidelines were issued
in 1979. Those guidelines include provisions dealing with rainfall
and leachate percolation.
Unlike its approach to hazardous waste management, the Act does
not require states to establish solid waste management programs. If a
state fails to establish a federally approved regulatory program, there
are no federal sanctions except for noneligibility for federal financial
provisions. SWDA §§ 9001-9101, 42 U.S.C. § 6991-6991(i) (Supp. V 1987).
337. SWDA § 4007(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6947(b) (1982).
338. SWDA § 4003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6943(a) (1982).
339. SWDA § 4002(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6942(b) (1982).
340. SWDA § 4002(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6942(b) provides that the EPA guidelines
are to be used "to assist in the development and implementation of State solid
waste management plans." A state plan must meet the minimum federal
requirements specified in SWDA § 4003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6943(a), in order to be
eligible for federal approval. SWDA § 4007(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6947(a)(1) (1982).
The state plan, for example, must provide for "use or dispos[al] of... [solid]
waste in a manner that is environmentally sound." SWDA § 4003(a)(6), 42
U.S.C. § 6943(a)(6) (1982). Nowhere does the Act expressly require incorpora-
"tion of the EPA guidelines into the state solid waste management plans, but the
Act clearly implies such a requirement.
341. SWDA § 4002(c), 42 U.S.C. § 6942(c) (1982).
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assistance. There is no backup federal regulatory program3 "4 and no
enforcement provisions. 3"
Although not required to do so, Missouri has enacted a solid waste
management program.3 5  Some of its provisions relate to water
pollution. The statute prohibits dumping or depositing solid wastes into
streams, springs, and other bodies of surface and ground water.m
Solid waste disposal facilities must be operated under state permit. 7
Sanitary landfills must be located and designed to minimize the impact
of leachate on surface and ground water.3 " It must have appropriate
liners, infiltration resistance, and a leachate collection system.'4 9
2. Hazardous Waste Management
Even more important to groundwater quality than management of
solid waste disposal is management of hazardous waste disposal. The
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act provides for a dual federal-
state program to regulate the generation, transport, storage and
disposal of hazardous wastes.' The regulatory provisions of the Act
apply only to post-enactment activities and active hazardous wastefacilities. 3 1
343. See SWDA § 3005,42 U.S.C. § 6925 (Supp. V 1987) (hazardous waste
facility permits); SWDA §§ 9002-9003, 42 U.S.C. § 6991(a)(b) (Supp. V 1987)
(underground storage tank notification and performance standards).
344. The SWDA enforcement provisions apply only to hazardous waste
management and underground storage tank management. See SWDA § 3008
42 U.S.C. § 6928 (Supp. V 1987) (hazardous waste); SWDA § 9006,42 U.S.C. §
9991(e) (Supp. V 1987) (underground storage tanks).
345. Mo. REV. STAT. § 260.200-.247 (1986 & Supp. 1989). For regulations,
see Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 80-3.010 (1989).
346. Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.210(1) (1986).
347. Mo. REV. STAT. § 260.205 (Supp. 1989).
348. Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 80-3.010(4)-3, (6) (1989).
349. i& § 80-3.010(7)(B)(G).
350. SWDA §§ 3001-3020, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-39b (Supp. V 1987).
351. Permits are required only for hazardous waste facilities existing on or
after a postenactment date established by regulation. SWDA §§ 3005(a), 3010,
42 U.S.C. §§ 6925(a), 6930 (Supp. V 1989).
Abandoned and closed hazardous waste disposal facilities are dealt with
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act (Superfund), 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675, discussed infra notes 472-523 and
accompanying text. Also, preenactment disposal activities creating an imminent
hazard can be dealt with and liability imposed under SWDA § 7003,42 U.S.C.
§ 6973 (Supp. V 1987). United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem.
Co., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
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a. Manifest System
Regulation of generators and transporters is based on a "cradle to
grave" manifest system. The system applies to all hazardous wastes
listed under the Act. 2 Factors used to determine hazardousness
include: toxicity, persistence, degradability in nature, potential for
accumulation in tissue, flammability, corrosiveness, and other hazardous
characteristics.35 Several thousand materials have been listed as
hazardous under the Act.'
The system is triggered by giving notice of the generation of a
hazardous waste.' The Act imposes container characteristic, label-
ling and recordkeeping requirementsYm Transport of hazardous
materials is lawful only when accompanied by a SWDA manifest and
when taken to a SWDA licensed hazardous waste treatment, storage or
disposal facility.5 7 Such facilities can be licensed only if they comply
with the requirements of the Act, including compliance with the
manifest system, monitoring, recordkeeping, reporting, facility siting
and design, operating and disposal practices, contingency planning, and
financial responsibility.m
b. Prohibited Disposal Activities
Prohibitions against certain temporary and permanent disposal
practices apply, all of which relate to protection of groundwater quality:
(1) bulk storage of hazardous wastes in salt dome and bed formations,
underground mines and caves; (2) placing bulk or noncontainerized
liquids in landfills; (3) land disposal of specified cyanide, heavy-metal,
acid, PCB and halogenated organic hazardous wastes; and (4) land
disposal of solvent and dioxin containing hazardous wastes.359 EPA
can add other hazardous wastes to the land disposal prohibitions and
is required to review all listed hazardous wastes." Furthermore, the
352. SWDA § 3001(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a)-(b) (Supp. V 1987).
353. SWDA § 3001(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a) (1982). For regulations, see 40
C.F.R § 261.1-.33 (1989).
354. 40 C.F.R. § 261.30-.33 (1989).
355. SWDA § 3002, 42 U.S.C. § 6922 (Supp. V 1987). For regulations, see
40 C.F.R. §§ 262.10-.70 (1989).
356. SWDA § 3002,42 U.S.C. § 6922 (Supp. V 1987). For regulations, see
40 C.F.R. §§ 263.10-.31 (1989).
357. SWDA § 3003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6923(a) (1982).
358. SWDA § 3004(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a) (Supp. V 1987).
359. SWDA § 3004(b)-(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(b)-(e) (Supp. V 1987). For
regulations, see 40 C.F.R. § 266.20-.80 (1989).
360. SWDA § 3004(g), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(g) (Supp. V 1987). Hazardous
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liquid hazardous wastes specified in items (3) and (4) above cannot be
disposed of in deep injection wells.3 1 In each of those categories, EPA
can authorize land or underground disposal of exempted hazardous
wastes.
3 62
c. Performance Standards for
Disposal Facilities
EPA has issued specific standards for ten different types of






(5) land treatment units
(6) landfills
(7) incinerators
(8) thermal treatment units
(9) chemical, physical and biological treatment units; and
(10) underground injection wells.
The specific standards are set forth in the federal regulations.W
3
In addition, there are general performance standards applicable to
all such facilities. All hazardous waste landfills and surface impound-
ments and enlargements thereof brought into operation after November
8, 1984, must have: (1) two or more liners with a leachate collection
system above (landfills only) and between liners (landfills and impound-
ments); and (2) a -groundwater monitoring system.' Alternative
operating practices and designs which are at least equally effective as
wastes are identified and listed under SWDA § 3001(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a)-
(b) (Supp. V 1987). Certain specified wastes are required to be listed. SWDA
§ 3001(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(e) (Supp. V 1987). For regulations, see 40 C.F.R
§ 268 (1989).
361. SWDA § 3004(f), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(f) (Supp. V 1987).
362. SWDA § 3004(b)(1)-(2), (c)(3), (d)(1), (e)(2), (f)(5), 42 U.S.c. § 6924(b)(1)-
(2), (c)(3), (d)(1), (e)(2), (f)(2). In addition, EPA has variance authority. SWDA
§ 3004(h), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(h) (Supp. V 1987).
363. 40 C.F.YR, § 264 (1989).
364. SWDA § 3004(o)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(o)(1) (Supp. V 1987). "Liner" is
defined by SWDA § 3005(j)(12(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(j)(12)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
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liners and leachate collection systems may be approved on a site specific
basis by EPA.Y
Groundwater monitoring is required also for all other surface
impoundments, waste piles, land treatment units and landfills regard-
less of date of first operation.m Certain surface impoundments
existing on November 8, 1984, are exempt from the double liner
requirement. These have at least one liner which is not leaking, are
located more than one quarter mile from an underground source of
drinking water, and generally are in compliance with the groundwater
monitoring requirements. 7
d. Permit Program for Disposal Facilities
Permits have been required for all existing and new hazardous
waste treatment, storage and disposal facilities since November 19,
1980.' The permit application must estimate the composition,
quantities and concentrations of hazardous wastes to be treated, stored
or disposed of, and the location of the facility.m Permits are subject
to conditions imposed by EPA "to protect human health and the
environment" 70 and the applicable performance standards. 7' Per-
mits have a fixed term not exceeding ten years.372  They may be
reviewed and modified after the first five years to assure continued
compliance with currently applicable requirements.3  When the
renewal application is made, new conditions may be imposed to reflect
improvements in control and measurement technologies and changes in
applicable regulations.37 4
365. SWDA § 3004(o)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(o)(2) (Supp. V 1987).
366. SWDA §§ 3004(p), 3005(i)-(j), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924(p), 6925(i)-(6) (Supp. V
1987). The groundwater monitoring regulations were upheld in Chemical Waste
Management, Inc. v. EPA, 649 F. Supp. 347 (D.D.C. 1986).
367. SWDA § 3005(j)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 69250)(2) (Supp. V 1987).
368. SWDA § 3005(a), (e), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a), (e) (Supp. V 1987). For
regulations, see 40 C.F.R. § 270 (1982).
369. SWDA § 3005(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(b) (1982).
370. SWDA § 3005(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(c)(3) (Supp. V 1987).
371. SWDA § 3005(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(c)(1) (Supp. V 1987) (cross-
referencing SWDA § 3004, 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (Supp. V 1987)). The substantive
performance standards are described in the consolidated permit regulations. 40
C.F.R., § 122.1-124.128 (1989).









Unlike the federal water and air pollution control programs, SWDA
does not require continuous reporting by owners or operators of
hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal facilities. They must,
however, keep records375 and furnish this information to federal or
state inspectors upon demand. 76 The inspectors may take samples of
wastes. 7 7  Mandatory inspections are required at least every two
years.3
78
Enforcement sanctions include compliance orders,379 civil penal-
ties,' permit suspension or revocation,381 and criminal fines and
imprisonment. 3 2 A person who violates SWDA requirements with
knowledge that he is placing another person in imminent danger of
death or serious bodily injury is subject to greater criminal sanc-
tions.W
3
f. Citizen Suit Provision
Not only is SWDA enforced by EPA, violations of the act can be
enforced by "any person" under the citizen suit provision.384 A prereq-
uisite to such a lawsuit is the giving of sixty days' notice to EPA, the
state regulatory agency, and the violator.' However, if EPA or the
state agency begins a civil or criminal action to require compliance with
permit conditions, performance standards, regulations, requirements, or
prohibitions, as the case may be, the citizen lawsuit is barred.Y
Similarly, a citizen suit may be brought to abate an imminent and
substantial endangerment to health or the environment, provided ninety
days' notice is given, and subject to the same bar based on SWDA or
Superfund enforcement prosecution, or Superfund cleanup study, action,
375. SWDA § 3004(a)(l)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a)(1-2) (Supp. V 1987).
376. SWDA § 3007(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6927(a) (1982).
377. Id.
378. SWDA § 3007(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6927(e) (Supp. V 1987).
379. SWDA § 3008(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) (Supp. V 1987).
380. Id ($25,000/day maximum).
381. Id.
382. SWDA § 3008(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (Supp. V 1987) ($50,000/day
and/or 2 years maximum). The sanctions can be doubled for second and
subsequent offenses.
383. SWDA § 3008(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (Supp. V 1987) ($250,000 or 15
years maximum; fine for organizations is $1,000,000 maximum).
384. SWDA § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (Supp. V 1987).
385. SWDA § 7002(b)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
386. SWDA § 7002(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1987).
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or court order.3 7 Citizen suits are not permitted to challenge the
siting of a hazardous waste treatment, storage or disposal facility or
issuance of a permit.'
g. Imminent Hazard Provisions
Upon information received, EPA may determine the presence or
release of a hazardous waste from a post-enactment facility or site
presents a substantial hazard to human health or the environment. 9
In that event, it may require the owner or operator to conduct monitor-
ing, testing, analysis and reporting to ascertain the nature and extent
of the hazard. ° If no owner or operator is able to carry it out, EPA
may do so itself or authorize a state or local agency to do so.
391
EPA may sue any past or present generator, transporter or owner
or operator of a solid or hazardous waste treatment, storage or disposal
facility or site who presents "an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment to health or the environment." The suit seeks to restrain any
activity which would present an endangerment in the future and to
cleanup or pay for cleanup of the results of activity in the past.392
"Imminent and substantial endangerment" is activity which poses a
"risk of harm" or "potential harm;" however, proof of actual harm is not
required.83
h. Delegation to States
States are authorized to devise their own hazardous waste
management programs.N These programs must incorporate all
federal minimum performance standards and permitting requirements,
or their substantial equivalents. 395 Federally-approved state programs
387. SWDA § 7002(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2) (Supp. V 1987).
388. SWDA § 7002(b)(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(D) (Supp. V 1987).
389. Releases from preenactment facilities and sites are handled under the
Superfund Act § 106.42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1982), discussed infra notes 478-96 and
accompanying text.
390. SWDA § 3013(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6934(a) (1982).
391. SWDA § 3013(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6934(d) (1982).
392. SWDA § 7003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (Supp. V 1987).
The courts have upheld the constitutionality of the statutory provision
making former owners liable for cleanup costs. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d
204 (3d Cir. 1982).
393. United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Ark.
1980).
394. SWDA § 3006,42 U.S.C. § 6926 (Supp. V 1987).
395. SWDA § 3006(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (Supp. V 1987). For regulations,
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operate in lieu of the federal program, and state regulatory actions have
the same force and effect as federal actions.39 If EPA determines that
a state program is administering its program out of compliance with
federal requirements, EPA may withdraw federal approval of the state
program and reinstitute the federal program.
397
i. Regulation of Hazardous Waste in Missouri
The Missouri Hazardous Waste Management Lawm was enacted
in 1977m9 to establish a regulatory program for hazardous wastes. It
has received federal approval.4 °° The federal program is in abeyance
in Missouri and only the state manifest and permit program operates
within Missouri. Except for, inter alia, waste discharges from point
sources, injections as part of oil and gas operations, and strip mine
wastes, 40 1 all of which are regulated under other statutes, wastes4 2
whose physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may cause or
significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in
serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness, or pose a
present or potential threat to human health or the environment are
subject to regulation under the statute. °3 In general, the policies and
methods of regulation under Hazardous Waste Management Law are
similar to those set out in the Solid Waste Disposal Act.
Permits are required for hazardous waste landfills and other
disposal facilities.404 Facility plans and an environmental and eco-
nomic profile, including the extent of groundwater contamination, must
be submitted with a permit application.40 5 The permit has a term not
exceeding ten years, and is reviewable for modification after five
years.4°6 Landfills built after October 31, 1980, must have a leachate
collection system.
40 7
see 40 C.F.R. § 271 (1989).
396. SWDA § 3006(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(d) (1982).
397. SWDA § 3006(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(e) (1982).
398. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 260.350-.430 (1986 & Supp. 1989).
399. 1977 Mo. Laws 415.
400. 40 C.F.R § 272 (1989).
401. Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.355 (1986).
402. "Wastes" are discarded materials and residual materials. Id
§ 260.360(19) (1986).
403. Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.360(10) (Supp. 1989).
404. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 260.375(12), 260.395-7 (1986 & Supp 1989). For
regulations, see Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 25-7.270 (1989).
405. Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.395-7(2), (5) (Supp. 1989).
406. Id § 260.395-12 (Supp. 1989).
407. Id § 260.395-18; see Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 25-7.264(F) (1989).
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Variances may be granted where the usual requirements will result
in "an arbitrary and unreasonable taking of property or in the practical
closing and elimination of any lawful business, occupation, or activi-
ty... without sufficient corresponding benefit or advantage to the
people."4°  Variances shall not be granted if such relief is prohibited
by the requirements of the federal Solid Waste Disposal Act, or if it will
permit "the continuance of a condition which unreasonably poses a
present or potential threat to the health of humans or other living
organisms.
4 9
Enforcement includes inspection powers,410 compliance orders,
411
injunctive relief,412 civil penalties,411 criminal fines and imprison-
ment,414 permit suspension or revocation, 415 and abatement activities
and recovery of cleanup costs. 416 Habitual violators whose violations
have posed a threat to human health or the environment may not be
issued a permit.417 Emergency action may be taken to mitigate
imminent hazards.41 Common law and other civil and criminal
remedies to enjoin public and private nuisances are preserved. 410
There is no citizen suit provision in the state statute.
Regulations have been established under the statute.420 Some of
them address surface and ground water quality concerns. They provide
detailed design and performance standards for siting, liners, leachate
collection systems, and monitoring systems.
4 2 1
408. Mo. REv. STAT. 260.405-1 (1986).
409. Id.
410. Id. § 260.377.
411. Id § 260.410(3).
412. Id. § 260.425(1).
413. Id § 260.425(1) ($10,000 per day maximum).
414. Id. § 260.425(3) ($2,500 to $25,000 per day and/or up to 1 year).
415. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 260.395(10), 260.410(4) (1986 & Supp. 1989).
416. Mo. REV. STAT. § 260.375(29) (1986).
417. Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.395(16) (Supp. 1989). This provision may be
applied to preenactment activity. Jerry-Russell Bliss, Inc. v. Hazardous Waste
Comm'n, 702 S.W.2d 77 (Mo. 1985).
418. Mo. REV. STAT. § 260.420(1) (1986). Such actions may include seeking
temporary injunctive relief.
419. Id. § 260.415(3) (1986).
420. See Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 25-7.270 (1989).
421. See id. § 25-7.264 (1989).
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3. Regulation of Hazardous Waste Injection
Into Groundwater
As an alternative to burying hazardous wastes, underground
injection of liquid wastes has been tried. That is a bad practice because
of the likelihood that this liquid waste will migrate to potable ground-
water aquifers. Hence, injection wells now are subject to federal and
state regulation.
In states without a federally approved state hazardous waste
management program, EPA operates a permit system for authorizing
the operation of those facilities, including underground injection
wells. 422 They are subject to the specific and general performance
standards discussed in subsection 2 above.
Injection of certain hazardous wastes into underground water
formations is prohibited by SWDA under certain circumstances. Heavy
metal wastes, dioxin and certain solvents cannot be injected into
underground water formations pending a 45-month study.42 The
regulations were issued in 1988.42
In addition to this regulation of hazardous waste injection under
SWDA, Congress has established a partially overlapping program
regulating injection of any wastes into groundwater aquifers used as a
source for drinking water.4  Since May 8, 1985, it has been unlawful
to inject any hazardous wastes into an underground water formation
used as a source for drinking water within one quarter mile of the
injection well or above such a formation.41
Missouri prohibits all underground injection of hazardous
wastes.42 Its prohibition is approved by EPA as satisfying federal
requirements.
42
4. Regulation of Underground Storage Tanks
Underground storage tanks present a significant threat for localized
groundwater pollution. EPA estimates that there are about 2,000,000
underground storage tanks nationwide, of which 95% hold petroleum
422. See generally 2 D. STEVER, supra note 9, § 7.04(4).
423. SWDA § 3004(t), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(0 (Supp. V 1987).
424. See 53 Fed. Reg. 28,118 (1988) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. § 148
(1989)).
425. SDWA §8 1421-24,42 U.S.C. 88 300h to 300h-3 (1982 & Supp. V 1987),
discussed supra notes 301-32 and accompanying text.
426. Pub. L. No. 98-616, § 405(a), 98 Stat. 3273 (1984), amended by Pub. L.
No. 99-339, § 201(c), 100 Stat. 654 (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. § 6939b(a)).
427. Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.424 (1986).
428. 40 C.F.R. §§ 147.1300-.1301 (1989).
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products and the other 5% hold non-petroleum hazardous substances.
About one-half of the petroleum tanks are located at gas stations, of
which 80% are bare-steel tanks which lack corrosion protection and
account for the majority of leaks. EPA estimates that about 10,000
tanks are leaking in the United States.42 Common law cases
demonstrate the danger from leaking underground storage tanks.
430
In 1984, Congress added provisions to SWDA regulating installation
and use of underground storage tanks holding petroleum products or
other substances regulated under the act.43' Those provisions were
intended to regulate a major source of leakage of contaminants into
groundwater. As with the remainder of SWDA, Congress intended that
the main burden of day-to-day administration of the UGST program was
to be assumed by the states, under overall policies established by the act
and federal regulations.
In 1989, Missouri enacted a regulatory system for underground
storage tanks.4 2 The statute parallels the federal provision, since it
was designed to meet the federal approval standards required for the
state to assume responsibility for regulation. The Missouri statute also
creates a regulatory system parallelling the federal system. It includes
registration of existing and new tanks, performance standards, financial
responsibility requirements, and an insurance trust fund for cleanup.
429. Underground Tanks: Two Million Storage Tanks Must Retrofit to Meet
Technical Standards in EPA Final Rule, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 980 (Sept. 16,
1988); Underground Tanks: EPA Issues Storage Tank Final Rules for
Construction, State Program Requirements, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1116 (Sept. 30,
1988).
430. See, e.g., Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Bennett, 123 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1941);
Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Keister, 64 F.2d 537 (6th Cir. 1933); North Georgia
Petroleum Co. v. Lewis, 128 Ga. App. 653, 197 S.E.2d 437 (1973); Yommer v.
McKenzie, 255 Md. 220, 257 A.2d 138 (1969); Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 69 Md.
App. 124, 516 A.2d 990 (1986); Gendreau v. C.K. Smith & Co., Inc., 22 Mass.
App. 989,497 N.E.2d 16 (1986). Relief was denied on the facts in a similar case
in Missouri. Bollinger v. Mungle, 175 S.W.2d 912 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943).
431. SWDA §§ 3004(w), 9001-09, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924(w), 6991-91h (Supp V
1987), added by Pub. L. No. 98-616, tit. VI, § 601(a), 98 Stat. 3277 (1984). See
generally 2 LAw OF HAZARDOUS WAsTE ch. 7 (8. Cooke ed. 1987-89); R. Beck &
C. Goplerud, supra note 9, § 242, at 335-36; 1 F. GRAD, supra note 9, § 4.03 (10);
S. NovICK, D. STEVER & M. MELLON, supra note 9, § 13.04; D. STEVER, supra
note 9, § 7.04(3).
432. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 319.100-.137 (Supp. 1989).
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a. Definition of Regulated
Underground Storage Tanks
Underground storage tanks containing petroleum or any hazardous
substance defined by the federal Superfund Act are subject to regulation
under the federal and state underground storage tank provisions, except
those hazardous substances which are already regulated under the
hazardous waste provisions of the federal Solid Waste Disposal Act and
the state Hazardous Waste Disposal Law.43 All underground tanks
and incidental piping are regulated under the act, except the following:
(1) small noncommercial farm and residential tanks storing motor
fuel (1100 gallons or less);
(2) heating oil tanks for on-site consumptive use;
(3) septic tanks;
(4) pipeline facilities regulated under federal or state laws;
(5) surface impoundments, pits, ponds and lagoons;
(6) storm water or waste water collection systems;
(7) flow-through process tanks;
(8) liquid traps related to oil or gas production or gathering
operations;
(9) storage tanks located in basements, mines or other under-
ground areas. 4U
b. Notification and Registration
Owners of existing regulated underground storage tanks must give
notice to EPA of their location, age, size, type and uses by May 8,
1986.4  Owners of such tanks taken out of service after January 1,
1974, and not removed from the ground thereafter, must give such
notice, together with the date of removal from service.43 Owners of
new regulated tanks must give such notice within thirty days of their
entry into service.4' Notice is to be given to the state or local agen-
cies specified by each state.43  Missouri designated the Department
of Natural Resources as the state agency to receive UGST notices.
Under the new Missouri provisions, owners of existing regulated
underground storage tanks currently in operation or removed from
433. SWDA § 9001(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6991(2) (Supp. V 1987); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 319.100(6) (1986).
434. SWDA § 9001(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6991(1) (Supp. V 1987); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 319.100(8) (1986).
435. SWDA § 9002(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6991a(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
436. SWDA § 9002(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6991a(a)(2) (Supp. V 1987).
437. SWDA § 9002(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6991a(a)(3) (Supp. V 1987).
438. SWDA § 9002(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6991a(b) (Supp. V 1987).
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service after January 1, 1974, must give notice to DNR by November 26,
1989.' New tanks must be registered within thirty days after being
brought into use." ° Notice must be given thirty days prior to taking
a tank out of service.4 1 The registration fee for tanks in service on
August 28, 1989, is $15 per year paid in five year increments.442
Registration may be denied for fraudulent or deceptive registration,




EPA was required to establish performance standards for new
underground storage tanks by November 8, 1987,44 and for new and
existing tanks storing petroleum products by May 8, 1987." 5 Those
performance standards are to regulate construction and lining charac-
teristics,"6  leak detection, recordkeeping and reporting, release
response actions, closure, and financial responsibility.447 Prior to the
effective date of those permanent performance standards, underground
storage tanks were to be constructed to avoid releases due to corrosion
or structure failure, to have cathodic protection against corrosion or be
constructed of noncorrosive materials, and to have linings appropriate
to the substance being stored." The Act's financial responsibility
provisions require coverage of at least $1,000,000 for classes of large
tanks and lesser amounts for classes of small tanks.4
9
Permanent federal performance standards became effective on
December 22, 1988.4' New underground storage tanks are subject to
439. Mo. REv. STAT. § 319.103(1)-(2) (Supp. 1989).
440. Id. 88 319.103(3), .120.
441. Id. § 319.103(6).
442. Id. § 319.123.
443. Id § 319.125.
444. SWDA § 9003(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(f)(2) (Supp. V 1987).
445. SWDA § 9003(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6991a(f)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
446. SWDA § 9003(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(b) (Supp. V 1987). Factors to be
taken into account are listed in this subsection.
447. SWDA § 9003(c), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(c) (Supp. V 1987).
448. SWDA § 9003(g), 42 U.S.C. § 6991a(g) (Supp. V 1987).
449. SWDA § 9003(d)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(d)(5) (Supp. V 1987). Evidence
of fimancial responsibility may be insurance, guarantee, insurance, surety bond,
letter of credit, qualification as a self-insurer, or other method satisfactory to
EPA. SWDA § 9003(d)(.1), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(d)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
450. For technical requirements, 53 Fed. Reg. 37,082 (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 280
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strict construction standards. All tank operators are subject to monthly
monitoring and periodic testing requirements, and cleanup and closure
requirements. These regulations also impose performance standards on
existing underground storage tanks. Existing petroleum tanks must be
retrofitted with corrosion protection and spill and overflow prevention
systems within ten years, although single-walled tanks will be allowed
to remain. Leak detection systems must be retrofitted much more
quickly, within one year for tanks twenty-five years or older, within five
years for tanks less than ten years old, and on a sliding scale for tanks
between ten and twenty-five years old. Many leak detection systems are
provided for, varying from tight inventory control systems coupled with
an annual tightness test to a groundwater monitoring system. The
same retrofitting requirements apply to existing chemical tanks. In
addition, chemical tanks must be retrofitted with the dual-containment
and leak detection systems applied to new chemical tanks within ten
years. Those requirements include double-walled tanks, concrete vaults,
and leak detection systems between the containment layers.
ii. Missouri
DNR is required to establish state performance standards for new
underground storage tanks (brought into service after August 28, 1989)
and for upgrading tanks existing before that date. They must include
standards on design, construction, installation, piping, release detection,
operation, and compatibility.4 5' Also, they must include requirements
for reporting releases and tank closure.452 Until permanent perfor-
mance standards are issued, underground storage tanks are to be
constructed to avoid releases due to corrosion or structural failure, to
have cathodic protection, to be constructed of noncorrosive materials or
with noncorrosive linings appropriate to the substance being stored, or
to be designed to prevent releases.
453
d. Financial Responsibility
The federal financial responsibility requirements take effect
between October 26, 1989, and October 26, 1990, depending on the
number of tanks owned by an operator. Tank owners must demonstrate
financial responsibility to take corrective action and to compensate third
(1989). For approval of state regulatory programs, 53 Fed. Reg. 37,212 (1988);
40 C.F.R. § 281 (1989).
451. Mo. REv. STAT. § 319.105(1) (1986).
452. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 319.109, .111 (Supp. 1989).
453. Id § 319.105(2) (Supp. 1989). Leak detection performance standards
are to be issued under Mo. REV. STAT. § 319.107 (Supp. 1989).
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parties. The amount of coverage is determined by facts related to the
tank structure and tank owner; it must be sufficient to cover either
$500,000 or $1,000,000 per occurrence, and either $1,000,000 or
$2,000,000 annual aggregate costs.4"
In Missouri, tank owners and operators are required to maintain
evidence of financial responsibility "in an amount and form sufficient for
taking corrective action and compensating third parties for bodily injury
and property damage caused by sudden and nonsudden accidental
releases."4  The amount of financial responsibility shall not exceed
that required by EPA under the federal act.4
In addition to the annual state registration fee, the owner or
operator of a tank in service on August 28, 1989, must pay a one-time
fee of $100 by December 31, 1989. The one-time fee for new tanks must
be paid within thirty days after the tank is brought into service.467
Both the annual registration fee and the one-time fee will be deposited
in the "Underground Tank Insurance Fund," which will be available for
cleanup costs not paid by a tank owner or operator.4  Owners and
operators may meet their financial responsibility obligations up to
$1,000,000 by insuring through the Fund, subject to a $25,000 deduct-
ible, a 50% copayment for liabilities between $25,000 and $50,000, and
a 25% copayment for liabilities between $50,000 and $100,000. 411
e. Petroleum Release Response Program
EPA is authorized to require an owner/operator of an underground
storage tank which is releasing petroleum to take corrective action or to
take corrective action itself to protect human health and the environ-
ment.460 This corrective action may include temporary or permanent
relocation of residents and providing alternative household water
supplies.46' EPA uses funds in the Leaking Underground Storage
454. 40 C.F.R. § 280.93 (1989).
455. Mo. REv. STAT. § 319.114(1) (Supp. 1989). Evidence of financial
responsibility may be a cash trust fund, guarantee, insurance, surety or
performance bond, letter of credit, qualification as a self-insurer, or other
method satisfactory to DNR. Id § 319.114(2) (Supp. 1989).
456. Id. § 319.114(3), referring to SWDA § 9003(d)(5), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6991b(d)(5) (Supp. V 1987). See supra note 459.
457. Mo. REV. STAT. § 319.129 (Supp. 1989).
458. Id §8 319.123, .129.
459. Id. § 319.131, .133.
460. SWDA § 9003(h)(l)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(h)(1-2) (Supp V 1987).
461. SWDA § 9003(h)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(h)(5) (Supp. V 1987).
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Tank Trust Fund for payment of costs of corrective actions,462 which
may be recovered from the owner/operator.4
The Missouri statute does not contain a special provision dealing
with emergency responses. The general enforcement provision
authorizing compliance orders and temporary and permanent injunc-
tions could be used to deal with emergency responses.4" In order to
facilitate emergency responses, the statute provides that no person shall
be liable for releases of petroleum or other actions taken or omitted at
the direction of a state response coordinator, except as a result of gross
negligence or intentional, reckless, willful or wanton misconduct.
46
f Enforcement
Federal enforcement consists of compliance orders, corrective action
orders, civil injunctions, and civil penalties.4 6 Missouri enforcement
consists of compliance orders, civil injunctions, and civil penalties.467
g. Citizen Suit Provision
The general SWDA citizen suit provision appears to apply to the
underground storage tank regulatory program.46 The Missouri
statute does not contain a citizen suit provision.
h. Delegation to States
States which adopt regulatory programs complying with federal
standards and requirements may operate them in lieu of the federal
program.469  These federal requirements include requiring leak
462. SWDA § 9003(h)(1)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(h)(1-2) (Supp. V 1987).
463. SWDA § 9003(h)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(h)(6) (Supp. V 1987).
464. Mo. REV. STAT. § 319.127(1) (Supp. 1989).
465. Id § 319.135.
466. SWDA §§ 9003(h)(4), 9006(a)-(d), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991b(h)(4), 699le(a)-(d)
(Supp. V 1987). Maximum civil penalties are $10,000/day for violations of the
act, regulations or standards, and $25,000/day for failure to comply with
compliance or correction action orders.
467. Mo. REv. STAT. § 319.127 (Supp. 1989) (civil penalties cannot exceed
$ 10,000 per day).
468. See SWDA § 7002(a)-(c), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)-(c), which applies to viola-
tions of "any permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition,
or order which has become effective pursuant to this chapter." Id
469. SWDA § 9004(b), (d), 42 U.S.C. § 6991c(b), (d) (Supp. V 1987). EPA
may withdraw approval if a state falls out of compliance with federal minimum
standards and requirements and reinstitute the federal regulatory program.
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detection and inventory control systems, tank testing, record mainte-
nance, release reporting, corrective action, tank closure, financial
responsibility, performance standards, and tank location notification
systems.
470
Missouri's 1989 statute4 1 was designed to meet federal approval
requirements, but had not yet been approved at press time.
D. Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation & Liability Act472
Abandoned landfills and dumps containing hazardous materials
pose a great threat of contamination to groundwater and surface waters.
Missouri was the victim of eighty-six dioxin-contaminated Superfund
sites, which included the entire area of Times Beach, and several
hazardous waste disposal Superfund sites, including the Conservation
Chemical site near Kansas City.473 The threat posed by leachate from
such sites is demonstrated by common law cases.
474
In 1980, Congress enacted the "Superfund Act" to clean up
abandoned hazardous waste disposal sites.475  It supplements the
Solid Waste Disposal Act which regulates the operation and closure of
hazardous waste disposal facilities in operation on or established after
its 1976 enactment date. The Superfund Act covers sites closed before
that date, or after that date where the owner/operator of the facility or
of the land cannot be found or has gone out of existence. Also, the Act
SWDA § 9004(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6991c(e) (Supp. V 1987).
470. SWDA § 9004(a), 42 U.S.C.§ 6991c(a) (Supp. V 1987).
471. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 319.100-.137 (Supp. 1989).
472. Pub. L. No.96-510,94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
9601-9675 (Supp. V 1987)) [hereinafter CERCLA].
473. Missouri Dioxin Task Force Final Report, app. IV (Oct. 31, 1983);
Dioxin: Quandary for the 80's, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 14, 1983, at 20-21
[special section]; Mo. DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES CONFIRMED ABANDONED OR
UNCONTROLLED HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL SITES IN MissouRi F.Y. 1987
(1988).
474. See generally New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir.
1985); Kenney v. Scientific, Inc., 204 N.J. Super. 228, 497 A.2d 1310 (1985);
Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
475. CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96-510,94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (Supp. V 1987). See generally ENVIRONMNTAL LAW
HANDBOOK, supra note 9, ch. 10 (10th ed. 1989); 2 LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE
chs. 12-14 (S. Cooke, ed. 1987-89); 2 J. DAVIDSON & 0. DELOGU, supra note 9,
ch 6; 1A F. GRAD, supra note 9, § 4A.02; S. NOVICK, D. STEVER & M. MAELLON,
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addresses clean up of accidental releases which pose an imminent
hazard.
One of the principal dangers posed by abandoned hazardous waste
disposal sites is percolation of the hazardous materials into groundwater
aquifers. This discussion will emphasize the Superfund provisions
related to groundwater contamination.
Unlike the other federal environmental regulatory statutes, the
Superfund Act does not contemplate the states taking over cleanup of
abandoned hazardous waste disposal sites. Instead, it provides for
supplemental state liability requirements." ,Missouri has enacted a
state superfund law which creates both a fund and a listing of aban-
doned hazardous waste sites. 77
1. Abatement of Abandoned Hazardous Waste
Disposal Sites
Corrective action under the federal Superfund Act is triggered by
notice to the National Response Center of EPA of the location of a
release of a hazardous material into the environment which poses an
imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare.47
Releases from licensed hazardous waste disposal facilities are dealt with
under the imminent hazard provision of SWDA.4 79 All other acciden-
tal releases are handled under the Superfund Act.
Remedial action under the Superfund Act is undertaken consistent
with the National Contingency Plan.480 Remedial actions can include
treatment, or removal and offsite disposal."' It is conducted either by
EPA, the owner/operator of the facility or land, or other responsible
party. 48 2 The remedial action must be pursuant to a prior-approved
plan.483 The plan must include measures to restore ground and
surface water quality to a level which assures protection of human
health and the environment. 4
476. CERCLA § 114(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a).
477. Mo. REv. STAT. N8 260.391, 260.435-.550 (1986).
478. CERCLA § 103(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a). Studies may be conducted to
determine whether a release has occurred. CEROLA § 104(b), 42 U.S.C. §
9604(b). For regulations, see 40 C.F.R § 302 (1989).
479. See SWDA § 3013, 42 U.S.C. § 6934 (Supp. V 1987), discussed supra
notes 389-93 and accompanying text.
480. CERCLA § 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a).
481. CERCLA § 121(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b).
482. CERCLA § 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a).
483. Id.
484. CERCLA § 104(c)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(6).
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The cost of remedial action, regardless of who conducts it, is borne
by the owner/operator of the facility where the release occurred, or by
the owner of the land on which the facility is located.485 Recoverable
are cleanup costs, other response costs, damages for injury to or
destruction of natural resources, and health assessment costs. 4 s
Liability is limited to $5,000,000 for overland transportation operations,
and $50,000,000 plus response costs for stationary facilities. 48 7 If the
release was the result of willful misconduct, willful negligence, or
violation of regulation, or if the owner/operator fails or refuses to
reasonably cooperate with response activities, there is no limit to
liability and full response costs and damages may be recovered.48
All cleanup costs incurred after enactment of the Superfund Act in
1980 may be recovered regardless of whether the release occurred before
or after that date.489 The Superfund Response Fund ultimately will
pay cleanup costs only if recovery cannot be obtained from an own-
er/operator.4 ° The state in which the release is located must fund ten
percent of unreimbursed cleanup costs.
49
'
485. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) ("owner or operator of... a
facility"). "Facility" is defined to include the area where the hazardous material
has been "deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be
located." CERCLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
Former owners of facilities remain liable under CERCLA. See United States
v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 844-45 (W.D.
Mo. 1984); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1113
(D. Minn. 1982). Current owners of land on which former disposal facilities
were located are liable. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d
Cir. 1985).
Off-site generators of hazardous wastes are liable. CERCLA § 107(a)(3), 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3). See New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 302
(N.D.N.Y. 1984); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135,
1148-49 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
486. CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(C). See defenses in CERCLA
§ 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
487. CERCLA § 107(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(1).
488. CERCLA § 107(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(2).
489. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F.
Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
490. No monies can be spent from the Fund until after a claim for reim-
bursement of response costs is made against a responsible party and the claim
remains unsatisfied for 60 days thereafter. Also, no monies can be spent from
the Fund during the pendancy of an action to recovery response costs from a
responsible party. CERCLA § 112(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(a). EPA has adopted the
practice of always seeking reimbursement of response costs before spending
monies from the Fund.
491. CERCLA § 104(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3).
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EPA may enter into agreements with potentially responsible parties
to perform response activities, provided EPA determines that the
response activity will be properly conducted.4" The settlement
agreement may include reimbursement from the Superfund,49' a
determination of the extent of future liability of potentially responsible
parties, 494 a consent decree for that amount of liability,495 and a
covenant by the United States not to sue for recovery of additionalliability.496
a. National Contingency Plan
Cleanup and remedial actions take place under the national
contingency plan.497 The plan provides for: (1) methods for discover-
ing and investigating hazardous waste disposal facilities; (2) methods
for evaluating and remedying any releases or threatened releases from
facilities which pose substantial danger to the public health or the
environment; (3) methods and criteria for determining the appropriate
extent of removal, remedy, or other authorized measures; (4) determin-
ing and assigning appropriate roles and responsibilities to various levels
of government and government entities in carrying out the plan; (5)
providing for identification, procurement, maintenance, and storage of
response equipment and supplies; (6) determining means of assuring
that remedial actions are cost-effective; and (7) determining priorities
among releases or threatened releases for the purpose of taking effective
remedial and removal actions.4' The plan must include an assess-
ment of the human health risks from contamination or potential
contamination of surface water used for recreation or of drinking water
directly or indirectly by hazardous substances or pollutants from
hazardous waste sites and facilities.49
492. CERCLA § 122(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a).
493. CERCLA § 122(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(b).
494. CERCLA § 122(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(c).
495. CERCLA § 122(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d).
496. CERCLA § 122(f)(1)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(1-2). However, such a
covenant not to sue does not bar suit by the United States to recover liability for
remedial actions resulting from conditions not known at the time of the consent
decree. CERCLA § 122(f)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(6).
497. The plan was prepared under CERCLA § 105,42 U.S.C. § 9605. It is
published at 40 C.F.R § 300 (1989).
498. CERCLA § 105(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a).
499. CERCLA § 105(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(c)(2).
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b. National Priorities List
As part of the national contingency plan, EPA annually prepares a
national priority list of sites and facilities meriting cleanup.0° The
list establishes a ranking based on the relative risk or danger to public
health or the environment. Criteria for ranking include: the population
at risk, the hazard potential of the hazardous substances at the site or
facility, the potential for contamination of drinking water supplies, the
potential for direct human contact, the potential for destruction of
sensitive ecosystems, the damage to natural resources which may affect
the human food chain, the contamination or potential contamination of
the ambient air, and the preparedness of the State to assume the ten
percent state share of costs.5°' The first 100 sites on the list include
at least one site selected by each state. 2 High priority is given to
sites or facilities where the release of hazardous substances has caused
the closing of drinking water wells or has contaminated a principal
drinking water supply. 3 As of March 31, 1989, the National Priority
List contained 848 sites, including twelve in Missouri.'
c. Missouri Provisions
The Missouri superfund act is similar in its structure. °5  It
contains equivalents to the National Contingency Plan and the National
Priority List. It provides for a hazardous substance emergency response
plan' ° and a registry of abandoned or uncontrolled sites, with priority
of importance.' The Missouri registry lists fifty-two hazardous waste
sites." Leachate from thirteen sites is known to have percolated into
groundwater aquifers.' Transfer of ownership of a listed site is
500. CERCLA § 105(a)(8)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B).
501. CERCLA § 105(a)(8)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(A).
502. CERCLA § 105(a)(8)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B).
503. CERCLA § 118, 42 U.S.C. § 9618.
504. The National Priority List is at 40 C.F.R. § 300, app. B (1989). The list
is being added to frequently. For a list of recent amendments, see 19 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 46,011 (Dec. 1989).
505. Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.435-.550 (1986 & Supp. 1989). For regulations,
see Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 25-10.010 (1987).
506. Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.505 (1986).
507. Id. § 260.440, .450 (1986).
508. Mo. DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, CONFIRMED ABANDONED OR
UNCONTROLLED HAZARDous WASTE DISPOSAL SIrES IN IssouRI F.Y. 1987
(1988).
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prohibited without the approval of the Department of Natural Resourc-
es.510 DNR has authority to conduct remedial actions.51  There is
strict liability for the cost of remedial action by the state.
512
2. Imminent Hazard Provisions
In the event an actual or threatened release of hazardous substanc-
es poses an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public
health or the environment from an abandoned site, EPA may obtain
abatement by issuing a cleanup order or seeking injunctive relief. If the
person required to abate under the order or injunction is not liable for
response costs under the Act, he may seek reimbursement from the
Hazardous Substances Superfund. Response actions are to conform to
the National Contingency Plan. 13
Missouri DNR also has power to take necessary actions "to clean up
such hazardous substance or end such hazardous substance emergen-
cy.1 14
3. Enforcement
Refusal to comply with a cleanup order or an order pursuant to a
settlement agreement subjects the violator to a civil penalty of $25,000
per violation. 51 5 The same penalty may be assessed each day such a
refusal to comply continues. 516 For second and subsequent violations,
the civil penalty may be increased to $75,000 per day.517 Refusal to
comply with a state cleanup order may subject the violator to punitive
damages not exceeding three times cleanup costs.
518
a. Preservation of Common Law Rights
Common law and statutory rights of action cognizable under state
law remain unaffected by enactment of the federal Superfund Act.
5 19
The Act extends any state statutes of limitation to the period of
limitations specified by the Act for personal injury or property damage
510. Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.465 (Supp. 1989).
511. Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.510 (1986).
512. Id § 260.530.
513. CERCLA § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606.
514. Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.510(1)(3) (1986).
515. CERCLA § 109(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9609(a)(1).
516. CERCLA § 109(b), (c), 42 U.S.C. § 9609(b), (c).
517. Id.
518. Mo. REV. STAT. § 260.530-1 (1986).
519. CERCLA § 310(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(h).
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caused by exposure to hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants
released into the environment from a hazardous waste site or facili-
ty.52
0
There does not appear to be any parallel Missouri provision
preserving common law rights; however, it seems unlikely that a court
would hold that they are preempted by the state superfund law.
b. Citizen Suit Provision
The Superfund Act contains a typical citizen suit provision which
allows any person to bring suit against any other person, including any
federal, state or local governmental entity, to enforce the Act, or
regulation, standard, condition, requirement or order issued pursuant
to the Act.5 21 Prerequisites to such lawsuits are: (1) the giving of sixty
days notice to EPA, the state agency and the alleged violator;62 and
(2) failure of EPA or the state agency to initiate a compliance lawsuit
by the end of that sixty day period." a Like in most Missouri environ-
mental regulatory statutes, there is not a citizen suit provision in the
state superfund law.
4. The Superfund
Both the federal and state superfund acts establish dedicated
cleanup funds funded by taxes on the production of hazardous chemicals
and petroleum.5 '
520. CERCLA § 309(a), 42 U.S.C. §8 9658(a), 9659(h). The Superfund
statute of limitations is set forth in CERCLA § 113(g-h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g-h).
521. CERCLA § 310, 42 U.S.C. § 9659. The Supreme Court held in
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989), that Congress has the
constitutional authority to override a state's sovereign immunity protected by
the Eleventh Amendment, that such action must be done by express statutory
language, and that it had done so by defining "person... who is alleged to be
in violation" as including a "State." See CERCLA §§ 310(a)(1), 310(i), 101(21),
42 U.S.C. §§ 9659(a)(1), 9659(i), 9601(21).
522. CERCLA § 310(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(d)(1).
523. CERCLA § 310(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(d)(2).
524. Hazardous Substance Superfund Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
§ 517(a), 100 Stat. 1772 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 9507); CEROLA
§ 111, 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (Supp. V 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 260.475-.480 (1986).
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E. Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Act525
State common law does not require restoration of the surface
following completion of surface mining," and vast areas of unre-
claimed surface mined land were created in the first seven decades of
the twentieth century.5 27 Among the many destructive aspects of
surface mining methods is pollution of surface water and groundwater
by acid and toxic materials associated with coal seams which are
exposed and liberated by the mining process. The danger posed by
surface mining is illustrated by common law cases.
528
To mitigate the adverse environmental and property value effects
of the rapidly growing amount of devastated land, some states and later
Congress enacted remedial legislation requiring reclamation of surface
coal mined land. Many, but not all, coal mining states enacted statutes
regulating surface mining methods and requiring reclamation. Missouri
was a latecomer among that number, enacting its first statute in
1971. 52
The federal Surface Mining and Reclamation Act was enacted in
1977 to regulate the location and technique of surface mining of coal
525. Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 447 (1977) (codified as amended at 30
U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982)) [hereinafter SMRCA].
526. Comment, The Common Law Rights to Subjacent Support and Surface
Preservation, 38 Mo. L. REV. 234 (1973); Annotation, Grant, Reservation or
Lease of Minerals and Mining Rights as Including, Without Expressly so
Providing, the Right to Remove the Minerals by Surface Mining, 70 A.L.R.3d
383-521 (1976). Cf Bonds v. Sanchez O'Brien Oil & Gas Co., 715 S.W.2d 444
(Ark. 1986).
527. By 1965, 3,200,000 acres had been surface mined for various minerals,
of which 2,000,000 acres had not been reclaimed. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
SURFACE MINING AND OUR ENV'T (1967), cited in H. CAUDILL, MY LAND IS DYING
23 (1971). In Missouri, 67,000 acres were surfaced mined before 1971.
Although much of that land has recovered through natural processes, about
26,000 acres remain barren and continue to cause environmental problems. Mo.
DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, MIssOURI's LAND RECLAMATION PROGRAM-1989
REPORT 5.
528. See Williams v. M.C. West Constr. Co., 579 S.W.2d 883 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1979); Central Indiana Coal Co. v. Goodman, 111 Ill. App. 480, 39 N.E.2d 484
(1942). The host of acid drainage from underground mine cases involve the
same polluting mechanism. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co.,
472 Pa. 115, 371 A.2d 461 (1977), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 807 (1977);
Woodward Iron Co. v. Hill, 38 Ala. App., 150,79 So. 2d 711 (1955); W.G. Duncan
Coal Co. v. Jones, 254 S.W.2d 720 (Ky. 1953); Panther Coal Co. v. Looney, 185
Va. 758, 40 S.E.2d 298 (1946).
529. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 444.500-.755 (1986 & Supp. 1989).
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and the subsequent reclamation of the mined land.m Among the
concerns addressed was contamination of surface watercourses and
groundwater aquifers by acid and toxic drainage from exposed forma-
tions, overburden, and tailings piles.
Like many other federal environmental regulatory acts, SMORA
contemplates that basic policies will be determined by the federal
government and that implementation of those policies will be done by
state agencies. Missouri has three statutes requiring reclamation of
coal mines,5' barite mines,> 2 and clay, limestone, sand, and gravel
pits.' The surface coal mining law has received federal approval and
the federal regulatory program is in abeyance. M
1. Jurisdiction Limited to Surface Coal Mines
The federal Act regulates only coal mines using surface mining
techniques.' Those techniques include contour, strip, auger, moun-
taintop removal, box cut, open pit, and area miningYm The state act
regulates "surface coal mining operations " and related activities.5 7
2. Permit System
The federal Act provides for a federal permit program." A
permit must be acquired for each year's mining activity. Application
must be made before mining activity begins.' The application must
describe the lands to be mined, the mining methods to be used,
530. Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 447 (1977) (codified as amended at 30
U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982)). On the Act generally, see 2 J. DAvmsON & 0.
DELoGu, supra note 9, ch. 10; 5 ROcKY MTN. MIN. L. INST., AMERICAN LAW OF
MINNG ch. 172 (1986).
The Act was held constitutional in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). The regulations were upheld in In re
Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 653 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 822 (1981).
531. Surface Coal Mining Law, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 444.800-.970 (1986 &
Supp. 1989).
532. Strip Mine Law, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 444.500-.755 (1986 & Supp. 1989).
533. Land Reclamation Act, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 444.760-.786 (1986 & Supp.
1989).
534. 30 C.F.R. §§ 925.10-.25 (1989).
535. SMCRA §§ 102, 701(28), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1202, 1291(28).
536. SMRCA § 701(28), 30 U.S.C. § 1291(28).
537. Mo. REv. STAT. § 444.805(15)-(16) (Supp. 1989).
538. SMCRA § 506(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1256(a). For regulations, see 30 C.F.R.
§§ 772-785 (1989).
539. SMCRA § 506(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1256(a).
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identification of hydrologic consequences of mining and reclamation
activities, and the reclamation plan to be followed.'( A permit can be
issued if: (1) reclamation can be accomplished under the proposed plan;
(2) material damage to the hydrologic balance outside the permit area
can be prevented; (3) the proposed mining area is neither "an area
designated as unsuitable for surface coal mining" nor being studied for
such designation; and (4) the necessary surface owner consent has been
obtained."' In addition, the permit applicant must file an Environ-
mental Impact Statement under the National Environmental Act.
54 2
The term of the permit cannot exceed five years,53 but it is
renewable upon compliance with the conditions attached to the original
permit.54  Performance bonds sufficient to pay for uncompleted
reclamation must be provided before the permit can be issued.5 5 The
bond will pay for reclamation not done by the permittee.
Missouri requires a permit for each year's mining activity, and
requires that the mining and reclamation be completed during the
permit's five year term, unless it is extended. 6 The permit applica-
tion must be accompanied by a reclamation plan, which must be
approved before mining can begin.' 47 Among the matters to be dealt
with are plans for controlling surface water drainage, and protecting
surface and ground waters from the adverse effects of mining and
reclamation.4 A performance bond or other approved surety must be
posted." 9
540. SMCRA § 507(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1257(b). On the scope of the reclamation
plan, see SMCRA § 508(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1258(a).
541. SMCRA § 510(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1260(b).
542. SMCRA § 702(a), (d), 30 U.S.C. § 1292(a), (d). See generally National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1982).
543. SMCRA § 506(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1256(b).
544. SMCRA § 506(d), 30 U.S.C. § 1256(d).
545. SMCRA § 509(a), 30 U.S.C.§ 1259(a). Partial release of the perfor-
mance bond may be obtained at two stages: (1) when backfilling, regrading and
drainage control has been completed (60/o release), and (2) after revegetation
has been established (retention of only that portion needed repeat revegetation).
The remainder of the bond is released five years thereafter. SMCRA §§
515((b)(20), 519(c), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1265(b)(20), 1269(c).
546. Mo. REv. STAT. § 444.815 (1986). For regulations, see Mo. CODE REGS.
tit. 10, §§ 40-6.010-.090 (1987).
547. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 444.820, .825 (1986).
548. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 444.825(1)(5), (13) (1986).
549. Mo. REv. STAT. § 444.830 (Supp. 1989). Partial release of the bond
when grading has been completed (600/6), and when revegetation has been
established. Mo. REv. STAT. § 444.875-3 (1986). For regulations, see Mo. CODE
REGS. tit. 10, § 40-7.011 (1987).
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3. Performance Standards
Surface mining must be conducted according to certain performance
standards and subject to certain prohibited activities specified in the
act.5 ° General performance standards include:
(1) a ban of highwalls, spoil piles and depressions;
(2) restoration of the surface to approximately the original contour;
(3) restoration of the topsoil, revegetation and erosion control;
(4) control of all acid-forming, toxic and flammable materials so as to
prevent contamination of the ground and surface waters;
(5) minimization of disturbance to the quantity and quality and
hydrologic balance of surface and ground waters;
(6) creation of slide and erosion barriers at the boundaries of the
mined area during mining; and
(7) downslope disposal of spoil on slopes greater than 20 degrees and
complete backfilling of bench cuts. 1
While the federal Act contemplates reclamation of the mined area for
restoration of the pre-mining use of the surface, 552 an exception may
be granted to allow a different post-mining use if: (1) it is considered an
equal or better economic or public use of the land; (2) it is compatible
with surrounding land uses and is practicable with respect to private
financial capability; and (3) it is consistent with existing state and local
land use plans.a5
The Missouri act imposes similar performance standards. 
5 4
Minimization of disturbance to the quality and quantity of ground and
surface waters is required.5
a. Prime Farmlands
Special federal requirements apply to "prime farmlands," as defined
by the U.S. Department of Agriculture.5" They cannot be mined
unless they can be restored to equal or higher levels of yields as non-
mined prime farmland in the area.557 The A and B soil horizons
550. SMCRA § 515(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1265(a).
551. SMRCA § 515(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b). For regulations, see 30 C.F.R.
§§ 810-828 (1989).
552. SMORA § 515(b)(2), 80 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(2).
553. SMCRA § 515(c)(3), 30 U.S.C. § 1265(c)(3).
554. Mo. REv. STAT. § 444.855 (1986). See regulations at Mo. CODE REGS.
tit. 10, §§ 40-3.010-3.310 (performance standards), 4.040 (steep-slopes), 5.010
(mining limitations) (1989).
555. Mo. R~v. STAT. § 444.855(2)(10) (1986). For regulations, see Mo. CODE
REGS. tit. 10, § 40-3.040 (1987).
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within the root zone must be restored in the same order to uniform
depths over the regraded spoil material.' Missouri imposes similar
requirements for prime farmlands. 9
b. Lands Unsuitable for Mining
Certain lands cannot be surface mined. The federal Act specifies
certain lands as being "unsuitable for surface coal mining." They
include:
(1) lands within National Parks, National Wildlife Refuge System,
National System of Trails, National Wilderness Preservation System,
Wild and Scenic Rivers System, and National Recreation Areas,
(2) lands within National Forests (unless the Secretary of Agriculture
determines that there are no incompatible significant recreational,
timber, economic or other values),
(3) lands where surface mining would adversely affect any publicly
owned park or places included in the National Register of Historic
Sites,
(4) lands within 100 feet of the right-of-way of any public road (unless
relocated), and
(5) lands within 300 feet from any occupied dwelling (unless waived
by the owner), public building, school, church, community building, or
institutional building, or public park, or within 100 feet from a
cemetery.wo
In addition, states are permitted to designate other lands as
unsuitable for surface coal mining. They include:
(1) lands which are technologically or economically infeasible to
reclaim,
(2) lands where surface mining is incompatible with existing state or
local land use plans,
(3) fragile or historic lands where surface mining operations could
result in significant damage to important historic, cultural, scientific,
and aesthetic values and natural systems,
(4) renewable resource lands where surface mining operations could
result in a substantial loss or reduction in long-range productivity of
water supply or of food or fiber products, including aquifers and
aquifer recharge areas, and
(5) natural hazard lands where surface mining operations could
substantially endanger life and property, including areas subject to
frequent flooding and areas of unstable geology."'
558. SMCRA § 515(b)(7), 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(7).
559. Mo. REv. STAT. § 444.855(2)(7) (1986). For regulations, see Mo. CODE
REGS. tit. 10, § 40-4.030 (1989).
560. SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e). For regulations, see 30 C.F.R.
§§ 761-769 (1989).
561. SMCRA § 522(a)(2)-(3), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a).
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Missouri forbids mining on the same areas forbidden by the federal
Act, 2 and it has established a planning process for determining
whether to declare any of those lands unsuitable for surface coal
mnng.W
3
c. Surface Owner Consent Requirement
Surfacp mining can be conducted only on lands where consent has
been obtained from the surface owner.64 Three alternative forms of
surface owner consent will satisfy the federal Act: (1) express written
consent of the surface owner; (2) a conveyance or lease which expressly
grants or reserves the right to use surface mining methods; or (3) a
surface-subsurface legal relationship established by state statutory or
common law which permits use of surface mining methods.6
The Missouri act also requires surface owner consent as a prerequi-
site to a permit. But its list of the forms of consent varies somewhat:
(1) express written consent of the surface owner; (2) a conveyance which
expressly grants or reserves the right to use surface mining methods; or
(3) a surface-subsurface legal relationship determined by a final court
decree.- The reason for the difference in the third alternative is that
the Missouri courts never have ruled on the surface-subsurface legal
relationship at common law where an express grant of the right to use
surface mining methods is absent.
4. Enforcement
The federal Act is administered by the Office of Surface Mining
(OSM) in the Department of the Interior. That agency issues permits
562. Mo. REv. STAT. § 444.890(4)(1)(2).(3) (1986).
563. Mo. REv. STAT. § 444.890(1) (1986). For regulations, see Mo. CODE
REGS. tit. 10, § 40-5.020 (1989).
564. SMCRA §§ 510(b)(6), 714(c), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1260(b)(6), 1304(c) (for
private and federal mineral estates respectively).
565. SMCRA § 510(b)(6), 30 U.S.C. § 1260(b)(6). The third alternative
acknowledges the common law of a few states which recognizes the validity of
the so-called "broad form deed" that allows the use of any mining method
selected by the miner regardless of whether that method was common in the
area when the conveyance or lease was entered into by the surface miner. See
Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956). This was true at the time
SMCRA was enacted. In 1987, however, Kentucky became the last state to
abandon the broad form deed doctrine and to require payment of compensation
for surface destruction. Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1987).
566. Mo. REv. STAT. § 444.835(2)(5) (1986).
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and monitors mining and reclamation activities in those states which do
not have a federally-approved state regulatory program.
OSM has been given the usual panoply of enforcement powers,
which include inspection, cessation orders, permit suspension or
revocation, civil injunctions and civil penalties.5 7
In Missouri, the state act is administered by the Land Reclamation
Commission, which is staffed by the Department of Natural Resourc-
es.' DNR has been given the usual enforcement powers, including
inspection, cessation orders, permit suspension or revocation, civil
injunctions, and civil penalties. 9
5. Citizen Suit Provision
Like many other federal environmental statutes, SMCRA has a
typical citizen suit provision which allows any person to bring suit to
enforce the act, following the giving of sixty days' notice and the failure
of OSM to initiate an enforcement lawsuit.570
The state act, unlike most Missouri environmental regulatory
statutes, does provide for citizen suits; it contains the typical prerequi-
sites, sixty days' notice and failure of DNR to prosecute an enforcement
action.
5 71
6. Preservation of Common Law Rights
The federal and state acts expressly preserve common law rights
and remedies.572
7. Delegation to States
The Act contemplates that implementation of federal surface mining
regulatory policies will be done by the states. It allows the states to
develop their own regulatory programs; if they incorporate federal
regulatory policies, the federal permit program is put in abeyance.
57 3
567. SMCRA §§ 517-18, 521(c), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1267-68, 1271(c) (civil penalties
cannot exceed $ 5,000 per day)
568. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 444.520, .810 (1986).
569. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 444.865-.870 (1986) (civil penalties cannot exceed
$ 5,000 per day). For regulations, see Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 40-8.030 (1989).
570. SMCRA § 520, 30 U.S.C. § 1270.
571. Mo. REv. STAT. § 444.880 (1986).
572. SMCRA § 520(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1270(e); Mo. REv. STAT. § 444.880(5)
(1986).
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In the absence of a federally-approved state regulatory program, a
federal regulatory program is to be initiated. 7 4
In order to obtain federal approval, a state regulatory program
must include a permit program, a process for designating lands as
unsuitable for mining,57r and enforcement capability." The state
program may include requirements more stringent than, but not
inconsistent with, federal requirements. 67   Also, it may include
sanctions in addition to those enumerated in the Act.5 7 In order to
assure adequate enforcement, the Act authorizes initiation of a federal
regulatory program if a state fails to maintain its enforcement pro-
gram.179  Alternatively, the federal government may enforce the state
program.mo
Missouri's act has received federal approval; hence, surface coal
mines must be permitted only under the state act, not the federal
at.581
8. Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund
The federal Act creates a fund used to reclaim surface coal mines
which ceased operations before the Act went into force. 2 It is funded
by a surcharge of $.35 per ton of surface mined coal and $.15 per ton of
underground mined coal.m Half of the funds collected in each state
or Indian reservation are allocated back to them respectively for
reclamation.8 The other half is allocated by OSM as additional
grants to states to use for specific reclamation projects,' such as
demonstration projects or reclaiming problem areas.
The Missouri act creates a state abandoned mine fund to reclaim
preenactment abandoned surface coal minesm which is funded by the
574. SMCRA § 504(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1254(a).
575. SMCRA §§ 503(a)(5), 522(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(5), 1272(a).
576. SMCRA § 503(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a).
577. SMCRA § 505, 30 U.S.C. § 1255.
578. SMCRA § 521(d), 30 U.S.C. § 1271(d).
579. SMCRA § 504(a)(3), 30 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(3).
580. SMCRA § 504(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1254(b).
581. See supra note 534.
582. SMCRA § 401(c), 30 U.S.C. § 1231(c). For regulations, see 30 C.F.R.
§§ 870-888 (1989).
583. SMCRA § 402(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1232(a).
584. SMCRA § 402(g)(2), 30 U.S.C. § 1232(g)(2).
585. SMCRA § 402(g)(4), 30 U.S.C. § 1232(g)(4).
586. Mo. REv. STAT. § 444.915 (1986). Missouri had completed reclamation
of about 1700 acres of abandoned mine lands by 1989, and 770 acres were in the
process of reclamation. Mo. DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, MIssoURI's LAND
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state share of the federal abandoned mine fund.s 7 It also establishes
a state Coal Mine Land Reclamation Fund to complete reclamation of
mines operated by defaulting permittees,88 It is funded by an
assessment of $.30 per ton for the first 50,000 tons sold each calendar
year and $.20 per ton for the next 50,000 tons sold.' 9
E. Protection of Water in Caves
Caves and sinkholes make apparently convenient places to
discharge wastes. That practice, however, poses a great threat to the
fauna living in the caves and to the quality of the groundwater and
surface watercourses fed by water in the caves. Cases illustrate this
phenomenon.
59°
Although the federal government has no statutes specifically
protecting water in caves, Missouri does. The Cave Resources Act59'
prohibits the discharge into caves, sinkholes, or underground waters any
substance that will violate the provisions of the Clean Water Law or
established water quality standards or effluent limitations. 92 The
prohibition does not apply: (1) to discharges made under a Clean Water
Law permit; or (2) where natural underground drainage systems are
used for stormwater drainage, artificial recharge of groundwater
aquifers, irrigation return flows, or artificial improvements to natural
drainage relationships; or (3) to underground mining operations.593
Violations are a misdemeanor.
594
RECLAMATION PROGRAM-1989 ANNUAL REPORT 5.
587. Mo. REv. STAT. § 444.920 (1986).
588. Mo. REV. STAT. § 444.960 (Supp. 1989).
589. Mo. REv. STAT. § 444.965 (Supp. 1989). When the fund accumulates
$ 7,000,000, or $2,500 times the number of permitted unreclaimed acres, the size
of the assessment is substantially reduced. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 444.960(3),
.965(2) (1986 & Supp. 1989).
590. See, e.g., Windle v. City of Springfield, 275 S.W. 585 (Mo. Ct. App.
1925), aff, 320 Mo. 459, 8 S.W.2d 61 (1928); Lynch v. Jefferson Township
School Dist., 6 Pa. D. & C. 343 (C.P. 1924); Lytton v. Steward, 2 Tenn. Ch. App.
586 (1876).
591. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 578.200-.225 (1986) (enacted 1980).
592. Id § 578.215-2.
593. I& § 578.215(2).
594. Id § 578.225.
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PART II
COMMON LAW DOCTRINES INFLUENCING
WATER QUALITY
Several common law doctrines determine the relative rights of
landowners to protection of the quality of surface and ground wa-
ters.595  They include the doctrines of private nuisance, negligence,
strict liability, and water use rights. In addition, the public at large is
protected by the public nuisance doctrine. By far the most commonly
used doctrines protecting surface water quality are riparian rights and
nuisance. 59 For protecting groundwater quality nuisance and
negligence are most common.
59
595. On the common law of water pollution generally, see 1 F. GRAD, supra
note 9, §§ 3.02 (1), 3.05(3); 1 W. RODGERS, supra note 9, ch. 2, at 28-168 (2d ed.
1986 & Supp. 1988); D. SELMI & K. MANASTER, STATE ENVIRONmENTAL LAW chs.
3-4 (1989). The last two books concentrate on the nuisance doctrine. Grad
discusses all of the common law theories.
This article does not address the problem of waste discharges onto the
surface of the ground, whether in the presence or absence of diffused surface
water flows after rains and snowmelts. But there is some common law on that
issue. In Missouri, there are three cases utilizing the private nuisance doctrine:
Bower v. Hog Builders, Inc., 461 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1970) (feedlot lagoon overflow
flowed onto neighboring land, causing odors); Manner v. H.E.T., Inc., 739 S.W.2d
724 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (construction erosion and debris flowed onto adjacent
land); Clark v. City of Springfield, 241 S.W.2d 100 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951) (city
combined sewer overflowed on residential land).
596. For a comprehensive list of pre-1970 cases throughout the United
States, see Davis, Theories of Water Pollution Litigation, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 738,
782-804. At that time, out of 444 reported cases, 136 used riparian rights law,
233 used private nuisance law, and 75 used public nuisance law. Id. at 805-06.
My recent unpublished research reveals 131 more cases of which 28 used
riparian rights law, 13 used private nuisance law, 10 used public nuisance law,
11 used negligence law, 7 used strict liability law, 9 used trespass law, and 32
did not specify a decisional rule. These cases will be listed in my forthcoming
book. See supra note *.
597. For a comprehensive list of pre-1974 cases throughout the United
States, see Davis, Groundwater Pollution: Case Law Theories for Relief, 39 Mo.
L. REV. 117, 147-63 (1974). At that time, out of 201 reported cases, there had
been 86 nuisance cases, 74 negligence cases, 24 strict liability cases, 2 cases
following percolating groundwater use rules, 4 cases following underground
stream rules, and 15 cases not specifying a decisional rule. Id. at 158-59. My
recent unpublished research reveals 80 additional cases of which 26 were
nuisance cases, 20 were negligence cases, 19 followed percolating groundwater
allocation rules, 6 were strict liability cases, 5 were trespass cases, and 4 did not









The nuisance doctrine is subdivided into private and public
nuisance. The private nuisance doctrine determines the relative rights
of landowners affected by the activities of one of them. The public
nuisance doctrine determines the right of the public at large to
protection from threats to the public health and safety. This section
discusses the private nuisance doctrine, while the public nuisance
doctrine is discussed in a later section.
Private nuisance is the most commonly employed legal theory
dealing with both surface water and groundwater pollution.
1. Definition
A private nuisance is defined as an unreasonable and substantial
nontrespassory interference with the use and enjoyment of another's
land." It is any nontrespassory act which impairs the fitness of land
for "the ordinary uses of life,"5 9 or any act which produces "a condi-
tion actually destructive of physical comfort or health, or a tangible,
visible injury to property."' The doctrine is directed at injurious
consequences of the defendant's activity, not at the predictability of the
contamination or subsequent injury or damage.
60 1
The private nuisance doctrine applies to pollution of surface and
ground waters.' The vast bulk of surface watercourse private
nuisance cases involve water supply contamination, odors adversely
affecting places of habitation, and soil poisoning.6 03 In the case of
598. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 88 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
822 (1979); W. RODGERS, supra note 595, § 2.3, at 41-42; Davis, supra note 597,
at 126; Comment, The Law of Private Nuisance in Missouri, 44 Mo. L. REV. 20,
21 (1979).
599. Mowrer v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 518 F.2d 659, 661 (7th Cir. 1975);
Kriener v. Turkey Valley Community School Dist., 212 N.W.2d 526, 531 (Iowa
1973); Bower v. Hog Builders, Inc., 461 S.W.2d 784, 795-97 (Mo. 1970); Sterling
v. Versical Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 319 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
600. Spartan Drilling Co. v. Bull, 221 Ark. 168,252 S.W.2d 408,410 (1952);
Bowman v. Humphrey, 124 Iowa 744, 746, 100 N.W. 854, 855 (1904).
601. Durrance v. Sanders, 329 So. 2d 26, 29 (Fla. Ct. App. 1976); Nelson v.
C & C Plywood Corp., 154 Mont. 414, 465 P.2d 314, 319 (1970).
602. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 832, 849 (1979).
603. Livezey v. Town of Bel Air, 174 Md. 568, 199 A. 838 (1938); Trevett v.
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groundwater pollution, nearly all private nuisance cases have involved
pollution of domestic and livestock wells. W4
2. Exceptions
Not all uses of land which adversely affect use of neighboring land
constitute nuisances. Although polluting, some are not considered to be
nuisances, but are dealt with under negligence law. Those land uses or
contaminations of groundwater pursuant to use of land which must be
conducted at that location, such as mining or oil and gas production,
fall within that exception regardless of the degree or nature of interfer-
ence.605  By contrast, pollution from manufacturing sites could
constitute nuisances, since they are not required by physical circum-
stance to be conducted at a particular location.
606
3. Doctrine Available Only to Affected
Landowners
Lawsuits under the private nuisance doctrine can be brought only
by landowners affected by the interfering activity. Because the doctrine
is designed to deal with disputes between landowners, members of the
public and governmental agencies have no rights under the private
nuisance doctrine and cannot sue.
4. Private Nuisance Doctrine Is Recognized in
All States
The private nuisance doctrine has an ancient lineage in the
common law. Therefore, it is recognized in all common law states.60
It has been applied to surface water pollution situations in thirty-nine
states ° and in groundwater pollution situations in tventy-eight
Prison Ass'n, 98 Va. 332, 336, 36 S.E. 373, 374 (1900). Of 233 surface water-
course quality private nuisance cases decided before 1970, 85% involved those
three classes of situations. Davis, supra note 596, at 749-50, 793-801. My
recent unpublished research does not affect this conclusion.
604. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Peoples Coal & Oil Co., 121 Conn. 579, 590-92,
186 A. 629, 634 (1936); Kinnaird v. Standard Oil Co., 89 Ky. 468, 474, 12 S.W.
937, 938 (1890); Davis, supra note 597, at 127.
605. Davis, supra note 597, at 127 nn.56-57 (citing cases).
606. See id.
607. Louisiana is the only non-common law state in the United States; it
follows the civil law tradition of France.
608. See list and citations in Davis, supra note 596, at 793-801.
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states.' It is recognized in Missouri l ° and has been applied in
twenty-two surface watercourse pollution cases811 and three ground-
water pollution cases.
6 12
609. See list in Davis, supra note 597, at 158-59, with citations at 152-55.
610. A classic Missouri private nuisance case involving pollution of diffused
surface water is Bower v. Hog Builders, Inc., 461 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1970).
611. Manhattan Oil Co. v. Mosby, 72 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1934) (oil well brine
polluted livestock water); City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 61
F.2d 210 (8th Cir. 1932), rev'd on other grounds, 289 U.S. 334 (1933) (inade-
quately treated city sewage damaged pastured); Frank v. Environmental
Sanitation Management, Inc., 687 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. 1985) (landfill leachate
escaping to stream polluted livestock water and killed fish); Stewart v. City of
Springfield, 350 Mo. 234, 165 S.W.2d 626 (1942) (city sewage polluted stream);
Smith v. City of Sedalia, 182 Mo. 1, 81 S.W. 165 (1904) (city sewage polluted
domestic and livestock water); Smith v. City of Sedalia, 152 Mo. 283, 53 S.W.
907 (1899), affg after remand by 182 Mo. 1, 81 S.W. 165 (1904) (city sewage
polluted domestic and livestock water); Smiths v. McConathy, 11 Mo. 518 (1848)
(farm animal wastes polluted domestic and livestock water); Bartlett v. Hume-
Sinclair Coal Mining Co., 351 S.W.2d 214 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961) (mine tailings
polluted livestock water and killed crops); Hillhouse v. City of Aurora, 316
S.W.2d 883 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958) (city sewage in stream caused odors); Newman
v. City of El Dorado Springs, 292 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956) (city sewage
polluted livestock water); Divelbiss v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 272 S.W.2d 839
(Mo. Ct. App. 1954) (oil well brine in stream killed livestock); Thompson v. City
of Springfield, 134 S.W.2d 1082 (Mo. Ct. App. 1939) (city sewage in stream
caused odors); Person v. City of Independence, 114 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. Ct. App.
1938) (city sewage in stream caused odors); Riggs v. City of Springfield, 96
S.W.2d 392 (Mo. Ct. App. 1936), rev'd on other grounds, 344 Mo. 420, 126
S.W.2d 1144 (1939) (city sewage in stream caused odors); Kent v. City of
Trenton, 48 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931) (city sewage polluted domestic and
livestock water); Fansler v. City of Sedalia, 189 Mo. App. 454, 176 S.W. 1102
(1915) (city sewage polluted livestock water); Luckey v. City of Brookfield, 167
Mo. App. 161, 151 S.W. 201 (1912) (city sewage polluted livestock water);
Kellogg v. City of Kirksville, 149 Mo. App. 1, 129 S.W. 57 (1910) (city sewage
polluted domestic and livestock water); Kellogg v. City of Kirksville, 132 Mo.
App. 519, 112 S.W. 296 (1908); City of Chillicothe v. Bryan, 103 Mo. App. 409,
77 S.W. 465 (1903) (city sewage polluted livestock water); Schumacher v.
Shawhan, 93 Mo. App. 573, 67 S.W. 717 (1902) (food processing wastes polluted
domestic and livestock water); Martinowsky v. City of Hannibal, 35 Mo. App. 70
(1889) (city sewage in stream caused odors).
612. Shelley v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 327 Mo. 238, 37 S.W.2d 518 (1938),
rev'g 2 S.W.2d 115 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927) (pipeline leak polluted domestic well;
damages granted); Village of Claycomo v. Kansas City, 635 S.W.2d 365 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980) (leachate from proposed landfill would pollute wells; motion to
dismiss denied, remanded for trial); Haynor v. Excelsior Springs Light, Power,
Heat & Water Co., 129 Mo. App. 691, 108 S.W. 580 (1908) (oil & grease escaped
into creek polluting domestic well; judgment for defendant).
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In recent years, the courts have begun to deal with contamination
of groundwater from hazardous waste disposal facilities, solid waste
landfills and petroleum leaks under the law of private nuisance. The
courts, not surprisingly, consider such contaminations a private
nuisance.613 Because of the grave danger posed by such facilities to
groundwater quality, courts have awarded punitive damages where the
defendant has failed to respond to the concerns of neighbors or has
acted in a wanton or grossly negligent manner.
6 14
B. Water Allocation Doctrines
1. Surface Watercourses
The riparian doctrine is employed universally by the thirty-one
states in the eastern United States to allocate water in watercourses
between users. First formulated in modern terms in Tyler v. Wilkin-
on,615 the doctrine provides that each landowner whose land abuts a
watercourse has a coequal right both to natural flow and to make a
reasonable use of that water, including consumptive uses. Reasonable-
ness is determined by comparing the uses made of the water by each
riparian and the relationship of those uses to the hydrologic characteris-
tics of the watercourse.61 Each state has had to emphasize either
613. Reliefgranted: Filisko v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 176 Conn. 33,404
A.2d 889 (1978); Pollard v. Land West, Inc., 96 Idaho 274,526 P.2d 1110 (1974);
Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Serv., Inc., 86 Ill. 2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 824 (1981);
Salter v. B.W.S. Corp., 290 So. 2d 821 (La. 1974); Village of Claycomo v. Kansas
City, 635 S.W.2d 365 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Dempsey v. City of Souris, 279
N.W.2d 418 (N.D. 1979); Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244 (R.I. 1982).
Relief denied: Chappell v. SCA Serv., Inc., 540 F. Supp. 1088 (C.D. Ill.
1982); Theriot v. Mermentau, Inc., 385 So. 2d 939 (La. 1980); Pirello v. Town of
Arcadia, 76 Misc. 2d 67, 348 N.Y.S.2d 950 (Sup. Ct. 1973), affd, 356 N.Y.S.2d
248 (1974); Durand v. Board of Coop. Educ. Serv., 70 Misc. 2d 429, 334 N.Y.S.2d
670 (Sup. Ct. 1972) affd, 41 A.D.2d 803, 341 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1973); Town of
Rolesville v. Perry, 21 N.C. App. 354,204 S.E.2d 719 (1974); see also cases cited
supra in notes 334, 335, 430, and 474.
614. See, e.g., Miller v. Cudahy Co., 858 F.2d 1449 (10th Cir. 1988); Sterling
v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), affd in part, reu'd
in part, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Bower v. Hog Builders, Inc., 461 S.W.2d
784 (Mo. 1970).
615. 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312). See 3 J. KENT,
COMMENTARiES 353-55 (1st ed. 1828).
616. Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955); Townsend v.
Bell, 167 N.Y. 462, 60 N.E. 757 (1901). On the riparian doctrine generally, see
A. TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, ch. 3 (1988-90); P. Davis,
488 [Vol. 55
78
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss2/2
WATER QUALITY
natural flow right or the reasonable use right, since they are inherently
contradictory. Most states have adopted the reasonable use emphasis
of the riparian doctrine.617
Missouri is a riparian doctrine state. Curiously, the Missouri courts
did not hand down a definitive decision until 1964, in Bollinger v.
Henry, 8 although an 1896 decision suggested adoption of the riparian
doctrine 9 Adoption of the doctrine was confirmed in 1972 and
1979,620 where the court accepted the guidelines of the Restatement
of Torts.6 2 ' The 1964, 1972, and 1979 decisions each emphasize the
reasonable use element of the riparian doctrine.
The riparian doctrine applies to waste discharges as well as to
water uses.2 The riparian is entitled to receive natural flow both in
quantity and quality.' At the same time, each riparian is entitled
to makes uses which alter the quality of that water, provided the
alteration is not unreasonable.6" Comparative reasonableness is the
Eastern Water Diversion Permit Statutes: Precedents for Missouri?, 47 Mo. L.
REV. 429,432-39 (1982); C. Davis, The Right to Use Water in the Eastern States,
in 7 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS 27-111 (1976 & Supp. 1978); Lauer, Reflections
on Riparianism, 35 Mo. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1970).
617. Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436,283 S.W.2d 129 (1955); Pyle v. Gilbert,
245 Ga. 403, 265 S.E.2d 584 (1980). For a functional analysis of the reasonable
use theory, see C. Davis, supra note 616, in 7 WATER AND WATER RIGHTs 1, 43-
52 (R. Clark, ed. 1976).
618. 375 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1964). For detailed discussions of the riparian
doctrine in Missouri, see T. LAUER, P. DAvIS & J. CUNNINGHAM, MSSOURI STATE
LAWS PERTAINING TO WATER AND RELATED LAND RESOuRcES 11-30 (Mo. Clean
Water Comm'n ed. 1977); Note, Reprise-The Rights of a Riparian Landowner
in Missouri, 49 UTMKC L. REv. 115 (1980).
619. Springfield Waterworks Co. v. Jenkins, 62 Mo. App. 74 (1895).
620. Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971) (dictum in a
groundwater case); Ripka v. Wansing, 589 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
621. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 850, 850A (1979).
622. See generally A. TARLOCK, supra note 616, § 3.13; Davis, supra note
596. For a functional analysis, see 1 W. RODGERS, supra note 595, § 2.19.
623. Beaunit Corp. v. Alabama Power Co., 370 F. Supp. 1044, 1052 (N.D.
Ala. 1973); H.B. Bowling Coal Co. v. Ruffner, 117 Tenn. 180, 100 S.W. 116
(1906); City of Richmond v. Test, 18 Ind. App. 482, 48 N.E. 610, 614 (1897).
624. Kennedy v. Moog Servocontrols, Inc. 48 Misc.2d 107,264 N.Y.S.2d 606,
613-14 (Sup. Ct. 1965), modified, 26 A.D.2d 768,271 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1966), affd,
21 N.Y.2d 966, 127 N.E.2d 356 (1968); Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v.
Hamilton, 100 Ala. 252, 14 So. 167, 169 (1893); Lockwood v. Lawrence, 77 Me.
297 (1885); Parker v. American Woolen Co., 195 Mass. 591, 81 N.E. 468, 470
(1907); Merrifield v. City of Worcester, 110 Mass. 216 (1872); Snow v. Parsons,
28 Vt. 459 (1856).
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standard employed in most pollution cases.62 An unreasonable
discharge has been described as one causing an appreciable or substan-
tial injury upon other riparians, not merely a slight inconvenience or
occasional annoyance.62 Factors to be considered include the extent
and nature of the wastes discharged, the locations and natures of the
riparians' respective uses, the extent of pollution caused by third
parties, the size and velocity of the receiving waters, economic and
social factors, and public necessity."e A right to discharge wastes has
been sustained in thirty riparian rights cases0 2 and expressly recog-
nized in five cases.
62
Missouri has followed the riparian doctrine in water pollution cases.
It allows waste discharges so long as they do not unreasonably interfere
with water uses and waste discharges of others.m
2. Groundwater
Groundwater allocation rules are used to decide pollution cases
much less often. Less than a handful of cases do so. The reason is
obvious: the rules followed in most states define those circumstances
under which water can be removed from an aquifer without any liability
for injurious consequences on other groundwater users. There is no
reasonableness element in the two most popular allocation rules.
625. Borough of Westville v. Whitney Home Builders, 40 N.J. Super. 62,122
A.2d 233 (1956).
626. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Hamilton, 110 Ala. 252, 14 So. 167
(1893); Tetherington v. Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co., 232 Ill. 522, 83 N.E. 1048
(1908); Muncie Pulp Co. v. Koontz, 33 Ind. App. 532, 70 N.E. 999 (1904);
Kennedy v. Moog Servocontrols, Inc., 48 Misc. 2d 107, 264 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup.
Ct. 1965), modified, 26 A.D.2d 768, 271 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1966), affd mem., 21
N.Y.2d 966, 237 N.E.2d 356, 290 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1968); Snow v. Parsons, 28 Vt.
459 (1856).
627. Red River Roller Mills v. Wright, 30 Minn. 249, 15 N.W. 167, 169
(1883); Hayes v. Waldron, 44 N.H. 580, 583-84 (1863); Townsend v. Bell, 167
N.Y. 462, 60 N.E. 757, 760 (1901).
628. See cases in Davis, supra note 596, app. A, at 788-89.
629. Donnelly Brick Co. v. City of New Britain, 106 Conn. 167, 137 A. 745
(1927); Ferguson v. Firmenich Mfg. Co., 77 Iowa 576, 42 N.W. 448, 449 (1889);
Dwinel v. Veazie, 44 Me. 167, 175 (1857); Hayes v. Waldron, 44 N.H. 580 (1863);
George v. Village of Chester, 59 Misc. 553, 111 N.Y.S. 722 (Sup. Ct. 1908), affd
mem., 137 A.D. 889, 121 N.Y.S. 1131 (1910), modified, 202 N.Y. 398,95 N.E. 767
(1911).
630. City of Cape Girardeau v. Hunze, 314 Mo. 438, 284 S.W. 471 (1926)
("reasonable use" applied in a sewer right-of-way condemnation case); Joplin
Consol. Mining Co. v. City of Joplin, 124 Mo. 129, 27 S.W. 406 (1894) (city
sewage rendered a stream useless for ore washing).
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Hence, there is no basis for incorporating a qualitative element in them.
A small minority of states, including Missouri, have adopted a compara-
tive reasonableness allocation rule. By analogy to a similar rule applied
to surface watercourses under the riparian doctrine, a qualitative
component may exist in the groundwater allocation rule in those few
states. A discussion of the three groundwater allocation rules operating
in the United States will illustrate the qualitative component problem.
a. Absolute Ownership Rule
The first groundwater allocation rule is the "absolute ownership"
rule. It provides that a landowner may use as much groundwater as he
wishes and at any location without liability for the injurious effects on
his neighbor's groundwater supply.63 1  Absolute ownership is an
application of the rule of capture, the concept that the landowner can
take and use all of the groundwater he is physically able to reduce to
possession by his well. This rule was developed in the middle nine-
teenth century and is considered the classic common law rule.6 2 It is
based on the premises: (1) that no one knows where percolating
groundwater moves underground; (2) that no one can predict what effect
diversion of groundwater will have on nearby wells; and (3) that a
landowner owns everything which lies beneath the surface of his land,
including groundwater.' Fairness requires that a person should not
be held liable for damage which he can neither predict nor avoid. In the
middle nineteenth century, knowledge about hydrology was nonexistent
and those premises were mandated by that ignorance. Although the
science of hydrology is well understood today, nonetheless, the absolute
ownership rule continues to be followed by many states.6m While it
631. See, e.g., Behrens v. Scharringhausen, 22 Ill. App. 2d 326, 161 N.E.2d
44 (1959); Western Md. R.R. v. Martin, 110 Md. 554, 73 A. 267 (1909); Gamer
v. Town of Milton, 346 Mass. 617, 195 N.E.2d 65 (1964); Rose v. Socony-Vacuum
Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 173 A. 627 (1934); Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49 (1856); A.
TARLOCK, supra note 616, § 4.04; Davis, Wells and Streams: Relationship at
Law, 37 Mo. L. REv. 189, 202 (1972); Davis, supra note 597, at 120 n.13.
632. The absolute ownership rule was first formulated in the English
decision of Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. Ch. 1842), and was first
adopted in the United States in Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855).
633. Davis, supra note 631, at 202.
634. My unpublished research of a few years ago shows that about 12 states
still follow absolute ownership: Alaska, Connecticut, District of Columbia,




Davis: Davis: Federal and State Water Quality
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
was unclear what rule Missouri followed before 1972, the Missouri court
expressly rejected absolute ownership in that year.
The theory of absolute ownership, that a landowner can use
percolating groundwater ,any way he chooses without liability for
injurious consequences, strongly suggests that injection of wastes into
or contamination of groundwater should not to give rise to liability.
There are no cases denying relief under the absolute ownership
rule.6 w
b. American Rule
The second groundwater allocation rule is the "American Rule,"
sometimes misdescribed as the "reasonable use rule." It provides that
a landowner may use as much groundwater as he wishes, but only on
his own land, without liability for the adverse effects on his neighbor's
groundwater supply.3 7 The use merely must be reasonable per se.
The rule does not call, however, for a comparison with the uses made of
the groundwater by his adversely affected neighbor. The American Rule
was formulated to mitigate the harsh effects of the absolute ownership
rule.' In effect, the American Rule is a limitation on the absolute
ownership rule, restricting the place of use to the landowner's overlying
land. 9 It, like absolute ownership, is an application of the rule of
635. Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
636. Davis, supra note 597, at 148. However, there is one case which
considered the granting of relief under absolute ownership, but denied it because
of procedural inadequacies in the case. City of Greencastle v. Hazelett, 23 Ind.
186 (1864). In addition, there are several cases which state in dicta that absent
negligence the absolute ownership rule would apply. None of these cases
indicate how the rule would be applied to groundwater pollution. See Brown &
Bros. v. Illius, 27 Conn. 84 (1858); Upjohn v. Board of Health, 46 Mich. 542, 9
N.W. 845 (1881); Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 307 N.Y. 328, 121 N.E.2d 249 (1954)
(by implication); Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 173 A. 627 (1934).
637. See, e.g., De Bok v. Doak, 188 Iowa 597, 176 N.W. 631 (1920);
Associated Constr. Stone Co. v. Pewee Valley Sanitarium & Hosp., 376 S.W.2d
316 (Ky. 1963); Chesley v. King, 74 Me. 164 (1882); Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc.,
251 Md. 428,248 A.2d 106 (1968); Bayer v. Nello L. Teer Co., 256 N.C. 509, 124
S.E.2d 552 (1962); Rothrauff v. Sinking Spring Water Co., 339 Pa. 129, 14 A.2d
87 (1940); A. TARLoCK, supra note 616, § 4.05; Davis, supra note 630, at 202-03;
Davis, supra note 597, at 120 n.14.
638. The Rule was first adopted in Hougan v. Milwaukee & St. P. R.R., 35
Iowa 558 (1872).
639. Davis, supra note 630, at 202-03.
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capture. Today the American Rule is followed by about as many states
as follow absolute ownership.'
Courts have tended to call the American Rule the "reasonable use
rule" even though it has no relationship to the comparative reasonable-
ness rule applied to surface watercourses (under the riparian doctrine),
to underground streams, or, in some states, to diffused surface water.
This absence of comparative or relative reasonableness has caused
considerable confusion among the courts in distinguishing the American
Rule from the third rule, discussed below. 41  The Missouri courts
clearly distinguish between the substance of the two rules, but not
between nomenclature.6
2
Just as there are no cases applying the absolute ownership rule to
groundwater pollution, until recent years there were none applying the
American Rule. 3 The concept of the rule, although a variant of
absolute ownership, ought to impose liability for offsite contamination
of groundwater, because the rule prohibits offsite groundwater use. A
recent case confirms that interpretation and imposed liability. for offsite
groundwater contamination.
c. Comparative Reasonableness Rule
The third rule of groundwater allocation has no commonly accepted
name. It employs the same concept of comparative reasonableness
adopted by the riparian doctrine for surface watercourses (and under-
ground streams), and in some states for diffused surface water. It
provides that a landowner may use groundwater only to the extent that
it does not unreasonably reduce the amount of groundwater available
640. My unpublished research of a few years ago indicates that 14 states
follow the American Rule: Alabama, Arizona, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and West Virginia.
641. On this problem of nomenclature, see Note, Water Law-Groundwater
Rights in Missouri-A Need for Clarification, 37 Mo. L. REv. 357-68 (1972).
Tarlock suggests that in recent years the courts are beginning to import
comparative reasonableness notions into the American Rule. A. TARLOCK, supra
note 616, § 4.05(1), at 4-9 to 4-10.
642. See Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
643. Davis, supra note 597, at 148. However, there are some cases stating
in dicta that absent negligence the American Rule ought to apply to groundwa-
ter pollution. See North Georgia Petroleum Co. v. Lewis, 128 Ga. App. 653, 197
S.E.2d 437 (1973); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Sawyers, 259 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1953);
Bayer v. Nello L. Teer Co., 256 N.C. 509, 124 S.E.2d 552 (1962); Schlichtkrull
v. Mellon-Pollock Oil Co. (No. 1), 301 Pa. 553, 152 A. 829 (1930).
644. Hughes v. Emerald Mines Corp., 450 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (acid
mine wastes polluted wells).
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to his neighbor. 5  Comparative reasonableness was applied to
groundwater use situations because both absolute ownership and the
American Rule were perceived to be unfair to the adversely affected
groundwater user, especially where the groundwater diverter was
thought to be overreaching. 6 Today comparative reasonableness is
applied to groundwater use in nearly as many states as the first two
rules.647 Missouri expressly adopted comparative reasonableness for
groundwater allocation in 1972, rejecting the other two rules, and
confirmed that adoption in 1979.'
The comparative reasonableness concept provides that each ground-
water user is entitled to use only that quantity of groundwater which
does not adversely affect another's use of groundwater to an unreason-
able extent. Since groundwater contamination can adversely affect
groundwater use by others, and since the comparative reasonableness
concept does contain a qualitative dimension when applied to surface
watercourses, 9 it should contain a qualitative dimension when
645. See, e.g., Jones v. Oz-Ark-Val Poultry Co., 228 Ark. 76,306 S.W.2d 111
(1957); MacArtor v. Graylyn Crest III Swim Club, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 26, 187 A.2d
417 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Koch v. Wick, 87 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1956); Higday v. Nicholaus,
469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971); Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569
(1862); State v. Michels Pipeline Constr., Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 278, 217 N.W.2d 339
(1974); Davis, supra note 630, at 203-04; Davis, supra note 597, at 120 n.15.
Tarlock suggests that the comparative reasonableness rule is a variant of
the western correlative rights rule of pro rata pumpage reductions in time of
groundwater shortage. A. TARLOCK, supra note 616, § 4.06(2). I disagree, since
the courts adopting the rule often analogize it to the riparian rights doctrine,
which incorporates comparative reasonableness. See, e.g., Higday v. Nicholaus,
469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
646. The courts first reined in large well users in cases like Forbell v. City
of New York, 164 N.Y. 522,58 N.E. 644 (1900). Soon thereafter, courts in a few
states began to apply comparative reasonableness to all well users, large and
small. Jones v. Oz-Ark-Val Poultry Co., 228 Ark. 76, 306 S.W.2d 111 (1957);
MacArtor v. Graylyn Crest III Swim Club, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 26, 187 A.2d 417
(Sup. Ct. 1963); Koch v. Wick, 87 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1956); Higday v. Nickolaus, 469
S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971); State v. Michels Pipeline Constr., Inc., 63 Wis.
2d 278, 217 N.W.2d 339 (1974). But the first comparative reasonableness case
came earlier. Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569 (1862).
647. My unpublished research of a few years ago indicates that comparative
reasonableness is applied to groundwater allocation in 9 states: Arkansas,
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii (artesian water), Minnesota, Missouri, New
Hampshire, Tennessee, and Wisconsin.
648. Ripka v. Wansing, 589 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Higday v.
Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971), applying the formulation of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1979).
649. Ferguson v. Firmenich Mfg. Co., 77 Iowa 576, 42 N.W. 448 (1889);
Parker v. American Woolen Co., 195 Mass. 591, 81 N.E. 468 (1907); Merrifield
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applied to groundwater use as well. A few cases indeed have held that
groundwater contamination which unreasonably interferes with
groundwater use by another does give rise to liability.65  Since
Missouri has adopted comparative reasonableness for groundwater
allocation, it ought to recognize the qualitative dimension to the rule.
4. Underground Streams
The three groundwater allocation rules just discussed apply to
percolating groundwater, water which oozes and percolates through the
soil."s l The absolute ownership and American rules are premised on
the assumption that the landowner cannot tell from the surface where
percolating groundwater is coming from and where it is going.
Therefore, it is not fair to impose liability when the landowner does not
have the information necessary to avoid injuring his neighbor's well. 2
By contrast, the comparative reasonableness rule acknowledges that in
modem times a landowner can and sometimes does acquire information
about groundwater movement and provides that he should not be
allowed to behave as if he did not have that information. 6W
Such considerations never have applied to the so-called "under-
ground stream."6 ' It is considered to be analogous to a surface
watercourse, with underground equivalents to banks and beds. But a
special rule applies to them only if they are discernible from the surface,
such as by a line of depressions, potholes or sinkholes, or a line of
water-dependent vegetation. 5  If they are not discernible, the
v. City of Worcester, 110 Mass. 216, 219 (1872); Stroebel v. Kerr Salt Co., 164
N.Y. 303, 58 N.E. 142 (1900); Davis, supra note 596, at 746-49.
650. Panther Coal Co. v. Looney, 185 Va. 758,40 S.E.2d 298 (1946); see also
P. Ballantine & Sons v. Public Serv. Corp., 86 N.J.L. 331, 91 A. 95 (1914) (stated
in dicta that comparative reasonableness would control absent negligence).
651. Finley v. Teeter Stone Co., 251 Md. 428,248 A.2d 106 (1968); Wheatley
v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855).
652. Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294 (1861); Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa.
528 (1855); Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49 (1855).
653. Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971); cf. Forbell
v. City of New York, 164 N.Y. 522, 58 N.E. 644 (1900).
654. Hydrologists argue that the "underground stream," with a defined bed
and banks, does not exist, except in karst topography. See Piper & Thomas,
Hydrology and Water Law: What is Their Future Common Ground?, in WATER
RESOURCES AND THE LAW 7, 10-11 (University of Michigan-Legislative
Research Center 1958); Tolman & Stipp, Analysis of Legal Concepts of Subflow
and Percolating Waters, 21 ORE. L. REv. 113, 121-24, 130-32 (1942).
655. Tampa Waterworks v. Cline, 37 Fla. 586,20 So. 780 (1896); Saddler v.
Lee, 66 Ga. 45 (1880); Jones v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 252 N.C. 626, 114
S.E.2d 638 (1960); Clinchfield Coal Corp. v. Compton, 148 Va. 437,139 S.E. 308
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groundwater is presumed to be percolating.6" When an underground
stream is discernible from the surface, the analogous surface water-
course rules apply; in the eastern states, that is the riparian rights
doctrine.' In most of those states, that means the comparative
reasonable use rule applies.
Courts have applied the same rules to pollution of underground
streams. A landowner may pollute a discernible underground stream
only to the extent that it does not unreasonably interfere with other
uses of that water.m There are no Missouri underground stream
pollution cases.
C. Negligence
The negligence doctrine has been used occasionally in surface
watercourse pollution cases. 9 It is used much more, however, in
groundwater pollution cases and is the second most common legal
theory employed. °
1. Definition
Liability exists under negligence law if injury or damage occurring
as a result of groundwater contamination is caused by defendant under
(1927).
656. Jones v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 252 N.C. 626, 114 S.E.2d 638
(1960).
657. See supra note 655.
658. Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline, 37 Fla. 586, 20 So. 780 (1896)
(reasonable use emphasis); Masten v. Texas Co., 194 N.C. 540, 140 S.E. 89
(1927); Kevil v. Princeton, 118 S.W. 363 (Ky. 1909) (by implication); Good v.
Altoona, 162 Pa. 493,29 A. 741 (1894) (natural flow emphasis); Rose v. Socony-
Vacuum Corp., 54 RI. 411, 173 A. 627 (1934) (dictum). See generally Davis,
supra note 597, at 137-39, 148.
659. See, e.g., Bunyak v. Clyde J. Yancey & Sons Dairy, Inc. 438 So. 2d 891
(Fla. Ct. App. 1983); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Stinson, 230 Miss. 533, 93 So.
2d 815 (1957); Ennever v. Borough of Bergenfield, 105 N.J.L. 419, 144 A. 809
(1928); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Petchiusky, 438 P.2d 475 (Okla. 1968); Atlas Chem.
Indus., Inc. v. Anderson, 524 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1975).
660. H.W. Peerson Drilling Co. v. Scoggins, 261 Ala. 284, 74 So. 2d 450
(1954); Kostyal v. Casa, 163 Conn. 92, 302 A.2d 121 (1972); Miller v. Cudaby
Co., 592 F. Supp. 976 (D. Kan. 1984); Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 69 Md. App. 124,
516 A.2d 990 (1986); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 202 N.J. Super. 106, 493
A.2d 1314 (A.D. 1985), affd in part, rev'd in part, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287
(1987); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn. 1986),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Town of East Troy v.
Soo Line R.R., 476 F. Supp 252 (E.D. Wis. 1979); see supra note 597.
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circumstances where he knew or should have known that such injury or
damage was reasonably foreseeable.6 1 The negligence doctrine is
directed at the predictability of the contamination or of the injury or
damage caused by defendant's activity, not at the degree or nature of
that injury or damage. 2 The comparative reasonableness standard
is used to determine liability. 3 The law of negligence generally is
applied to activities where there are neither unavoidable nor inherent
consequences. It presumes that, in the normal conduct of such
activities, injury or damage will not occur.6
Negligence law has been applied mostly to groundwater pollution
situations, although a few surface watercourse pollution cases have used
it. Most commonly it has been applied to activities which normally do
not pollute ground or surface water, such as leaks from pipelines or
underground storage tanks at service stations.6 In addition, negli-
gence law is applied to polluting activities whose location is constrained
by physical circumstances, such as mining and oil and gas recovery.W
By contrast, nuisance law generally has been applied to activities which
have a high propensity for polluting groundwater, but whose location is
not constrained by physical circumstances.6
7
2. Doctrine Is Available Only to Injured
Party
The negligence doctrine is designed to deal with injuries or damage
caused by one party to another party. Hence, the doctrine is not
available to third parties, members of the public or governmental
agencies.
661. Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 307 N.Y. 328, 331, 121 N.E.2d 249, 251 (1954);
Collins v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 131 Pa. 143, 159, 18 A. 1012, 1013 (1890).
662. Swift & Co. v. Peoples Coal & Oil Co., 121 Conn. 579, 588, 186 A. 629,
632-33 (1936); Ressler v. Gerlach, 189 Pa. Super. 192, 195, 149 A.2d 158, 160
(1959); Davis, supra note 597, at 125-26.
663. That is the normal standard for liability under the negligence doctrine.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965).
664. Long v. Louisville & N. R.R., 128 Ky. 26, 31-34, 107 S.W. 203, 205-06
(1908); Collins v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 131 Pa. 143, 159-60, 18 A. 1012,
1013-14 (1890); Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411,420, 173 A. 627, 629
(1934); Davis, supra note 597, at 125-26.
665. Davis, supra note 597, at 128-29; supra note 658.
666. See supra note 605.
667. Davis, supra note 597, at 128-29. This is confirmed for pollution of
surface watercourses by my unpublished research.
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3. Negligence Doctrine Is Recognized in All
States
Because it is part of the common law inheritance, negligence law is
recognized in all common law states.6 Missouri has applied the
negligence doctrine in six cases."
In recent years, the law of negligence has continued to be applied
to spills and leaks of hazardous materials which contaminate groundwa-
ter.7 0 Most of those cases involve situations where normally no
contamination would occur.
D. Strict Liability
The doctrine of strict liability occasionally has been applied to
surface watercourse pollution, but more frequently has been employed
668. See supra note 660.
669. Bollinger v. Mungle, 175 S.W.2d 912 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943) (gas station
leak polluted domestic well; no negligence found); Reddickv. Pippin, 421 S.W.2d
225 (Mo. 1967) (sewage lagoon overflow allegedly polluted domestic well;
allegation not proved); Shelley v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 2 S.W.2d 115 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1927), rev'd on other grounds, 327 Mo. 238, 37 S.W.2d 518 (1931) (pipeline
leak polluted domestic well; judgment for defendant); Chapman v. American
Creosoting Co., 220 Mo. App. 419, 286 S.W. 837 (1926) (creosote escaping from
ditch saturated ground and polluted domestic well; procedural error found);
Shelley v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 247 S.W. 472 (Mo. Ct. App. 1923) (pipeline
leak polluted domestic well; damages granted); Ozark Pipe Line Corp, v. Decker,
32 F.2d 66 (8th Cir. 1929) (oil pipeline leak polluted domestic & livestock well;
insufficient evidence to support recovery); see also Haynor v. Excelsior Springs
Light, Power, Heat & Water Co., 129 Mo. App. 691, 108 S.W. 580 (1908)
(dictum) (oil & grease escaped into creek polluting domestic well; judgment for
defendant).
670. Reliefgranted: Sterlingv. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp 303 (W.D.
Tenn. 1986), affd in part, rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Town of
East Troy v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 476 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Wis. 1979), affd, 653
F.2d 1123 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 922 (1981); Bracewell v. King,
147 Ga. App. 691,250 S.E.2d 25 (1978); North Georgia Petroleum Co. v. Lewis,
128 Ga. App. 653, 197 S.E.2d 437 (1973); Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Serv.,
Inc., 86 Ill. 2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 824 (1981); Ewell v. Petro Processors, Inc., 364 So.
2d 604 (La. App. 1978); see also Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 202 N.J. Super.
106, 493 A.2d 1314 (A.D. 1985), affd in part, rev'd in part, 106 N.J. 557, 525
A.2d 287 (1987); Lien v. Murphy Corp., 201 Mont. 488, 656 P.2d 804 (1982);
Vanvooren v. John E. Fogarty Memorial Hosp., 113 R.I. 331, 321 A.2d 100 (R.I.
1974).
Relief denied: Meehan v. State, 95 Misc. 2d 678,408 N.Y.S.2d 652 (Ct. Cl.
1978); Williams v. M.C. West Constr. Co., 579 S.W.2d 883 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).
(VCol. 55
88
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss2/2
WATER QUALITY
in certain cases of groundwater pollution.6 71 Some states impose
liability regardless of fault in situations where the activity is particular-
ly likely to cause groundwater contamination (in the "ultrahazardous"
or "abnormally dangerous" activity situation). It is most commonly
imposed in the mining and oil and gas production industries,672 and
in escape of hazardous wastes.
6 7 3
1. Definition
The formulations of the definition of situations calling for strict
liability vary between the states. Most commonly, "abnormally
dangerous" and "ultrahazardous" activities give rise to strict liabili-
ty.674 In nonpollution cases, Missouri has adopted the "abnormally
dangerous" activity definition. 5
The degree of care exercised by defendant and the predictability of
harm are not defenses to liability. That, of course, is what strict
liability means. Conceptually, the activity must be sufficiently
dangerous, either because of its propensity to cause injury or damage or
because of the great of extent of such injury or damage if it occurs, that
the person engaging in it should be expected to compensate for it; it is
considered unreasonable to expect the injured or damaged party to
assume the burden of injury or damage under any circumstances.
671. See infra notes 677-78.
672. Berry v. Shell Petroleum Co., 140 Kan. 94, 33 P.2d 953 (1934), reh'g
denied, 141 Kan. 6,40 P.2d 359 (1935); Yommer v. McKenzie, 255 Md. 220,257
A.2d 138 (1969); Bumbarger v. Walker, 193 Pa. Super. 301, 164 A.2d 144 (1960);
Watson v. Great Lakes Pipeline Co., 85 S.D. 310, 182 N.W.2d 314 (1970); Texas
Co. v. Giddings, 148 S.W. 1142 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Davis, supra note 597, at
136. See id. at 155-56 for fact situations of strict liability cases.
673. See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn.
1986), affd in part, rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Anderson v.
Cryovac, Inc., 852 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1988); Kenney v. Scientific, Inc., 204 N.J.
Super. 228, 497 A.2d 1310 (1985).
674. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS §§ 519-20,822 (1977,1979).
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2. Application of Doctrine to Water
Pollution
Ten states have applied the strict liability doctrine to groundwater
pollution situations,67 and three states have applied it to surface
watercourse pollution. 7  No state has rejected the doctrine in an
appropriate case. Since many states have not yet reported a suitable
case, one must conclude that the remaining 75% of states have left the
question undetermined. Missouri is among the states which has yet to
consider the application of the strict liability doctrine to groundwater
pollution situations. 8s  In recent years, there have been a few strict
liability decisions. 9
Remedies for the Public
A. Public Nuisance
The common law also recognizes rights of members of the public to
be free from the threats to public health and safety posed by surface
water and groundwater contamination. A classic public nuisance
situation would involve contamination of public water supply sources or
several neighboring domestic and livestock wells.68S Relief is granted
under the doctrine of public nuisance.
676. As of 1974, ten states had done so: Alabama, Illinois, Kansas,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
and Texas. Davis, supra note 597, at 136 n.105, 155-56. Since then, Montana,
New Jersey, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Utah have used the doctrine. See
case cited in supra notes 672-73, and infra note 679.
677. Florida, Kansas, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma and Texas.
See, e.g., Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975);
Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Anderson, 514 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974),
affd in part & rev'd in part, 524 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1975); Biddbi v. Henredon
Furniture Indus., Inc., 76 N.CApp. 30, 331 S.E.2d 717 (1985); State Dep't of
Environmental Protection v. Ventrom Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 468 A.2d 150 (1983).
678. Davis, supra note 597, at 155-56.
679. Lien v. Murphy Corp., 656 P.2d 804 (Mont. 1983); Wood v. Picillo, 443
A.2d 1244 (R.I. 1982); Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah
1982).








A public nuisance usually is enforceable only by a public official,
such as a public health officer or prosecuting attorney.68 1  If an
individual is specially damaged or injured, a public nuisance may be
enforced independently by him. That special damage or injury must be
different in kind, not merely in degree, from the damage or injury
suffered by the public at large.8 2 Special damage can include damage
to land sufficient to enable the owner to bring a private nuisance action,
or a personal injury action. W3
2. Public Nuisance Doctrine Is Recognized in
All States
Public nuisance cases involving surface watercourse pollution are
quite common, whether brought by public officials or by private
individuals suffering special damage.6
Until recent years there were very few groundwater pollution cases
applying the public nuisance doctrine.' But the number of cases has
681. Attorney-General ex rel. Township of Wyomingv. City of Grand Rapids,
175 Mich. 503, 141 N.W. 890 (1913).
682. Nolan v. City of New Britain, 69 Conn. 668, 38 A. 703 (1897); Bair v.
Central & So. Fla. Flood Control Dist., 144 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1962).
683. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 90 (5th ed. 1984).
684. Of 444 pre-1970 surface watercourse pollution cases, 75 used the public
nuisance doctrine, including 12 involving odors affecting habitation, 9 involving
domestic supplies, 14 involving public water supply supplies, and 9 involving
livestock supplies. For a list of 75 cases up to 1970, see Davis, supra note 596,
at 801-04. My recent unpublished research reveals ten more cases. See Carson
v. Hercules Powder Co., 240 Ark. 887, 402 S.W.2d 640 (1966); People ex rel.
Ricks Water Co. v. Elk River Mill & Lumber Co., 107 Cal. 214,40 P. 486 (1895);
Schoen v. Kansas City, 65 Mo. App. 134 (1895); Columbia River Fishermen's
Protective Union v. City of St. Helens, 160 Or. 654, 87 P.2d 195 (1939); Nolan
v. City of New Britain, 69 Conn. 668, 38 A. 703 (1897); City of Lakeland v. State
ex rel Harris, 143 Fla. 761,197 So. 470 (1940); Attorney General ex rel Township
of Wyoming v. City of Grand Rapids, 175 Mich. 503, 141 N.W. 890 (1913); State
v. Schenectaly Chem., Inc., 103 A.D.2d 33, 479 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1984); Twitty v.
State, 354 S.E.2d 296 (N.C. App. 1987); Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co.,
472 Pa. 115, 371 A.2d 461 (1976), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 807 (1977).
685. Of 235 pre-1974 groundwater pollution cases, 3 used the public
nuisance doctrine, 2 involving domestic wells and 1 involving a public water
supply well. Berry v. Shell Petroleum Co., 140 Kan. 94, 33 P.2d 953 (1934),
reh'g denied, 141 Kan. 6, 40 P.2d 359 (1935) (domestic well); Barclay v.
Commonwealth, 25 Pa. 503 (1855) (public water supply); Watson v. Great Lakes
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risen dramatically in recent years.' Missouri has not had any public
nuisance cases involving groundwater pollution, 7 but it has applied
the doctrine to stream pollution.
B. Federal Common Law of Interstate Public
Nuisance
State case law is not the only source of common law principles. The
federal courts also have evolved a common law which sometimes is
applicable. This law exists in the area of interstate groundwater
pollution.
The existence of a federal common law of interstate public nuisance
has two important consequences. First, it gives the federal district
courts jurisdiction to hear these cases without satisfying the usual
jurisdictional prerequisites of (1) violation of a federal statute; 6 9 or (2)
diversity of citizenship plus jurisdictional minimum amount in
controversy.' Second, it creates a source of substantive case law
independent of state common law.
For many years, the federal courts had evolved federal common law
in many areas, but in 1938 the United States Supreme Court abolished
the federal common law in most of those areas. In Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins,69' it held that a federal court had no general power to
develop its own substantive law and required application of the
Pipeline Co., 85 S.D. 310, 182 N.W.2d 314 (1970) (domestic well).
686. Since 1974 there have been 13 public nuisance cases involving ground-
water pollution. See, e.g., Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Serv., Inc., 86 Ill. 2d 1,
426 N.E.2d 824 (1981); Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D.
Mass. 1986); Lien v. Murphy Corp., 201 Mont. 488, 656 P.2d 804 (1983); New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); Wood v. Picillo, 443
A.2d 1244 (R.I. 1982); Neal v. Darby, 282 N.C. 277,318 S.E.2d 18 (N.C. Ct. App.
1984).
687. Davis, supra note 597, at 152. However, one case in Missouri involves
a classic public nuisance fact situation but does not state the theory by which
relief was granted. Windle v. City of Springfield, 320 Mo. 459, 8 S.W.2d 61
(1928), transferred from, 275 S.W. 585 (Mo. Ct. App. 1925) (city sewage
discharged into cave polluted spring and lake, and caused odors).
688. Stewart v. City of Springfield, 350 Mo. 234,165 S.W.2d 626 (1942) (city
sewage polluted stream); State ex rel. Wear v. Springfield Gas & Elec. Co., 204
S.W. 942 (Mo. Ct. App. 1918) (industrial waste polluted livestock water and
killed fish); Schoen v. Kansas City, 65 Mo. App. 134 (1895) (city sewage in
stream caused odors).
689. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
690. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The minimum jurisdiction amount in controversy in
diversity cases is $50,000.
691. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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appropriate state common law in diversity of citizenship cases. That
eliminated the federal common law in areas such as contracts and torts.
The federal courts continued to develop and apply substantive law
in those areas where the states had no jurisdiction to apply their own
law. One such area is interstate pollution.
92
1. Origin of Doctrine
For many years prior to 1938, the federal courts had applied their
own substantive law of public nuisance in cases involving interstate
water pollution..3 and interstate air pollution.69 In 1972, the Su-
preme Court held that the abolition of the federal common law under
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins did not abolish the federal common law related
to interstate pollution. In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,695 the Court
ruled that the federal common law continued to apply to matters
involving the federal relationship even when no federal statute exists.
The federal question jurisdiction extends to all areas of federal law, not
merely federal statutes. Since interstate water pollution affects the
relationship between states, a federal question is created.6e
2. Statutory Preemption
The decision in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee was predicated on the
fact that the lawsuit was filed when there was no federal statute
applying to interstate water pollution situations. The Court indicated
that Congress might preempt the federal common law of interstate
water pollution in the future.Y
Congress enacted the Clean Water Act in 1972.m It contains the
well-known NPDES permit system which requires that states which
would be affected by the granting of a permit be given notice and an
opportunity to submit written comments.6m It also provides that EPA
692. On the federal common law of interstate water pollution generally, see
1 F. GRAD, supra note 9, § 3.03(12); 1 W. RODGERS, supra note 9, § 2.14, at 120-
26.
693. See New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921); Missouri v. Illinois,
180 U.S. 208 (1901).
694. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
695. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
696. Id (citing Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971) (another
interstate water pollution case)).
697. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 107.
698. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §
1251-1376 (1986 & Supp. 1989)).
699. See discussion of the Clean Water Act supra notes 24-299 and
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may veto the granting of a permit when waters of another state would
be affected.7 °
In 1981, the Supreme Court held that those provisions of the Clean
Water Act addressed the interstate water pollution problem and
constituted preemption. Thus, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois"°1 held
that the federal common law of interstate water pollution had been
abolished. This means that the federal common law of interstate public
nuisance no longer applies to pollution of surface watercourses.
70 2
3. Doctrine Still Applies to Groundwater
The preemption of the federal common law of interstate pollution
announced in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois was based on enactment of
a federal statute comprehensively regulating the field. Such preemption
cannot occur in the absence of a statute. Since the Clean Water Act
does not apply to groundwater pollution,703 and expressly excludes
underground injection of water, gas or other materials derived from oil
and gas production from regulation, °4 that act could not preempt the
federal common law as it applies to interstate groundwater pollution.
Furthermore, underground injection of wastes is not comprehensively
regulated either under the Safe Drinking Water Act °5 or under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.7°6 Hence, there is no statute
which could preempt the federal common law of interstate groundwater
accompanying text.
700. CWA § 402(d)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2)(A).
701. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
702. National Audubon Soc'y v. Department of Water & Power, 858 F.2d
1409 (9th Cir. 1988).
In a recent case, the Supreme Court has held that the law of the state in
which the waste discharger is located can be employed in a lawsuit seeking
relief from interstate surface watercourse pollution. International Paper Co. v.
Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
703. The statutory jurisdiction is limited to "navigable waters," defined to
mean "waters of the United States." CWA § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). Those
terms reference surface watercourses and the courts have held they do not
include groundwater. United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp.
1127 (D. Conn. 1980); United States v. GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1379 (S.D. Tex.
1975).
704. CWA § 502(6)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6)(B).
705. 42 U.S.C. § 300f-300j. See discussion supra notes 301-332 and
accompanying text.
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pollution. As a result, the federal courts have applied the federal
common law of public nuisance to groundwater pollution.
707
4. Substantive Law
The federal common law of interstate public nuisance ought to be
substantively identical to the state common law of public nuisance. But
there do not appear to be any federal cases describing the substantive
elements of the federal cause of action. Theory suggests that the
groundwater pollution ought to extend across a state boundary or have
the capability in the future of having an interstate effect in order to
have a federal cause of action. The federal courts do not appear to be
in agreement whether such an interstate effect must be shown.
708
CONCLUSION
Today, regulation of water quality is scattered among several
federal and state statutes. Pollution of surface watercourses and of
groundwater is separated at the federal level, while they are integrated
in most states, including Missouri. At the federal level, waste discharg-
es from point sources are fully regulated, as soon will be point sources
of stormwater drainage. Regulation of nonpoint sources, however, has
not yet occurred, although recent federal legislation requires the states
to develop regulatory programs. Waste injection into groundwater is
partially prohibited under federal regulation and fully prohibited under
707. Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Solvents Recovery Serv., 495 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 1980).
708. The only federal groundwater pollution action extant did not require
the presence of an interstate effect. United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv.,
496 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 1980), held that an interstate effect need not be
alleged in a SWDA § 7003 (42 U.S.C. § 6973) "imminent hazard" action, but that
allegation of an intrastate public nuisance is sufficient.
That case maybe limited to its facts. Most interstate watercourse pollution
cases based on the federal common law of public nuisance have involved
interstate effects. See Ancarrow v. City of Richmond, 600 F.2d 443 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979). Indeed, Committee for Consideration of Jones
Falls Sewage System v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976) (water pollution)
and Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975), modified, 529 F.2d
181 (8th Cir. 1976) (air pollution), have expressly required an interstate effect.
However, several other pre-Milwaukee interstate surface watercourse
pollution cases have held that an interstate effect need not be shown. Illinois
v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980), vacated on other
grounds, 453 U.S. 917 (1981); In re Oswego Barge Corp., 439 F. Supp. 312
(N.D.N.Y. 1977); United States ex rel. Scott v. United States Steel Corp., 356 F.
Supp. 556 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
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Missouri law. Percolation of hazardous wastes into groundwater is
regulated at the federal and state levels under several statutes. There
is no regulation of groundwater pollution resulting from percolation of
nonhazardous wastes from surface or underground sources. Future
legislatures should fill those gaps in regulation.
Together the common law and equity always have provided relief
in the form of damages for past pollution and injunctions to prevent
future pollution. Causes of action for private relief exist under the
doctrines of private and public nuisance, negligence, violation of riparian
and groundwater allocation rights, and, for especially noxious or
dangerous pollutants, strict liability. Public relief exists under the
public nuisance doctrine. Those doctrines do not provide for comprehen-
sive reduction in waste discharges, which is why regulatory systems
were enacted. Nonetheless, recent cases show that the common law and
equity are doing what they have always done, providing relief from new
kinds of pollution.
96
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414 Organic Chemicals, Plastics, and
Synthetic Fibers
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416 [reserved]
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